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Hazard Vulnerability in Socio-economic Context: An Example from Ecuador 
 
Lucille Richards Lane 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
How people perceive the risks associated with natural hazards contributes 
to their willingness to take protective action.  Such action may be constrained by 
prevailing socio-economic and place-specific conditions that restrict or inform the 
choice of protective measures available to the individual.  Vulnerability to the 
impacts of extreme geophysical events increases when the range of alternatives 
is limited or misinformed. 
Many evacuees from a potentially violent volcanic eruption in Ecuador 
returned to their home town of Baños while it was still under an evacuation order 
in 2000 and considered to be a high risk area by officials.  The research 
examined four main questions: (1) What economic conditions confronted Baños 
evacuees?  (2) What political or other social events occurred while they were 
evacuated that limited their perceived range of options? (3) What information was 
available about prior eruptions of the volcano and other local natural hazards? 
and (4) What were the characteristics of the economic base of Baños?  These 
questions were investigated using data from interviews with evacuees, 
 viii 
 ix 
government and non-governmental officials, census and other statistical 
information, scholarly texts and newspaper reports. 
The research suggests that economic conditions made it extremely 
difficult for people to relocate to other communities.  When a violent eruption did 
not occur immediately, and few direct impacts of the eruptions were experienced 
in Baños, many people chose to return home in an effort to reestablish 
themselves economically.  These people perceived the volcano hazard in Baños 
to be far less threatening than the economic destitution associated with 
evacuation.  This perception may have been influenced by factors other than the 
socio-economic context, including efforts of political leaders and tourist business 
owners to effect the town’s economic recovery.  These efforts included an 
aggressive publicity campaign that minimized the risk posed by the volcano.  
Besides encouraging tourists to return, the campaign also encouraged evacuees 
to do so.  Finally, among some residents, religious beliefs may have contributed 
to perceptions that they would not be harmed in the event of an explosive 
eruption. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Natural Hazards and Developing Countries 
Economic losses from natural disasters are greatest in the world’s more 
prosperous nations but these events kill more people and have more long-term 
economic consequences for people living in countries of medium and low human 
development (IFRC, 2001; Smith, 1996).  This is not attributable to a higher 
incidence of disasters in these countries.  It is due in great part to the socio-
economic context in which the physical hazard occurs (Hewitt, 1997; Smith, 
1996).  This context can make populations more vulnerable to the effects of 
disaster. 
According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC, 2002), the root causes of disasters are frequently poverty and 
development that is not sustainable.  The Secretary General of the United 
Nations noted in 1999: “Ninety per cent of disaster victims worldwide live in 
developing countries, where poverty and population pressures force growing 
numbers of poor people to live in harm’s way…”(Annan, 1999).  The most recent 
data from the IFRC (2002) continue to support this statement. 
The problems identified by the IFRC are generally the result of the 
political, economic, and social conditions that exist in a particular country.
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These conditions may also reflect the nation’s relationships with other countries 
(Susman et al., 1983).  Ecuador is a country of medium human development with 
an economy that has depended for about three decades on price-volatile 
petroleum exports as its main source of revenue.  Ecuador is also a relatively 
small country, with an area of 283,560 km2, about the size of the state of 
Nevada, and subject to many natural hazards, some of them catastrophic in 
human and economic terms.  For example, an El Niño event in 1997-1998 
caused damages estimated at 14.5 percent of 1998 GDP (World Bank, 2001).  
The weather disturbance killed about 200 people, damaged approximately 
15,000 homes, many of them in low-income neighborhoods, and resulted in 
widespread loss of jobs.  The initial disaster was compounded by a dramatic 
decrease in food production due to the havoc caused by flooding in agricultural 
areas (World Bank, 2001). 
The number of hazards studies undertaken in developing countries is 
growing rapidly, but the socio-economic context in which these events occur is 
still under-researched.  Geographers were among the first to examine hazards 
across a variety of cultures.  Gilbert White and other researchers in the 1960s 
and 70s were pioneers in the field.  White and his colleagues were mostly 
interested in examining hazard perception and the choices that individuals and 
communities made in order to manage or adjust to the hazard.  The research 
was conducted in several different countries (White, 1974).  Geographers have 
also been in the forefront of studies that emphasized the importance of the socio-
economic context in which hazards occur (Alexander, 2000; Burton, Kates and 
 2 
White, 1993; Cutter, 1994; Hewitt, 1983 and 1997).  At least two multidisciplinary 
teams that included a geographer have made a study of the vulnerability of 
communities to volcanic hazards: Dibben and Chester (1999) studied the 
evolution of the economy of Furnas on the volcanic island of São Miguel in the 
Azores, and Tobin and Whiteford (2001, 2002) and Whiteford et al. (2002) have 
been studying hazard vulnerability within a health context in Ecuador.  Such 
studies, however, are still uncommon.  In the case of Ecuador, there is ample 
space for more geographical studies on the subject of vulnerability to natural 
hazards. 
This thesis is an attempt to examine, within a geographical framework, 
aspects of the socio-economic context that prevailed in Ecuador when a volcano 
in the central highlands became active after many years of quiescence.  It is 
theorized that context helped to shape hazard perceptions and contributed to the 
vulnerability of individuals displaced by the eruptions.  The research concentrates 
primarily on the people and conditions in one community, Baños, and relates the 
physical hazard event and local socio-economic context to socio-economic 
events at the national level.  Most of the events or conditions researched were 
identified as important crises in their lives by individuals who had been evacuated 
from areas around Tungurahua Volcano when it seemed likely that it would erupt 
violently.  Other topics were suggested because of the economic dependence of 
Baños on tourism, and aspects of its history and geographical location. 
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Baños and Tungurahua Volcano 
Baños, along with other communities at risk, was evacuated on October 
16, 1999.  The Ecuadorian government and local and international NGOs had 
potentially between 20,000 and 24,000 evacuees to house, feed and assist in 
finding employment.  Only a fraction of the total, however, sought assistance in 
the government shelters.  Most people tried to survive in whatever manner they 
could: living temporarily with relatives or friends, renting living space, or simply 
making a home for themselves on the streets of nearby towns.  It was a harsh 
world to have to try to survive in because economic conditions in Ecuador were 
dire for all but the wealthiest.  For the evacuees, displaced and dispossessed, 
the economic challenges must have seemed insurmountable.  The government 
was in no position to be of any great assistance because it was essentially 
bankrupt and three months after the evacuation, the president was deposed in a 
coup d’état. 
Economic conditions for the country at large continued to deteriorate 
dramatically in the weeks following the evacuation.  When the volcano did not 
erupt explosively as expected, and government assistance faltered, a movement 
developed to return to Baños.  In January 2000, the town was reoccupied by 
several thousand people.  Business and political leaders then embarked on a 
campaign to reactivate tourism, the town’s economic base.  Although officially 
Baños remained under the evacuation order until the end of August 2000, the 
effort to attract tourists gained momentum.  By January 2001 there were signs 
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that the effort was beginning to pay off and eventually, by early 2002, Baños 
appeared to have regained much of its pre-evacuation activity. 
Mount Tungurahua, however, continued its eruptive cycle and to present a 
high risk to the community located at its base.  Due in great part to the physical 
characteristics of its location, Baños would be difficult, if not impossible to 
evacuate successfully on short notice, the kind of notice the volcano had given in 
prior historical eruptions.  Regardless, for many reasons, some of which are 
suggested in this research, some ten thousand people returned to live in this 
hazardous environment.   
 
Organization of the Chapters 
This thesis, therefore, examines the effects of the volcanic hazard on the 
town of Baños, how people in the community perceived the hazard, and some 
factors, including socio-economic events and historical occurrences, which might 
have contributed to shaping perception. 
• Chapter 2 reviews the hazards literature on individual perception of 
volcanic hazards, evacuation, tourism, vulnerability and 
marginalization, and states the hypotheses and research questions; 
• Chapter 3 outlines the methodology, which included analysis at three 
levels: that of the individual, of the community, and of the nation; 
• Chapter 4 covers the physical and human geography of the study site.  
Topography, principal rivers, climate and soils of the area around 
Tungurahua Volcano are described.   Selected demographics of the 
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Canton of Baños are presented, and the political and economic 
geography of the town of Baños is summarized. 
• Chapter 5 describes the current spatial and temporal distribution of 
hazards from Tungurahua Volcano, and the historical record is 
summarized.  The chapter also provides a brief history of major natural 
hazards in the general area of the volcano and a list of significant 
hazards that occurred in Ecuador between September 1999 and 
December 2001. 
• Chapter 6 recounts the mandatory evacuation and dispersal of the 
inhabitants of Baños, the return of many people before the evacuation 
order was lifted and how they and their leaders effected the economic 
recovery of the town. 
• Chapter 7 shows the economic dependence of Baños on tourism and 
traces the development of religious and secular tourism to the area. 
• Chapter 8 focuses on the socio-economic context in which the hazard 
and evacuation occurred.  The country’s general economic situation is 
described and selected economic indicators are presented.  Data are 
also provided on the extent of social unrest that accompanied the 
economic crisis. 
• Chapter 9 provides conclusions and a timeline showing the 
concurrence of volcanic and other hazards, and of political, economic 
and social events.  Month-by-month data on inflation and cost of living 
are included in the economic section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
There is an extensive body of knowledge on individual perception and its 
effects on response to hazards.  This research has contributed to our 
understanding of how people at risk behave under conditions of uncertainty 
(Burton, Kates and White, 1993; Lindell and Perry, 1992; Mileti, Drabek and 
Haas, 1975; Palm, 1990).  The subset of perception and response to volcanic 
hazards is necessarily more limited but this area also has received considerable 
research attention and has contributed to how emergency agencies manage 
human response to volcanic hazards (Blong, 1984; Crandell, Mullineaux and 
Miller, 1979; Greene, Perry and Lindell, 1981; Mileti et al., 1991; Newhall and 
Punongbayan, 1996; Perry and Lindell, 1990). 
Much of the early research on perception, however, paid comparatively 
little attention to the social, political or economic context in which hazards occur, 
and how these factors might influence the manner in which hazardous space is 
perceived and therefore, how individuals or communities respond to the risk 
posed by hazards.  That context matters greatly to hazard studies, however, is 
increasingly recognized by researchers seeking to explain why the number of 
people affected by disasters is increasing in spite of technological advances and 
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improved prediction capabilities (Blaikie et al., 1994; Cannon, 1994; Gregory et 
al., 1997; Hewitt, 1983, 1997; and Maskrey, 1994). 
Hazardous events take their greatest toll on human lives and create the 
greatest human suffering in the less developed countries.  More than half of all 
natural disasters reported between 1991 and 2000 occurred in countries ranked 
by the United National Development Program (UNDP) as being of medium 
human development (MHD), while two-thirds of all deaths occurred in countries 
of low human development (LHD) (IFRC, 2001 162).  These are the nations 
where hazard studies placing perception in context are most needed.  The need 
is especially great in the case of volcanic hazards because there have been 
tremendous population increases in LHDs and MHDs over the past decades.  In 
many countries with active volcanoes more people are living in areas that could 
be affected by the effects of eruptions.  Due to the long return period of eruptions 
these are also places where no recent eruptions have occurred (Simkin et al., 
2001). 
The literature review examines four aspects of the overall body of hazards 
literature: (1) individual perception of volcanic hazards; (2) response to 
evacuation; (3) the role of the tourist industry in preparedness, response and 
recovery; and (4) vulnerability and marginalization.  It should be noted that there 
is considerable cross-over and interconnectedness among the research areas. 
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Individual Perception of Natural Hazards 
Perception contributes to how humans understand the world.  The “range 
of judgments, beliefs and attitudes” (Taylor, Stewart and Downton, 1988) that is 
formed in turn influences how individuals respond to hazards and hazard 
warnings. 
Volcanic hazards present special challenges to perception because 
eruptions produce a variety of different hazards that have different spatial 
dimensions and impacts.  Additionally, explosive eruptions generally have long 
return periods.  The range of eruption hazards includes lava flows, pyroclastic 
surges and flows, tephra, gases, lateral blasts, debris avalanches, debris flows 
(also called lahars) and floods (FEMA, 1997).  All of these hazards create diverse 
geographic areas of risk, and different degrees of risk, and all have somewhat 
different effects on those in danger.  These factors can make hazard perception 
complex.  Shield volcanoes are characterized by non-explosive eruptions and 
lava flows are regular but rarely fast-moving.  The perceptions of people living 
near this type of volcano, with constant but relatively predictable and non-violent 
activity, will be very different from those living on the flanks of volcanoes subject 
to sudden, explosive eruptions.  In the case of the latter, long periods of 
quiescence, from decades to centuries, many encourage dense settlements in 
areas that are in fact extremely hazardous (Blong, 1984).  When this type of 
volcano does begin an eruptive phase, those living in the area may perceive risk 
quite differently from the scientists studying the hazard (Crandell, Mullineaux and 
Miller, 1979; Mileti et al., 1991; Perry and Lindell, 1990), and some people may 
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even deny that there is any significant risk (Newhall and Punongbayan, 1996).  
Furthermore, some volcanoes may initiate an eruptive period that is 
characterized by non-catastrophic hazards.  During this period, populations living 
in the hazard zone may be lulled into a false sense of security and discount the 
possibility of a major eruption.  As people continue with their daily routines they 
may come to ignore warnings issued by authorities (Simkin et al., 2001). 
In addition to the characteristics of the hazard itself, a range of cognitive 
and situational factors contribute to shaping individual perception (for a review 
see Tobin and Montz, 1997).  Systems of belief sometimes contribute to 
acceptance of the hazard as an event ordained by a god or gods, impossible to 
evade.  Such beliefs may also affect willingness to take protective action (Blong, 
1984; Dibben and Chester, 1999; Murton and Shimabukuro, 1974).  Systems of 
belief may also determine what protective action is taken (Chester, 1993; 
Chester et al., 1985; Lindell and Perry, 1992).  Some researchers have found 
that gender and ethnicity may influence hazard perception but exactly how this 
occurs, if it does, is still not understood.  Researchers in the 1970s found that 
various ethnic groups in Hawaii had different attitudes toward volcanic hazards 
and females generally perceived the hazard to be more threatening than did 
males (Hodge, Sharp and Marts, 1979).  On the other hand, the role of 
experience in perception is much better understood and is related to the recency, 
frequency and intensity of the hazard (Tobin and Montz, 1997). 
Lack of recent experience with volcanic eruptions results in unfamiliarity 
with the consequences of the associated hazards and people may be reluctant to 
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take protective action.  Ongoing eruptions on the other hand, may make the 
hazard salient and people become more aware of potential impacts (Cola, 1996; 
Dibben and Chester, 1999; Hodge, Sharp and Marts, 1979; Perry and Lindell, 
1990; Punongbayan et al., 1996).  In the case of frequent but low-impact events, 
experience may translate into a false sense of security creating a potentially 
high-risk situation for the individual who bases future response on past 
experience (Johnston et al., 1999; Warrick, 1979). 
 
Response to Evacuation 
An evacuation is the removal of oneself or others from harm’s way and 
there is an extensive literature on the management and effects of evacuation as 
a protective measure (for a review see Perry, 1985).  There is an equally 
voluminous body of work on behavior in response to evacuation warnings (for a 
review see Drabek, 1986).  The review in this thesis considers only limited 
aspects of the behavioral foundation on which human response to evacuation 
warnings and orders is based, and some of the applications of these studies to 
the discipline of emergency management. 
Behavioral Aspects 
Some of the early models to explain how people respond to evacuations 
used rational choice and utility theories as the basis for explanation (see review 
by Tobin and Montz, 1997).  Since complete information rarely, if ever, exists and 
studies showed that individuals do not always act in what appears to be their own 
best self-interest, much subsequent research used emergent norm theory to 
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explain how individuals determine whether or not to respond to evacuation 
warnings (Perry, 1979, 1985 and 1994; Perry, Lindell and Greene, 1982; 
Quarantelli, 1980).  Although there are variations in the basic model, emergent 
norm theory suggests that under conditions of uncertainty, when presented with 
a warning to evacuate, individuals first determine whether or not the threat is 
real.  If the threat is accepted as real, the next question is whether if affects the 
individual and/or the individual’s family.  Finally, a decision is made as to whether 
evacuation, or a different protective measure, will reduce risk.  Whether or not 
the family is together or whether missing members are known to be in a safe 
place are almost always factors in the decision-making process (Lindell and 
Perry, 1992; Smith, 1996). 
Each of the three steps in the decision-making process may be influenced 
by a host of variables that circumscribe rational choice.  Among other factors, 
researchers have examined the roles played by age, gender and ethnicity; family 
traits; hazard experience and perceived locus of control; a variety of community 
and structural constraints; and prevailing health conditions (Tobin and Montz, 
1997).  Several of these variables are discussed in the above literature review of 
perception.  This approach has generated a bounded-rationality model to explain 
behavior. 
More recently, Gladwin et al., (2001) have used an ethnographic decision 
tree model to determine evacuation decisions.  These researchers argue that 
decision-making is more complex than some models suggest and that an 
ethnographic approach can capture “the richness of the decision process as well 
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as its messiness” (Gladwin et al., 2001 118), and thus provide a sounder basis 
for emergency management.  This approach includes criteria such as safety 
features of the home and discussions among family members as to the 
appropriate course of action, factors overlooked in existing studies. 
Many behavioral studies have focused on the reasons people do not 
evacuate.  Early research by Zeigler et al., (1981), as well as by Perry (1985), 
showed that people frequently wait for an official order to evacuate before doing 
so.  This finding emphasizes the important role that the source issuing the 
warning plays in ensuring the safety of populations at risk.  Reluctance to 
evacuate has also been attributed to fear that abandoned property will be looted.  
Although some researchers conclude such fears are mostly unfounded (Fischer, 
1994), looting is commonly thought to accompany most evacuations and this 
perception is especially prevalent in the case of evacuations in response to 
volcanic eruptions (Lindell and Perry, 1992). 
Additional research has focused on what has come to be known as the 
“crying wolf syndrome” (Breznitz, 1984).  If there is no disaster after a warning 
has been issued, people tend to ignore subsequent warnings, which can have 
serious consequences.  The management of evacuations in response to volcanic 
hazards poses special challenges in this regard.  Violent eruptions are 
devastating but scientists are still not able to forecast exactly when, or even if, 
they will occur (Chester, 1993).  This makes it difficult for authorities to decide 
when to issue an evacuation order or even whether it is advisable to do so. 
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Emergency Management Aspects 
In emergency management, evacuation is considered a generic protective 
mechanism, one that can be applied to a variety of hazardous situations (FEMA, 
n.d.).  Depending on the characteristics of the hazard, evacuation may entail the 
removal from harm’s way of only a few individuals, a limited evacuation, or the 
mass movement of thousands of people.  Mass evacuations are generally 
disruptive (Rasid et al., 2000 1).  In addition to the logistical considerations 
involved in providing safe exit for those displaced, the livelihoods of people are 
interrupted, and when an entire community is uprooted, its economic base may 
be destroyed.  
Some evacuations are spontaneous.  People anticipate the impact of an 
event, rising floodwaters, for example, and voluntarily move to an area they 
consider safe.  In other instances, people must be urged or required to leave an 
area.  The early studies by Zeigler et al. (1981) and Perry (1979, 1985) cited 
above were confirmed recently by Fisher and his colleagues (1995).  These 
researchers studied evacuation response to a major toxic fire emergency that 
occurred in Ephrata, Pennsylvania in 1990.  The study showed that people at risk 
were much more likely to leave if they were ordered to do so, even though the 
fire was an obvious threat.  However, while people ordered to evacuate an area 
will generally do so, compliance is not always prompt (Quarantelli and Dynes, 
1972). 
Another factor in whether or how quickly people respond is the credibility 
of the source issuing the evacuation order.  The more credible the source the 
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more likely it is that people will comply (Janda et al., 1996; Lindell and Perry, 
1992; Perry, 1985).  Compliance with an evacuation order is also much more 
likely if there is a safe place to go to (Drabek and Hoetmer, 1991), and 
assistance to leave the threatened area can affect evacuation rates in areas 
where few individuals or families have their own means of transportation. 
Evacuation may be an appropriate solution to saving lives, depending on 
the circumstances and nature of the hazard, either before an event or 
subsequent to its occurrence (Lindell and Perry, 1991).  To illustrate: hurricane 
evacuations generally take place before the storm makes landfall, but in the case 
of earthquakes, evacuations generally occur post-impact, and involve getting 
people away from areas where buildings or other structures have been 
weakened by the shock and might collapse.  In the case of preventive 
evacuations, the timing of the evacuation is critical because when a population 
has been removed from a potentially hazardous area, especially in the case of 
mass evacuations, the people who have been evacuated generally have lost 
their ability to earn a living.  This situation requires, among other actions, the 
provision of shelter, food, medical assistance, teaching for school-aged children 
and, frequently, the retaining of adults so they can survive economically in what 
may be a very different economic environment (Blong, 1984). These services 
may have to be provided for a long time (Blong, 1984). 
Under certain circumstances, rather than reduced exposure by removing 
those at risk, authorities may opt for sheltering-in-place.  The degree of risk to 
which people are exposed if sheltering-in-place is the option may be very high, 
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but this risk may be accepted so as to avoid the social and economic disruption 
of an evacuation (Lindell and Perry, 1992).  Even in small-scale evacuations 
authorities must provide sheltering for the affected population. 
Most evacuations involve coordination by authorities in one or two 
localities only; others require a regional response; very large scale emergencies, 
such as some types of volcanic eruptions, may require concerted action among 
states/provinces or nations (FEMA, n.d.). 
 
Tourist Industry and Disasters 
Many tourist destinations are located in hazardous locations and the 
number of tourists visiting these areas in recent years has been increasing.  
Consequently, the number of people in potentially hazardous places has also 
been on the rise (Drabek, 1995).  The role of the tourist industry in hazard 
prevention, response and recovery, however, is still under-researched (Drabek, 
1995; Faulkner, 2001). 
Tourists may be particularly vulnerable to the effects of hazards because 
they are generally in unfamiliar surroundings and they depend greatly on the 
availability and smooth functioning of local services, such as hotels or motels, 
restaurants, transportation – even hospitals.  Lack of fluency in the local 
language may make it difficult to understand hazard warnings or other 
emergency communications or result in misunderstanding of these messages.  It 
would seem then, that the level of preparedness, ability and willingness of local 
tourist establishments to assist travelers during periods of crisis is crucial to 
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prevent or minimize injury or loss of life.  This aspect of hazard emergency 
management was studied in the United States by Drabek (1995, 1992) who 
concluded that only larger companies had emergency plans and that “the overall 
record is very spotty” (1995 7), even in communities with relatively recent hazard 
experience. 
The economies of smaller communities that attract tourists may also be 
highly or exclusively dependent on a steady influx of people.  When the flow is 
interrupted, almost everyone in these communities can be adversely affected.  
The tourist industry frequently minimized the hazardousness of a particular 
location (Cammisa, 1993 in Faulkner, 2001; Murphy and Bayley, 1989).  Efforts 
to preserve the economy intact may partially explain such denial.  Minimizing 
perceived risk may also be a factor in the ability of a tourist destination to recover 
after a disaster (Murphy and Bayley, 1989), although recovery may be protracted 
and the site may never return to its former level of activity, as occurred with the 
hot-spring resort of Toyako-Onsen, located at the foot of the volcano, Mt. Usu, 
Japan, in the late 1970s (Hirose, 1982). 
 
Vulnerability and Marginalization 
Tobin and Montz (1997) have pointed out that so-called “rational” behavior 
designed to reduce exposure to a potential hazard does not always follow from 
individual or community perception of the event because a host of other factors, 
both internal and external, intervene to modify the expected response.  With 
respect particularly to external factors, these two researchers write that “the 
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individual may feel relatively powerless…when confronted with the realities of 
major political, social, and economic structures that serve to constrain individual 
activity” (Tobin and Montz, 1997 133). 
Such constraints or limitations obviously make the individual more 
vulnerable because appropriate behavioral choices that lead to preventing, 
avoiding or recovering from the disaster may not be available options. 
This particular aspect of disaster studies has been researched by a 
number of investigators including Blaikie et al. (1994), Cannon (1994), Hewitt 
(1983, 1997), and Wisner (2001).  Hewitt (1997) argued that vulnerability 
“depends, in large measure, upon ongoing conditions of material and social life, 
or their transformation” (167).  These “ongoing conditions” create circumstances 
in which risk is not shared equally by all people or groups in society and where 
the ability of some to recover when disaster does strike is greater because they 
have access to more resources (Cannon, 1994).  For disadvantaged or 
marginalized groups, particularly, the effort required to survive day-to-day is all-
consuming, and people may live in hazard-prone areas because it is, or appears 
to be, their only viable option (Blaikie et al., 1994).  The challenges that people 
routinely face on a daily basis may not allow them to worry about whether the 
river they live next to or the flanks of the volcano they live on are hazardous 
places (Maskrey, 1994).  Research in New Zealand, which included 
consideration of cultural and social factors, confirmed earlier studies that, among 
the less affluent, present problems outweighed consideration of possible future 
disaster (Gregory et al., 1997). 
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Vulnerability, however, does not affect only the poor.  Affluent people may 
also live in hazardous environments and may be very reluctant to abandon their 
possessions when disaster threatens.  They know that it could be difficult and 
perhaps take years to reestablish themselves in other locations (Dibben and 
Chester, 1999). 
Individual vulnerability to disaster is only one aspect of risk analysis.  On a 
much larger scale, the effects of natural disasters seem to affect some countries 
or regions more than others (Hewitt, 1997; Tobin and Montz, 1997).  These 
countries are generally countries of low- and medium-human-development (El 
Masri and Tipple, 1997; IFRC, 2001) or, as Wisner (2001) points out, they are 
nations with a “long history of political and economic marginalization” (2).  In 
these countries there is still ample room for research into the causes of human 
vulnerability.  To be successful, such studies must pay attention to what Maskrey 
(1994) refers to as “local specificities” including “local historical and geographical 
variations” (122). 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Two frameworks guided this research: individual decision-making was 
examined according to emergent norm theory and a bounded rationality model; 
vulnerability was examined in terms of a model showing the relationship between 
a hazard and the social, political and economic context in which it occurs. 
While emergent norm theory seeks to explain how individuals make 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty by progressing through a three-stage 
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decision-making process (Lindell and Perry, 1992; Perry, 1985; Smith, 1996; 
Tobin and Montz, 1997), the bounded rationality model suggests that a host of 
cognitive and structural variables affect the manner in which individuals progress 
through this process (see review in Tobin and Montz, 1997). 
As relates to vulnerability, Cannon (1994 21) identified three aspects that 
are important: livelihood vulnerability, self-protection vulnerability, and social 
protection vulnerability.  All three types of vulnerability are defined by income 
opportunities, livelihood type, entry qualifications, assets and savings, and health 
status.  Self-protection is additionally influenced by such environmental 
conditions as building quality, hazard protection and location of home or work.  
Social protection, besides all of the forgoing elements, includes such 
considerations as building regulations and technical interventions. 
The determinants of each type of vulnerability include class position, 
gender, ethnicity, age, the action of the state, technical ability or availability, and 
the characteristics of the hazard itself, along with the level of scientific knowledge 
and technical practices, and the science and engineering used by the state and 
dominant groups.  Cannon (1994) built these types of vulnerability and 
determinants into a model, elements of which were used to guide this research 
(Figure 1).  The model suggests that self-protection (willingness to take action, 
such as compliance with an evacuation order) might be contingent upon other 
aspects of vulnerability determined by the social, political and economic context 
in which the individual must make a decision when confronted with a potential 
hazard. 
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Figure 1.  Model showing the relationship between hazard vulnerability, 
and its root causes, in the causation of disasters 
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Research Hypotheses 
The literature review and the theoretical frameworks suggested two areas 
for investigation, therefore two hypotheses were advanced: 
(1) It was hypothesized that the socio-economic context in which the 
hazard occurred contributed to the vulnerability of people who were evacuated 
because this context limited the economic options available to them.  Research 
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was therefore conducted to examine the contextual conditions of the people who 
were evacuated from Baños, looking specifically at social, economic and political 
factors. 
(2) It was hypothesized that perception of the volcano hazard was 
influenced by specific geographic, economic and historical characteristics of 
Baños.  Research was therefore conducted into the spatial characteristics of the 
town and its development. 
 
Research Questions 
Several research questions develop from these hypotheses: 
1. How did evacuees and people who returned to the hazard zone in Baños 
rank the volcano hazard in relation to the economic, political or social 
context in which the hazard occurred? 
2. What were the economic conditions of life for people in Baños before, 
during and after the evacuation? 
3. What political events were occurring during and after the evacuation? 
4. What was the spatial distribution of hazards from the volcano?  
5. What other natural hazards occurred in Ecuador that may have provided a 
comparison of relative risk? 
6. What other local “historical and geographical specificities” (Maskrey, 1994 
122), if any, may have influenced hazard perception? 
7. Was the tourist industry a prominent actor during the return and recovery 
phases?  If it was, what was its role? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
The methodology consisted of analysis conducted at the level of the 
individual, and at the local and national levels.   This was achieved through 
personal interviews, a review of academic and other publications, and 
compilation and analysis of data from several statistical databases.   All data 
were subsequently consolidated and synthesized and placed on a timeline to 
show what economic conditions and political developments were occurring just 
prior to, during and subsequent to the evacuation of Baños.  
 
Level of Analysis 
Analysis was conducted at three levels: individual, local and national.  At 
the level of the individual, perceptions of the hazard, response to the evacuation 
of Baños and surrounding communities, and ranking of crises were analyzed.   
Local level analysis consisted of reviewing the physical, economic and historical 
geographies of the town of Baños and adjacent areas affected by the volcanic 
hazard.  National level analysis consisted of examination of the socio-economic 
context in which the hazard, the evacuation and the return to Baños occurred. 
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First level of analysis: review of individual perceptions of the hazard, response to 
the evacuation, reasons for returning to the hazard zone, and ranking of 
crises experienced. 
Data for this level of analysis were extracted from a study conducted by 
Graham Tobin, Ph.D. and Linda Whiteford, Ph.D., MPH, in which the researcher 
participated as an assistant.  The study examined the role of women in post-
disaster environments and consisted principally of the application of two 
structured questionnaire surveys. 
The surveys were applied on-site in Ecuador, in Spanish, in June 2000 
and January 2001, to individuals who had different evacuation experiences: 
people who had evacuated to a shelter in a metropolitan area; individuals who 
had evacuated and were working in a resettlement center in a small agricultural 
community; people who had been evacuated but had returned and were living in 
the town of Baños before the evacuation order issued by the authorities was 
lifted; and a control group consisting of individuals living outside the hazard zone 
and who had not experienced the disruption of an evacuation.  The June 2000 
survey consisted of 54 questions and was applied to 131 individuals; the January 
2001 survey consisted of 70 questions and was applied to 171 individuals.  Both 
closed and open-ended questions were included in the questionnaires. 
The steps taken with this first level of analysis were: 
Step 1: Both surveys were reviewed for questions that related to hazard 
perception, evacuation experience, perceptions of government assistance, 
identification of events or occurrences that respondents classified as 
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crises in their lives and reasons for returning to Baños.  Twenty-three 
questions considered relevant to the research for this thesis were 
abstracted from the 2000 questionnaire and 16 from the 2001 
questionnaire.   The questions, in English translation, are included as 
Appendix I and Appendix II respectively. 
Step 2: Frequency tables of descriptive statistics relating to the selected 
questions were generated using the software package, Statistical Program 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS).  On questions where there were 
insufficient data in one or more of the possible responses, and where 
grouping was appropriate, data were aggregated.  For example, the 
responses “high risk” and “very high risk” were grouped as “high risk,” and 
the responses “low risk” and “moderate risk” were grouped as “moderate 
risk.”   On open-ended questions which resulted in a multitude of different 
responses, these were grouped into broad categories.  For example, 
“Loss of Bank Funds,” “Loss/Lack of money” and “[Currency] Devaluation” 
were grouped as “Economic Problems.”  The data were further analyzed 
by selecting certain variables for cross-tabulation. 
Step 3: From the data analysis several themes were identified that suggested 
research topics that would help to understand aspects of the socio-
economic context of the hazard that respondents said were significant.  
These themes included principally political upheaval/change, currency 
devaluation, and the nation’s bank crisis, conversion from a national 
currency to the dollar, inflation, unemployment and underemployment.  
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Second level of analysis: review of the physical, economic and historical 
geographies of the town of Baños and adjacent areas affected by the 
volcanic hazard and of materials relating to the actual evacuation of 
Baños, dispersal of the population and return to the town. 
The steps taken within the second level of analysis were: 
Step 1: A site description that included elements of the physical geography of the 
area, including rivers, topography, climate and soils.  The spatial and 
temporal distribution of major natural hazards was generally described 
with more detailed attention given to the volcanic hazards of Tungurahua 
Volcano.  The site description was developed from scholarly geographical 
and historical texts, a study of topographic maps, and from field 
observations made by the researcher during four trips to the hazard zone 
(in June 2000, January 2001, March 2002 and May 2002).  The main 
sources for data on Tungurahua Volcano were Ecuador’s Geophysics 
Institute (Instituto Geofísico) and the Global Volcanism Program of the 
Smithsonian Institution.  Description of damages from the current eruptive 
cycle came from field observations made during trips to communities on 
the flanks of the volcano and to the west of the volcano in the Provinces of 
Tungurahua and Chimborazo, discussions with representatives of local 
emergency management and humanitarian organizations, informal 
interviews with local inhabitants and monitoring over a three-year period of 
print media reporting of the hazard.  Some of the principal physical 
characteristics of Baños and surrounding areas and of the volcanic hazard 
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were photographed to aid in understanding and illustrating hazard effects 
and the threat posed to Baños by the spatial characteristics of its location. 
Step 2:  A survey of the historical geography of Baños to help in understanding 
some of the principal socio-economic characteristics of the area today that 
appeared, from field observations and preliminary readings, to influence 
vulnerability.  These present-day characteristics included the town’s 
dependence on tourism for its economic survival, the position taken by 
some members of the clergy in regards to the evacuation, and the town’s 
historical ties with the Ecuadorian Amazon. 
Step 3: A brief study of the current importance of tourism to the town of Baños 
and, by extension, of the importance of Baños to national tourism.  The 
study was conducted using local and national statistics provided by the 
national Ministry of Tourism in Quito, the Provincial Ministry of Tourism in 
Ambato and by the local tourism authority in Baños as well as an interview 
with its director, a review of the tourism development plans of the 
municipality of Baños, newspaper reports, and informal interviews with 
local artisans, tour and hotel/motel operators.  Basic demographic 
information on Baños and surrounding areas, culled from 1990, 1995 and 
2001 census data were included in this study. 
Step 4: Description of the evacuation of the town of Baños in October 1999, 
dispersal of the population, and the reoccupation of the town in January 
2000 while the evacuation order was still in effect, focusing particularly on 
those aspects that might contribute to understanding individual perception 
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of the hazard and response to the evacuation as identified in the Level 1 
analysis of questionnaire survey data.  Source materials for this 
description included newspaper reports, TV news clips, video footage 
taken by participants in the return, official documents relating to the 
evacuation and to sheltering of the population, published reports by local 
and international NGOs, fields notes taken by the researcher during 
administration of the questionnaire surveys for the Tobin and Whiteford 
(2001) study, and informal interviews with local residents and 
representatives of local and national agencies involved in disaster 
response during research visits in  March and May 2002. 
Third level of analysis: review of the national socio-economic context in which the 
volcanic hazard, the evacuation and the return to Baños occurred. 
The steps taken within the third level of analysis were: 
Step 1: Collection, analysis and, where appropriate, graphing of statistical data 
on each of the topics identified as significant by individuals (from Level 1 
analysis).  Data were obtained primarily from the websites of the Instituto 
National de Estadística y Censos (Census Bureau), the Banco Central del 
Ecuador (Central Bank of Ecuador), the Ministerio de Agricultura (Ministry 
of Agriculture), the Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del 
Ecuador (Integrated Social Indicators System of Ecuador) and the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Step 2: Identification and analysis of additional events occurring in the general 
hazard area and in Ecuador at the time that might have contributed to 
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perceptions of relative risk.  The on-line versions of the national daily 
newspapers were the main sources for these topics. 
Step 3: Identification and listing of significant natural hazards that occurred in 
other parts of Ecuador while Mount Tungurahua was erupting.  The main 
sources were the national newspapers and the website of the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. One or more of the 
following were criteria for inclusion on the list: 
• one or more fatalities 
• 20 or more people reported injured 
• significant damage to property or infrastructure 
• livelihoods endangered 
Whenever possible newspaper reports were checked against other 
sources or one newspaper’s report compared against another’s.  
Verification of many of the reports was not possible.  
 
Consolidation and Synthesis 
The final step in the methodology consisted of combining level 2 (local) 
and level 3 (national) data in a timeline to assist in understanding the concurrent 
nature of the several crises to which the people of Baños and surrounding areas 
were exposed from the time they were evacuated in October 1999 through 
December 2001 when the town was well on the way to recovery.   For 
completeness, major political events and economic data starting in January 1999 
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were included in the timeline, although these predate the evacuation by several 
months. 
 
Notes on the Sources 
Two main challenges were encountered with source materials.  First, the 
available number of academic texts on Baños and surrounding areas was limited.  
The history of Baños, for example, was culled primarily from one text, written by 
an academic in 1954 and not published during his lifetime.  The text is 
unabashedly enthusiastic about the town and its inhabitants, and was published 
by the Ministry of Culture for the Province of Tungurahua in 2001 – subsequent 
to the evacuation of Baños. 
The second challenge was that statistical data were not as accessible in 
Ecuador as is generally the case in the United States.  This may be due in part to 
the fact that data are not always maintained or are not maintained in easily 
retrievable formats.   For example, details of crop production in Baños and 
peripheral communities at the time of the evacuation were provided by an official 
from hand-written notes.  It could also be due to the belief that statistical data 
might be used for political purpose.   Most data from the 2001 census, for 
example, were only available in mid-2002 as preliminary data.  The data had 
become a political issue and the Director of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
y Censos (INEC), the Ecuadorian Census Bureau, resigned in early 2002 
claiming that the national government was requiring that cost-of-living data be 
manipulated for political purpose due to upcoming elections. 
  
   
CHAPTER 4 
 
STUDY SITE: PHYSICAL AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 
 
 
Introduction 
Tungurahua Volcano (5,023 meters) is located in the Eastern Cordillera of 
the Ecuadorian Andes at 10 28’ S, 780 27’ W (Hall et al., 1999) on the border 
between the provinces of Tungurahua and Chimborazo (Map 1). 
The research concentrated on the town of Baños, in Tungurahua 
Province.  Baños is the largest community in the volcano’s high risk zone.   In the 
event of a major eruption, this town and peripheral communities could be subject 
to pyroclastic flows and lahars.  For these reasons, the area was evacuated in 
October 1999.   When the hazards resulting from the volcano’s ongoing eruptions 
did not cause major damage in Baños many people soon returned to live there. 
Baños is located at an altitude of 1,800 meters, so the climate is mild and 
relatively humid, compared with the harsh conditions that characterize most of 
the surrounding villages.  Built at the northern base of Mount Tungurahua, Baños 
is a popular tourist destination, due in part to thermal springs heated by the 
volcano.  The town has also benefited from its location in one of the few passes 
in the Andes between highland Ecuador and the Amazon basin. 
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Map 1. Ecuador: Provinces 
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This chapter describes the physical geography of the area in the vicinity of 
and immediately to the north and west of Mount Tungurahua.  The eastern and 
southeastern flanks of the volcano are sparsely populated and had experienced 
few effects from the eruptions, so are not included in this site description.  The 
section on the area’s physical geography is followed by a section on the general 
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physical and demographic characteristics of the town of Baños.  This is followed 
by an outline of the principal economic activities in the town and surrounding 
rural communities.  Finally, the historical importance of the location of Baños on a 
route between highland Ecuador and the Amazon is described. 
 
Physical Geography of the Hazard Zone 
Rivers and Relief 
Mount Tungurahua is drained by several rivers.  The most important are 
the Chambo and the Pastaza.  The Pastaza River is formed by the confluence of 
the Chambo and the Patate at a location known as Las Juntas (“The Juncture”).  
This point, northwest of the volcano, is approximately 6 kilometers west of the 
town of Baños, which is located at the volcano’s northern base on a narrow 
terrace between the gorge cut by the Pastaza River and the steep, exposed 
remnants of an earlier Tungurahua (Hall et al., 1999).  The Pastaza flows toward 
the east, bordering the volcano on the north before proceeding through a narrow 
pass in the Eastern Cordillera to the Amazon (Illustration 1).  In the study area, 
peaks in the mountain range to the north of the Pastaza attain heights of 
between 3,100 meters and 3,700 meters, forming an almost unbroken northern 
wall to the valley. 
The Chambo River flows roughly southeast to northwest, through the 
valley bordering the lower western flanks of the volcano (Illustration 2).  None of 
the mountains on the west bank of the Chambo is as high as Mount Tungurahua, 
but these mountains too form a virtually unbroken range with elevations from 
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approximately 2,900 meters (Chingazo II) in the south, to 3,800 meters (Cerro 
Mulmul), located near the confluence of the Chambo and the Patate rivers. 
Illustration 1.  Valley of the Pastaza River 
 
Lane, 2002
                                                                    
Looking east along the valley of the Pastaza toward the 
town of Baños (left of center). 
 
Illustration 2.  Valley of the Chambo River 
 
 Lane, 2002
 
Looking south along the valley of the Chambo, with the 
lower flanks of Mount Tungurahua on the left.  
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Both the Pastaza and the Chambo have been dammed by lava flows from 
the volcano during geologic and historic times (Hall et al., 1999).  The danger of 
such natural dams is that lakes form behind the dam.  When these fail, torrents of 
water descend the river valleys destroying everything in their path.  There are 
historical accounts of at least one such event. 
In addition to the regionally important rivers described above, Mount 
Tungurahua is drained by many smaller streams.   Of particular importance are 
the rivers Puela (a tributary of the Chambo), Vazcún and Ulba (tributaries of the 
Pastaza).  Numerous quebradas (ravines) form a radial pattern outward from the 
summit of the volcano (Map 2).  Lahars and other volcanic hazards have 
descended the three rivers and the many quebradas in prehistoric and historic 
eruptions.  The town of Baños is located between the valleys of the Vazcún and 
Ulba rivers (Map 3). 
The Rio Blanco, which joins the Chambo in the southern section of the 
study area, does not drain the volcano directly, but is an important physical 
feature because it has been associated with two non-volcanic natural disasters 
that severely impacted people, infrastructure and agriculture in the area during 
the study period. 
Portions of the local relief are extreme.  The flanks of Mount Tungurahua 
have a grade of 300 to 350 (Hall et al., 1999) (Map 4), and some of the ravines 
draining the volcano have slopes approaching 700 (Kirkby, 1981).   Parts of the 
valley of the Vazcún River have slopes nearing 600. 
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Map 2.  Communities, rivers and ravines on the flanks 
of Tungurahua Volcano 
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The highlands to the west of the Chambo River, where there has been 
significant ash fall, are characterized by broad, undulating plains.  Despite the 
altitude, many of these areas support intensive agriculture.  This is typical of 
parts of Quero Canton in Tungurahua Province (Illustration 3). 
Illustration 3.  High plains in Tungurahua Province 
 
 
Lane, 2002 
 
These farms, west of Mount Tungurahua, are directly 
in the path of ash emissions from the volcano, which 
is partly visible in the background. 
 
Climate and Soils 
Climate in the area varies greatly.  Because the study area is located near 
the Equator, temperature is determined by elevation more than by any other 
factor.  Additionally, there can be large variances between nighttime and daytime 
temperatures.  The period from April/May through July/August is considered 
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winter.  The prevailing winds blow from east to west and bring moisture-laden 
clouds from the Amazon basin.  A rain shadow effect is noticeable on many 
slopes.  In general, lower elevations are drier than higher ones (Kirby, 1981). 
It may take thousands of years for soils that develop near volcanoes to 
acquire enough organic matter so they have good capacity for water retention 
(Huttel et al., 1999).  The soils closest to Mount Tungurahua contain more ash 
than those farther to the south along the valley of the Chambo River (Kirby, 
1981).  Where the grade is steep (between 250 and 700), which is the case of 
much of the land on the flanks of Tungurahua, the upper, fertile layers of soil 
have been eroded, exposing the underlying hardpan, known locally as cangaua 
(CEPEIGE, 1997).  This applies to many of the lands in the valley of the Pastaza 
River, near the town of Baños, where the development of large-scale, intensive 
agriculture has not been possible for the most part, and where existing 
agricultural activities are further eroding the soil (CEPEIGE, 1997). 
 
Baños 
The town of Baños is the seat of the Canton of Baños, which occupies an 
area of 1,056.0 km2 and is divided administratively into one urban and four rural 
parishes: Baños (urban) and Lligua, Ulba, Rio Verde and Rio Negro (Map 5).  In 
1995, the urban area of Baños occupied one square kilometer and population 
density in the downtown area was approximately 180 people per hectare 
(Asociación de Municipalidades del Ecuador – Municipio Baños de Agua Santa, 
1996). 
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Map 5.  Canton of Baños: Parishes 
Canton of Baños: Parishes
Adapted from: CEPEIGE, 1997 Lane, 2002
N
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Baños, Lligua and Ulba were the parishes most directly affected by the 
volcano and the evacuation, but the entire canton suffered economically as a 
result of closure of the highway between Ambato and the Oriente which passes 
through the town of Baños and neighboring communities. 
The Pastaza River runs through the canton from west to east, and most of 
the population is concentrated in the narrow valley formed by the river.  Baños is 
located at an altitude of 1,800 meters, on a narrow shelf between the gorge of 
the Pastaza River (Illustration 4), and the valleys of the Vazcún River to the west 
and the Ulba River to the east.   
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Illustration 4.  Pastaza River gorge at Baños 
 
Lane, 2002 
                                                                                                                
The narrow suspension bridge was the only way to exit directly from downtown 
Baños over the Pastaza River during the time research was conducted.  A dirt 
path, used for pedestrian and animal traffic, zigzagged down from the level of the 
town to the bridge, a difference in elevation of about 100 meters.  A new bridge 
was planned for the same location but built higher up the canyon walls, nearly at 
street level in Baños, to enable faster evacuation.  In August 2002 construction 
had not been completed. 
 
The valleys of the Vazcún and Ulba rivers were conduits for lahars during 
historical eruptions in 1773, 1886, 1916 and 1918, and a large pyroclastic flow 
descended the valley of the Vazcún in 1918 (Instituto Geofísico, 2002). 
 
Demographics 
In 2001, 73 percent of the cantonal population of 16,136 was concentrated 
in the parish of Baños.  Eighty-eight percent of parish inhabitants were in the 
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cantonal seat, the town of Baños (Figure 2).  This population made Baños the 
largest community in the high risk zone. 
Figure 2.  Distribution of population in Baños Canton 
Distribution of population in Baños Canton 
(2001 Census)
65%8%
2%
7%
7%
11%
Baños (town)
Baños (periphery)
Lligua 
Rio Negro
Rio Verde
Ulba
 
                   Data obtained from INEC statistics, 2001 Census 
 
According to Ecuadorian Red Cross data, approximately 17,000 people 
were evacuated in October 1999 from the hazardous areas in and around Baños 
(Ecuadorian Red Cross, 1999), somewhat more than the total cantonal 
population registered in the 2001 Census.  Local officials estimated in March 
2002 that only 60 percent of evacuees had returned to the hazardous areas. 
Since the 1990 census, the cantonal seat, Baños, and its urban periphery 
have grown at the expense of the rural parishes, but the overall population of the 
canton has changed by only 4.7 percent (Table 1). 
Table 1.  Population growth in the Canton of Baños 
Census 
year Baños Lligua 
Rio 
Negro 
Rio 
Verde Ulba Total 
1990 10,991 431 1,047 1,040 1,907 15,416 
2001 11,828 311 1,086 1,056 1,855 16,136 
                                            Data obtained from INEC 1990 and 2001 Censuses 
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No data were available for the town exclusively but, given the skewed 
distribution of population, data for the canton are taken as representative of the 
town.  Based on the 1990 Census, literacy rates were high: 19.4 percent of the 
population had completed secondary school.  This was higher than in any other 
canton in Tungurahua Province with the exception of Ambato, which includes the 
provincial capital and where literacy rates were 24.8 percent.  The incidence of 
illiteracy was second to lowest in the province: only 8.7 percent of the population 
of Baños could not read or write, which compared with 12.6 percent in Ambato 
Canton, and an overall average of 14.0 percent for the province.  Baños also had 
a high percentage of college-educated people (9.1 percent), exceeded only by 
the percentage in Ambato (14.8 percent) (SIISE, n.d.). 
The level of education may possibly be reflected in the poverty rates 
which, based on 1995 data, showed a similar pattern of relative wellbeing: 
Baños, at 63.0 percent, had the lowest rate of poverty of consumption in 
Tungurahua Province, where the average rate was 74.1 percent (SIISE, n.d.).  
Separate data indicated that the Canton of Baños also had the lowest 
percentage of population with basic needs unmet (Guzmán, 2001). 
Economic Bases of the Town of Baños and Peripheral Communities 
The principal economic activity in Baños was tourism.  Because of its 
importance, this activity is described separately in Chapter 6.  The most 
important industrial feature of the canton was the hydroelectric dam across the 
Pastaza at Agoyán, a few kilometers east of Baños.  The facility generated 
approximately 15 percent of Ecuador’s electricity (Kielmas, 1999) (Map 6). 
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The most important commercial agricultural activity was aviculture.  In late 
1999 local ranches had a population of more than 250,000 chickens, of which 
200,000 were on farms in Agoyán, east of the town of Baños.  Subsistence 
farming, on minifundios of mostly between ¼ and ½ hectare, was important for 
families in the communities of Cusúa, Juive Grande, Pondoa, Juive Chico, Pititig, 
Lligua, Illuchi, Lligniay, El Recreo, San Vicente, Santa Ana, Ulba, Agoyán, Santa 
Rosa de Runtún and Bellavista (Illustration 5).  With the exception of Cusúa, all 
of these communities are in the Canton of Baños.  Cusúa is in Pelileo Canton but 
because of its proximity to the town of Baños, for planning and evacuation 
purposes, it was included with Baños by Civil Defense authorities.  Small farms 
in, and near these communities produced surplus that helped supply local 
markets, principally in Baños.  Corn was important locally, as were crops of 
beans and tree tomatoes.  At the higher elevations there were plantings of crops 
such as onions and potatoes; at the lower elevations, farming activity included 
small orchards of tropical or subtropical fruits.   Much of the area in the parish of 
Baños was in pasture.  Farm families typically owned two or three cows and pigs, 
in addition to a few chickens.  Equines, mostly asses, were used primarily for 
farm work and transportation (Ministerio de Agricultura, 1999). 
No data on the actual populations of these rural communities were 
available but Ministry of Agriculture data listed approximately 750 rural homes 
scattered throughout the area.  Rural families generally consisted of at least five 
to six people so there were possibly between 3,700 and 4,500 people living on 
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area small farms at the time of the evacuation in October 1999 (Ministerio de 
Agricultura, 1999). 
Illustration 5.  Farm in Ulba River valley 
 
Lane, 2002 
 
Small farms, like the one in the foreground, are located 
throughout the valley of the Ulba and in the valleys of other 
rivers in the hazard area.  Lahars descended the Ulba valley 
in 1886, 1916 and 1918.  In some areas the slopes angle as 
much as 60 to 70 degrees. 
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Gateway Between East and West 
The town of Baños is located in one of less than a handful of passes in the 
Ecuadorian Andes between the high intermontane central valley and the Amazon 
basin.  The town’s development has been closely associated with its 
geographical location. 
The narrow passageway created by the Pastaza River through the 
Eastern Cordillera of the Andes was the conduit for successive movements of 
people between the regions east and west of the mountain chain.  Small bands 
of pre-Colombian tribes may have moved up the Pastaza from the Amazon and 
established temporary communities in the area where Baños was subsequently 
founded (Reyes, 2001), although most authorities maintain that among these 
peoples, the Puruhá entered the high inter-Andean valley from points north and 
south of Tungurahua.  Regardless, once established in the central Andean 
region, the Puruhá kept in contact with the Amazon region by using the valley of 
the Pastaza (Gomez, 1999), and shortly after the Spanish arrived in Ecuador in 
the 1530s, this was the route these indigenous people used to withdraw to the 
safety of the Amazon (Reyes, 2001). 
The Spaniards came to the area in 1541 looking for silver mines that, 
according to legend, were at the base of Tungurahua.  The Spanish Crown 
consolidated its sovereignty over the area by granting land and mining rights.  
This firmly established the Spanish presence in the valley of the Pastaza and 
along the Chambo and Patate rivers. 
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It was left to the Dominicans though to establish a permanent settlement, 
which they did in 1553, and which they named Pueblo del Espíritu Santo, later to 
become Baños (“Baths” in English).  From Baños the religious order extended 
the Catholic religion and the domain of Spain into the Oriente, or Amazon.  By 
1583, the place that started as a simple shrine had become an important center 
for pilgrims who may have come from as far away as Lima in Peru (Reyes, 
2001). 
By 1628, the path through Baños had become the main route between 
Riobamba and the Amazon region.  In the early 1600s the Jesuits, like the 
Dominicans, were also advancing along the Pastaza, but in the opposite 
direction, from east to west, having come up the Amazon and its tributary the 
Bobonaza (Zúñiga, 1977).  The Jesuits finally made it all the way through in 1655 
and established themselves in the valley of the Patate (Reyes, 2001), to the 
northwest of Baños.   In 1743, an Ecuadorian scientist, Pedro Vicente 
Maldonado, who was also a former governor of Esmeraldas Province and the 
owner of property that extended from Cusúa near Baños all the way to Canelos 
in the Amazon, followed the same route that the Jesuits had used but in the 
opposite direction.  He proceeded from west to east, in order to meet up with a 
French scientific expedition (Zúñiga, 1977). 
In the 1750s, the Spanish government realized that the valley of the 
Pastaza was a more convenient and accessible means of reaching the Tierra de 
la Canela (Land of Cinnamon) than the more northerly route taken earlier by 
Gonzalo Pizarro and Francisco de Orellana in their search for the land of spices 
 49 
(Rudolph, 1991).  From this time on, Baños became an important point for 
exploration of the Amazon region and of Spanish efforts to halt the westward 
advance of Portuguese and Brazilians (Reyes, 2001).  After the independence 
movements in Spanish-America in the early 1800s, Ecuadorian incursions into 
the Amazon region came into direct conflict with Peruvian interests in the area.  
Baños, because of its strategic location in the east-west pass, was the “jumping 
off” point for many expeditions into the contested territory (Reyes, 2001). 
The pass in the Eastern Cordillera carved by the Pastaza River continues 
to be strategically important today.  Among other efforts to further develop its 
economic base, the town of Baños was positioning itself as the launching point 
for ecotourism to the Amazon (Municipalidad Baños de Agua Santa – Ministerio 
de Turismo, 2002), the fastest-growing segment of the tourist industry in 
Ecuador. 
Prior to the eruption and evacuation of Baños in 1999, the Ecuadorian 
government signed an agreement with an Argentinian firm for a multimillion-dollar 
highway construction project to improve the existing narrow, mostly unpaved 
road between Baños and Puyo in the southern portion of Pastaza Province 
where oil exploration activities are underway.  Subsequently, two Ecuadorian 
presidents, Alvaro Noboa and Lúcio Gutierrez, placed funding and completion of 
the road on their agendas when meeting with their Argentinian counterparts (La 
Hora, March 5, 2000; El Comercio, December 5, 2002), highlighting the 
importance of this east-west route. 
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Conclusions 
The area around Mount Tungurahua is physically rugged, with highly 
eroded soils in many areas, and unreliable sources of water for irrigation.  Deep 
valleys with fast-flowing rivers make communication difficult and sometimes 
hazardous.  For inhabitants of rural communities, even under normal 
circumstances, life in this environment is harsh and economic survival 
precarious.  The town of Baños, on the other hand, with its amenable climate, 
and non-agriculture-based economy, has become a center of relatively prosperity 
and wellbeing.  
The physical space that Baños occupies offers both advantages and 
drawbacks.  The thermal waters that are heated by the volcanic activity that 
threatens the town with destruction have been successfully merchandized, first 
by religious and later by secular entrepreneurs.  The steeply-angled slopes and 
outcroppings of ancient lava flows that make the area inappropriate for large-
scale agriculture provide the dramatic scenery that attracts visitors from Ecuador 
and from throughout the world.  The Pastaza River, with its deep gorge that 
prevents fast exit from town in the event of a major eruption of Mount 
Tungurahua, also made is possible for Baños to become a gateway between 
east and west. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
NATURAL HAZARDS 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In addition to the volcanic activity of Mount Tungurahua, other geologic 
and meteorological hazards frequently afflict areas currently affected by the 
volcano.  Earthquakes are a major and widespread hazard and even relatively 
small events can trigger massive landslides.  Prolonged or heavy rainfall is often 
followed by flash floods and slope failure due to the steepness of the terrain.  
Droughts, windstorms and ice storms are not uncommon. 
During historic times, earthquakes have claimed more lives in the 
provinces of Chimborazo and Tungurahua, and caused greater damage to 
property and infrastructure than have the infrequent eruptions of Mount 
Tungurahua.  Furthermore, given the current prevalence of landslides, it is likely 
that these hazards also have taken a great toll on the people living in the area.   
In order to understand perception and response to Tungurahua’s current 
eruptions and associated hazards, it is helpful to consider them in relation to 
concurrent hazards and to the historical records of natural hazards that are 
known to have caused great numbers of fatalities as well as social and economic 
disruption.
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The chapter compares the effects of the current volcano hazard in 
Chimborazo Province and in other parts of Tungurahua Province with effects on 
the town of Baños and its satellite communities; reviews the impacts of previous 
historical eruptions on Baños; describes the effects of major area earthquakes; 
and lists non-volcanic natural hazards that resulted in loss of life, damage to 
property or infrastructure, or that in some fashion may have diverted local or 
national resources from the volcanic emergency during the research period. 
 
Tungurahua Volcano 
 
Mount Tungurahua is one of a number of active volcanoes in the Eastern 
Cordillera, one of two parallel ranges of the Andes that traverse Ecuador from 
north to south.   The volcano’s summit (5,023 meters) towers over the 
surrounding countryside, where elevations are approximately in the 2,000- to 
2,200-meter range (Illustration 6).  Tungurahua is a relatively young 
stratovolcano (Hall et al, 1999; GVP, 1999) that is actively building and helping to 
shape the landscape around it.   Locally it is also known as Mama Tungurahua.  
The most extensive damage from the volcano’s current cycle has been 
from ash fall which has repeatedly affected populations and agriculture in rural 
areas.  Two populous provincial capitals (Ambato and Riobamba) and several 
medium-sized towns have also been affected but to lesser degrees.  Lahars have 
been frequent but affect a much more restricted area in the immediate vicinity of 
the volcano. 
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Illustration 6. Tungurahua Volcano 
 
Lane, 2002 
A column of steam and gasses rises from the symmetrical cone of Mount 
Tungurahua on March 19, 2002.   The volcano is often shrouded in clouds. 
   
The volcano straddles the border between Tungurahua and Chimborazo 
Provinces and the impacts of eruptions have been felt primarily in Baños, Pelileo, 
Quero, Mocha and Tisaleo Cantons in Tungurahua Province (Map 7), and in 
Guano and Penipe Cantons in Chimborazo Province (Map 8). 
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Map 7.  Cantons of Tungurahua Province 
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Map 8.  Cantons of Chimborazo Province 
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Current Eruptive Cycle: 1999-? 
 
Tungurahua has been monitored scientifically since 1989 (Instituto Geofísico, 
n.d.).  In September 1999 the volcano gave serious indications that it was 
awakening from an 80-year sleep: seismic activity and gas emissions were on 
the increase.  On September 15, following continuous tremors and the emission 
of a vapor column that extended to 2 kilometers above the crater, Civil Defense 
authorities issued a yellow alert level on the volcano (GVP, 1999).  This meant 
that a major eruption was possible within weeks (see below for explanation of 
alert levels).  Three explosions on October 5, increasing gas emissions and 
finally, incandescence at the crater on October 13, convinced authorities that an 
explosive eruption was imminent, and the alert level was raised to orange on 
October 16 (GVP, 1999).  This action resulted in a mandatory evacuation order 
for the town of Baños and for the smaller rural communities in similar high-risk 
areas in the vicinity of the volcano.  Inhabitants of some villages, particularly 
those located at higher elevations, who had been experiencing ash fall regularly, 
seen the incandescence, felt the tremors, or heard the loud rumblings and 
roaring emanating from the volcano, had voluntarily started to leave the area 
before the official order was issued. 
Ecuador’s Civil Defense System recognizes four levels of alert: (1) WHITE 
alerts authorities that they must start preparing or updating mitigation plans in 
anticipation of the occurrence of an adverse event; (2) YELLOW, which may last 
weeks or months, requires verification that personnel and means are available to 
manage probable emergency situations and the execution of exercises and 
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simulated evacuations; (3) ORANGE may last days or weeks.  It requires 
notification of the public that an emergency is possible and of any preparatory 
measures that should be taken; as well as the mobilization of personnel and 
equipment for a possible evacuation and intensification of community self-
protection measures; (4) RED is the actual occurrence of the hazard.  Duration 
may be hours or days.  Emergency plans are implemented or executed (Defensa 
Civil, 2001; researcher’s translation). 
The major explosive eruption anticipated in mid-October 1999 had not 
occurred as of December 2002, but Tungurahua had engaged in an almost 
continuous display of activity, sometimes intense.  This included at least one 
pyroclastic flow that extended out 1,000 meters (GVP, 1999), the ejection of 
incandescent material to heights sometimes several hundreds of meters above 
the summit, numerous lahars, frequent ash fall, tremors and loud explosions, one 
of which was heard 75 kilometers away in Quito, the capital of Ecuador (GVP, 
2000). 
 
Two Principal Current Hazards: Lahars and Ash Fall 
Lahars 
Starting in October 1999 numerous lahars or mudflows descended the 
steep flanks of Tungurahua, following the natural route afforded by the 
quebradas, and cutting across roads vital for communication and economic 
activity (Table 2). The compilation in Table 2 is not complete as not all lahars 
may be noted in available official records but does convey a sense of the 
frequency of events. 
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Table 2.  Tungurahua Volcano: Lahars (October 1999 – July 2002) 
 
Date Location Comments 
1999 
October 18-24 Chontapamba and Rea ravines  Deposits on road between 
Penipe and Baños 
November 20 Baños area – 2 events Both cut across highways; one 
was 20 meters wide 
December 10 Mudflows – no details Cut across three segments of 
Baños-Penipe road 
2000 
January 21 Several mudflows – no details  
January 29 2 mudflows Roads affected 
February 5-6 Mudflows – no details  
October Frequent mudflows  
November Frequent mudflows  
2001 
February 19 Cusúa ravine  
March 16 Vazcún, Los Pájaros, Las 
Pampas 
Generated by heavy rainfall 
April 29-30 Las Pampas, Cusúa, Hacienda 
and Achupashal sectors 
Lahars in Las Pampas area; 
blocked Pelileo-Baños road on 
April 29 
May 3 Possible lahar recorded by 
monitors 
 
May 9-15 Cusúa, Basural, Mandur, Vazcún 
and Ulba valleys 
Baños-Riobamba highway 
blocked 
June 11 Achupashal ravine   
July 18-24 Western flank July 19 lahars reached Baños-
Riobamba highway 
September 11-12 Path followed not given Affected Penipe 
December 14-16 Lahars  
December 29 Juive Grande ravine Las Pampas and Los Pájaros 
sectors affected 
2002 
January 9 Western flank  
February 5 or 6 Path followed not given Affected Las Pampas 
February 11-18  Juive and Cusúa Pyroclastic flows traveled part 
way down these ravines 
February 19 Chontapamba sector  
April 7 North flank Blocked Ambato-Baños road 
April 21 Path followed not given Blocked Ambato- Baños road at 
Las Pampas 
April 28 3 lahars – Descended Juive and 
Cusúa ravines 
Blocked Ambato- Baños road at 
Las Pampas and Los Pájaros 
May 1 Path followed not given Las Pampas 
June 3 Traveled northwest  
Compiled from GVP monthly and weekly reports for 1999 - 2002 and 
newspaper reports over the same period. 
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Besides being triggered by earthquakes, lahars also occur frequently 
during the local rainy season.  Most of the lahars have occurred on the 
northwestern and western flanks, where ash has accumulated in larger quantities 
(Illustration 7).  These slopes remained on orange alert even after the alert level 
for the Canton of Baños was downgraded to yellow on September 5, 2000 
(Instituto Geofísico, n.d.). 
Illustration 7.  Destruction caused by lahars 
 
 
Lane, 2002 
Bypass made 
by residents 
Valley of 
Chambo 
Ravines 
followed by 
lahars 
Old road, destroyed 
by lahars 
In May 2002 residents of the dangerous western and northwestern flanks 
were using a primitive bypass road to access their farms.  The main road, 
bordering the valley of the Chambo River, was destroyed by lahars early in 
the eruptive cycle. Two of the many ravines that drain the volcano are shown 
here.  They are near the flank community of Bilbao.  
 
 
Many people returned to the dangerous areas and by May 2002 about 200 
families were living on the volcano’s flanks in Tungurahua Province.  In August 
2001, emergency management personnel in Chimborazo Province estimated that 
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there were 1,600 people living in communities on the flanks in the hazard zone 
for which they were responsible (El Universo, August 31, 2001).  Several months 
later, one official estimated the number had increased to 2,000 (Rodriguez, 
2002). 
Lahars can travel quickly down steep slopes.  Monitoring by the Instituto 
Geofísico gives authorities some warning of when these events are occurring 
and most people living on the flanks have learned to avoid the ravines where 
lahars commonly occur.  Some people, however, still do not stay away from 
these hazardous places, particularly if there have been no recent events 
(Rodriguez, 2002) (Illustration 8). 
Ash Fall 
 
Ash from Tungurahua is fine-grained (GVP, 2000) and is sometimes 
carried great distances.  Starting in 1999, ash fall became a common occurrence 
in communities located approximately to the west and southwest of the volcano, 
mainly in Riobamba, Penipe and Guano cantons in Chimborazo Province, and in 
parts of Ambato, Baños, Pelileo, Quero, Mocha and Tisaleo cantons in 
Tungurahua Province.  Communities in other cantons and provinces were also 
affected but to a much lesser extent.  Even so, on February 14 and 15, 2000, for 
example, ash was reported to the north-northwest of the volcano, in the towns of 
Píllaro, Latacunga and Salcedo, with up to one millimeter deposited on that 
occasion as far as 10 kilometers from Mount Tungurahua (GVP, 2000). 
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Illustration 8.  Ravine cut by lahar near Baños-Ambato road 
 Lane, 2002 
 
The remains of a campfire and other signs of occupancy in this 
ravine in March 2002 show that some people still had not 
learned to avoid these areas at all times.  Following the course 
of ravines, fast-moving lahars can reach areas near the base 
of the volcano like this one, right off the Baños-Ambato road, 
in a few minutes.  
 
 61 
Besides showering down on the neighboring countryside, ash was 
occasionally carried by prevailing, higher altitude winds hundreds of miles away, 
towards the Ecuadorian coastline and out over the Pacific.  Communities to the 
north of the volcano, such as Baños, experienced ash fall only infrequently due to 
the prevailing winds that generally push the ash plume toward the west and 
southwest. 
During the first weeks of intense activity in late 1999, up to one centimeter 
of accumulated ash was reported to have fallen (GVP, 1999).  Frequent 
emissions continued throughout 2000, 2001 and 2002, with ash plumes or 
steam-and-ash plumes becoming a familiar part of the local landscape.  An 
eruption in early February 2000 produced a high-altitude cloud consisting of a 12-
kilometer wide band of thick ash, a 27-kilometer wide band of finer ash and an 
additional 26-kilometer band suspected to contain ash (Washington VAAC, 
2000).  On several occasions ash columns towered to 12 kilometers above sea 
level and one reached to 13 kilometers (GVP, 2001).  Throughout the eruptive 
period several centimeters of ash would be deposited on the lower west flank of 
the cone; farther west thicknesses would be millimeters deep.  When ash deposit 
thicknesses are mentioned in the reports of the Global Volcanism Program they 
generally range from 0.5- to 2.0-millimeters. 
In August 2001 there was a marked increase in activity.  On August 5 a 
strong eruption sent a massive ash column approximately 7.5 kilometers above 
the crater (GVP, 2001).  According to Instituto Geofísico estimates, this and 
subsequent emissions through August 26, generated between 10 and 15 million 
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metric tons of ash spread over parts of Chimborazo, Tungurahua and Bolívar 
provinces (GVP, 2001) (Illustration 9). 
Illustration 9. Ash fall in Chimborazo Province 
 
 
               © Diario El Universo.  Reproduced with permission 
 
A farmer in San José de Sabañag in Chimborazo 
Province shakes ash from a fruit tree during 
eruptions in August 2001.  Recurrent ash fall has 
caused serious problems for agriculture. 
 
In some places depths of ash between 1.6 and 2.0 centimeters were 
recorded (La Hora, August 19, 2001).  An estimated 39,000 people (8,000 
families) were affected.  The ash blanketed 53,597 hectares of farmland and 
pastures, destroying or endangering crops and livestock and damaging more 
than 3,100 houses (OCHA, 2001).  Because crop yields were so low, many small 
farmers had to use the portion of the harvest normally reserved for seed as food 
instead (WFP, 2001 – September 21).  
Tungurahua engaged in another episode from September 12 through 25, 
2001, depositing ash to the north in Pondoa, Runtún and Baños; to the 
southwest in Quero, Penipe and Riobamba; and to the west in Pillate, Juive, 
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Cotaló, and Bilbao, before settling into its usual pattern of small but regular 
emissions (GVP, 2001). 
Almost exactly one year to the day after the August/September 2001 
eruptions, another cycle of intense emissions was underway:  during the first 
weeks of August 2002 a similar pattern of heavy ash fall occurred to the west and 
southwest of the volcano, affecting 40 communities in Quero canton as well as 
other portions of southern Tungurahua Province, parts of northern Chimborazo, 
and portions of Bolívar Province (El Universo, August 15, 2002).  Five thousand 
acres of food crops and 10,000 acres of pastures were damaged (WFP, 2002 – 
August 30).  Farmers able to do so started evacuating their herds (El Universo, 
August 19, 2002).  The deepest ash fall recorded during that cycle was 
measured at 2.5 centimeters.   Agricultural production was forecast to decline by 
five to ten percent (WFP 2002 – August 30). 
Although the August 2001 and 2002 ash emission events were the most 
spectacular, the volcano had been emitting ash clouds intermittently but 
consistently since late 1999. 
Hazard Experience in Baños During the Current Cycle    
Although located in an area at high risk from pyroclastic flows, lahars and 
potential flash flooding in the event a dam formed on the Pastaza River, by 
December 2002, the town of Baños had escaped the worst of the direct impacts 
of Mount Tungurahua’s current eruptive phase: ash fall and lahars.  Since ash fall 
had been directed generally to the west and southwest of the volcano by the 
prevailing winds it was infrequent and light in Baños.    Similarly, the town had 
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been spared the effects of most of the lahars which had descended primarily the 
western and north-northwestern flanks, a few kilometers west of Baños, although 
the course of one quebrada had brought a few large lahars to a point just to the 
west of town.  In November 1999, while Baños was evacuated, a lahar had 
descended the valley of the Vazcún destroying part of one of the main tourist 
attractions, El Salado thermal baths. 
Lahar activity through 1999 and 2000 destroyed the road that winds along 
the western flanks of the volcano in Chimborazo Province but the road along the 
volcano’s northern flanks, leading from Ambato to Baños and on to the Oriente, 
was quickly cleared and repaired following any lahar events.  Consequently, 
transportation to and from Baños was not disrupted except for brief periods of 
time.  Most of the time, Baños was also spared other direct reminders of the 
hazard such as roaring and the continual sight of the eruption column which was 
not visible from the center of town because of the intervening outcropping called 
Runtún.   The lack of visibility of the hazard was atypical as the column was 
clearly visible from many other communities in the broader hazard zone 
(Illustration 10). 
Effects of Previous Historical Eruptions 
  
The historical record indicates that during active cycles Tungurahua 
alternates periods of quiet with periods of intense activity.  The onset of the latter 
is sudden (Mothes et al., 2001) leaving little or no time for warning and 
evacuation.  There are three eruptions of Mount Tungurahua for which there is 
both historical and geologic evidence.  These are the events of 1773, 1886, and 
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1916-18. The historical record also reports activity from 1641 through 1646, but 
the evidence is scant and scientists have yet to confirm these events (Hall et al., 
1999). 
Illustration 10.  Ash plume from Tungurahua seen from Riobamba 
 
 
Lane, 2002 
 
The ash plume from Tungurahua was clearly visible from 
this location in Riobamba, Chimborazo Province, in 
March 2002, and has become a common sight in many 
communities.  In Baños, at the foot of the volcano, the 
plume is not usually seen and the town rarely receives 
ash fall. 
 
Geologic studies by Minard Hall and other scientists with the Instituto 
Geofísico and members the French Institut de Recherche et Développement 
(Hall et al., 1999), confirmed the following: during the 1773 event there was 
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widespread tephra fall and the Pastaza River was blocked by a massive lava flow 
that descended the volcano’s north-northwest flank; the 1886 eruption was 
marked by “numerous pyroclastic flows that descended different routes on the 
western flank” (Hall et al., 1999 14), and a lava flow created a dam across the 
Chambo; the period from 1916 through 1918 was also characterized by 
pyroclastic flows. 
Lahars occurred frequently during all three of the historic eruptions.  
Towns like Baños, on the north, and the villages of Puela and Penipe to the 
southwest, as well as smaller communities along the western flanks were at 
great risk.   Heavy ash fall also occurred on occasion during all three historic 
eruptions (Hall et al., 1999). 
The historical record indicates that several people died in an April 1773 
eruption when what was described at the time as a hot mudflow descended the 
valley of the Vazcún and entered part of Baños (Reyes, 2001; Martínez, 1932).   
Some of the residents of Baños were able to escape across the Pastaza River.  
The 1773 eruption caused the dispersal of the town’s inhabitants to other 
communities and it was several years before Baños fully recovered from the 
1773 event (Reyes, 2001). 
Two brothers, Augusto and Nicholás Martinez wrote eyewitness accounts 
of the 1886 and 1916-18 eruptions.  The following details were abstracted from 
excerpts from their writings, published in 1904 and 1932 respectively, and 
compiled recently by Manuel Espinosa Apolo (2000). 
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During the 1886 eruption Augusto Martínez noted pyroclastic flows that 
descended ravines on the volcano.  The first of these flowed down the north-
northwest flank in the area of Juive Grande and Juive Chico and dammed the 
Pastaza for 15 days, forming a lake that inundated lands along the Patate River.  
Huge lahars descended the courses of the Puela, Ulba and Vazcún Rivers.  A 
river of lava descended the northwest flank in the area where present-day Cusúa 
is located.   Ash fall was extensive, reaching thicknesses of 20 centimeters in 
parts of the highlands of Chimborazo Province.  In Ambato, ash fell for 18 hours.  
Tungurahua’s last 1886 eruptive display was on November 16.  The volcano 
produced a pyroclastic flow and an eruption column heavily laden with tephra 
that deposited ash as far north as Quito (Apolo, 2000). 
The 1916-1918 eruptions reached a climax toward the end of 1918.  
Nicolás Martínez, in a study published in 1932, reported seven great eruptions 
between January and November 1918, all of them “extremely violent but short-
lived” (Apolo, 2000 144; researcher’s translation).  The worst eruption occurred 
on April 5 without warning and it caused widespread destruction.  The largest 
pyroclastic flows “descended the valley of the Vadcún [sic.], at the entrance to 
Baños, which was not at all surprising since many ravines that originate at the 
crater feed this valley” (in Apolo, 2000 150; researcher’s translation).  The flow 
stopped 100 meters short of the town proper.   Describing the devastation 
wrought in the valley of the Ulba, Martínez noted that it was in many ways worse 
even than that in the Vazcún, 
because the pyroclastic flow…melted the ice fields that cover the 
eastern summit of Tungurahua, melting them instantly…and 
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generating a formidable lahar that covered or carried before it 
houses, animals and plants, without, fortunately, causing one single 
human victim.  When this lahar arrived at the Pastaza, because of 
its momentum it crossed [the river], dashing against the opposite 
bank and causing a great landslide that formed a dam that 
contained the waters of the river and formed a beautiful lake, more 
than one kilometer long, which lasted for several months (in Apolo, 
2000 152; researcher’s translation). 
 
 
 
Other Significant Natural Hazards 
 
Earthquakes: Historical Accounts 
One of the earliest accounts of the vulnerability of humans to the area’s 
natural hazards dates from 1640 when an entire indigenous village near 
Riobamba in Chimborazo Province was destroyed (Wolf, 1904).  Subsequent 
earthquakes that caused significant death and destruction in Chimborazo and 
Tungurahua provinces in the general vicinity of the study area, and which are 
well-documented, occurred in 1645, 1698, 1797, 1840 and 1949 (Apolo, 2000).  
Official reports to the Spanish Crown listed 6,500 dead in the 1698 event.  The 
1797 earthquake is considered to be the worst in Ecuador’s history (Egred, 
2000).  Riobamba, near the epicenter, was destroyed, prompting relocation of the 
town – a fact that current residents almost invariably refer to when talking with 
visitors.  Estimates of the number of dead vary greatly.  The official count was 
13,533, but conservative historians calculate that approximately 20,000 perished 
(Egred, 2000).  In Baños 432 people died and the town’s development came to a 
halt temporarily.  The earthquake disrupted the terrain so greatly that a natural 
dam was formed on the Patate River.  After three months, the dam broke and a 
huge wall of water descended the Pastaza, again causing destruction in Baños 
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(Reyes, 2001).   Finally, an earthquake in 1949 completely destroyed the old 
town of Pelileo, located between Ambato and Baños.  The earthquake also razed 
entire sections of Ambato, damaged 32 other communities in Tungurahua 
Province, ten in Cotopaxi and several in Chimborazo.  The initial death toll in the 
Pelileo earthquake was estimated at 6,000 but the final number was probably 
much higher (Eichler, 1952).  Perhaps the worst effect of the 1949 earthquake on 
Baños was that the town’s transportation lifeline to the west was cut off (Reyes, 
2001).  
Natural Hazards Concurrent with the Eruptions of Tungurahua 
Since Mount Tungurahua started erupting in late 1999, other natural 
hazard events in the study area took lives and damaged property, and several 
major natural disasters occurred in Ecuador.  The following lists are by no means 
complete but they do give a sense of the prevalence of these events during the 
study period. 
Concurrent Local Hazards 
May 2000: Ice storms caused crop damage. 
October 2000:  A summit bloc failure on El Altar, a nearby inactive volcano, 
resulted in a flash food and the deaths of 13 people in Penipe and Guano 
cantons in the vicinity of Mount Tungurahua.  Several homes and 
business structures were destroyed, and there was extensive loss of 
livestock and crops (Defensa Civil, 2000; Hall et al., 2000). 
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October/November 2000: A drought, followed by a series of freezes, caused the 
loss of 15,000 acres of crops in Tungurahua Province (La Hora, 
November 18, 2000). 
June 2001: Exceptionally heavy rainfall caused several landslides along the road 
between Baños and Puyo in the Amazon region.  Two people died in Rio 
Verde, just east of Baños (El Universo, June 15, 2001; GVP, 2001).  The 
same storm system resulted in flooding along the Chambo, Blanco and 
other rivers and the road between Penipe and Riobamba was partially 
destroyed (Jordan, 2001)  In the vicinity of Baños people living along the 
Pastaza, Vazcún and Ulba Rivers had to move to higher ground.  In 
Ambato, the heavy rains caused flooding of the Ambato River, at least one 
bridge was destroyed and the city’s potable water supply was 
compromised (La Hora, June 12 and 13, 2001; Jordan, 2001). 
August 2001: In Ambato, Tungurahua Province, local flooding resulted in one 
death. 
August/November 2001: Drought throughout the Sierra.  Toward the end of the 
period the low level of water in the Pastaza River threatened to 
compromise generating capacity at Agoyan Hydroelectric plant (El 
Comercio, 13 and18 November, 2001). 
Concurrent Hazards in Other Parts of Ecuador 
Late 1999: At about the same time that Mount Tungurahua started erupting, 
Guagua Pichincha, a volcano that overlooks Quito, the capital of Ecuador, 
also renewed its activity.  The greatest threat to Quito was from ash fall 
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which, had it continued for any length of time, could have seriously 
disrupted activities in the city of 1.2 million.  Some small villages closer to 
the volcano were evacuated (GVP, 1999). 
April 2000: Heavy rains throughout Ecuador caused extensive flooding and 
numerous landslides resulting in 14 fatalities. 
May 2000: Ice storms affected agriculture in the Central Sierra while heavy rains 
throughout Ecuador resulted in 34 deaths from flooding.  Twelve people 
were killed in landslides in Imbabura and Carchi provinces. 
July 2000: Activity at Guagua Pichincha volcano increased again and Quito 
received light ash fall. 
September 2000: Earthquakes in Guayas Province and in Quito caused property 
damage. 
October 2000: An earthquake centered near Ibarra in Imbabura Province caused 
one fatality, injured several people and caused widespread damage to 
homes partly due to local construction practices. 
January 2001: Two scientists died at Guagua Pichincha Volcano in Quito (El 
Universo, January 17, 2001).  
March 2001: Heavy rains in many areas caused widespread flooding.   Thirty-
nine people died in Sucumbíos and Orellana provinces.  A landslide in 
Alausí, Chimborazo Province, killed three people; in the province of Azuay 
eight villages were isolated by a series of landslides (El Universo, March 
13, 2001; La Hora, March 13, 2001). 
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June 2001: Torrential rains caused flooding and landslides resulting in 41 
fatalities and the loss of 4,000 livestock.  Most fatalities were on the 
Papallacta – Baeza road, about 70 kilometers east of Quito (OCHA, 2001 
– June 20), where 14 landslides occurred in one 47-kilometer stretch.   
One of the landslides damaged the trans-Ecuadorian oil pipeline (La Hora, 
June 12, 2001).  The same weather system caused extensive flooding in 
four provinces in the Amazon region, destroying crops and disrupting 
transportation systems.  International food assistance was necessary to 
feed people in isolated communities (WFP, 2001 – November 14).  
July 2001: A landslide on the road between Loja and Zamorra killed two people; 
a third was missing and presumed dead. 
August 2001: Record snowfall in parts of the northern Sierra left 200 travelers 
stranded.  
August-November 2001: The lowest precipitations recorded in the Sierra of 
Ecuador in 20 years.  Province of Cotopaxi, adjacent to Tungurahua 
Province, was among those most affected by the drought.  
 
Conclusions 
As of December 2002, there was no record available that showed a fatality 
as a direct result of hazards from Mount Tungurahua, although the long-term 
effects of poor nutrition and compromised health remained to be known.   
Widespread ash fall from the volcano had caused many hardships for thousands 
of rural people dependent on agriculture for their survival.  Lahars had disrupted 
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communications along the western and northwestern flanks particularly, causing 
further economic distress for isolated communities.  For townspeople in Baños, 
however, once they returned to the homes they were forced to evacuate, the 
rhythm of life eventually resumed, with scant experience with or evidence of the 
potentially devastating hazard right on their doorstep.  The impacts of 
Tungurahua’s activity were almost always somewhere else. 
Historically too, past eruptions were beyond the memory of most 
residents.  More recent cataclysms, such as the 1949 earthquake that destroyed 
the nearby town of Old Pelileo and razed half the provincial capital, were still 
within the lifespan of many local people.   The horrendous flash-flood disaster in 
October 2000 that killed 13 people in Penipe and Guano cantons, virtually right 
next door to Baños, was factual, an actual occurrence.  The possibility of a major 
explosive eruption of Tungurahua, on the other hand, remained an uncertainty, 
even for the scientists monitoring the volcano. 
The normal progression of the seasons of the year regularly brought with it 
its own set of hazards: flooding and landslides were certain to occur.  Friends 
and neighbors died in these events, only one or two at a time perhaps, but they 
were actual happenings.   For those who read newspapers or watched television, 
even events farther away, in other parts of Ecuador, may at times have seemed 
more threatening: certainly 30 or 40 people buried in a landslide or drowned in 
rising floodwaters might be reminders of the instability of local slopes or of the 
swift flow of the Pastaza, but not of the potential hazards from an explosive 
eruption of Mount Tungurahua. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
BAÑOS AND TOURISM 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Tourism is vital to the economy of Baños and the growth of international 
travel tourism has made Baños an important contributor to the economy of 
Ecuador.  Visitors have been coming to Baños for several centuries, first as 
religious pilgrims and later as secular tourists.  In recent years, the number of 
foreign visitors has edged ahead of the number of Ecuadorians visiting the town.  
The latter still converge on Baños in the thousands especially on religious 
holidays and during school vacation time. 
The usual influx of tourists came to a halt during the weeks following the 
October 1999 evacuation, although adventure-seekers continued to be attracted 
to the area by the eruptions of Mount Tungurahua.  The tourist industry was 
devastated by the evacuation and members of the industry were prominent in the 
movement to return to the town.  Business owners and the Municipality, working 
closely together, embarked on an aggressive campaign to counteract the 
negative publicity that resulted from the eruptions and the evacuation.  By 
January 2001 local businesses appeared to be on the road to recovery and by 
May 2002, Baños seemed to have reestablished itself as a prime tourist center in 
spite of its hazardous location. 
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Tourism and the Ecuadorian Economy 
Tourism provides hard currency for Ecuador and its role in the economy 
has been growing in importance for several years.  In 2000, despite the fact that 
the country was experiencing economic and political turmoil, approximately 615 
thousand foreign tourists visited there and contributed US$402 million to the 
economy (Ministerio de Turismo, 2002).  This made tourism, with 7 percent of the 
total, the country’s third-ranked source of foreign revenue from the sale of goods 
and services.  Sales of petroleum contributed 41 percent, and the export of 
bananas about 14 percent.  According to available data, tourism was expected to 
rank third again in importance in 2001.  By mid-year tourist revenues were about 
US$213 million and were projected to reach US$441 million by yearend.  
Tourism provided direct jobs for approximately 53,000 people and the data 
suggested that as many as 160,000 people depended directly or indirectly on 
tourist-related activities (Ministerio de Turismo, 2002). 
 
Tourism and the Economy of Baños 
Baños is one of the most popular tourist destinations in Ecuador.  During 
2000, the town was under an official evacuation order for the first eight months of 
the year.  Even so, according to Ministry of Tourism data, Baños ranked as the 
country’s fifth most popular destination, with 140,000 foreign visitors, or 23 
percent of all foreign tourists to Ecuador.  Only Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca and 
Otavalo drew more visitors (Ministerio de Turismo, 2002).  Quito is the capital; 
Guayaquil is the largest city and most important commercial center; Otavalo is 
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famous for its Indian market and handicrafts; and Cuenca is a provincial capital 
with a long history in the arts.  According to the Director of the Baños Municipal 
Tourism Department (Rios, 2002), the rankings for 1999 were similar, with 
117,070 tourists visiting Baños out of a total of 509,000, also 23 percent of all 
foreign visitors to Ecuador. 
The peak months for tourism in Baños are June, July and August.  These 
are the most popular months for visits by foreign tourists and they are also 
summer vacation months in the Sierra.  Religious holidays, such as Carnaval 
(the period preceding Lent), Easter and All Saints, attract large crowds from 
throughout Ecuador.  On the weekends, Baños is visited by many people from 
the surrounding countryside and from the neighboring provincial capitals of 
Ambato and Riobamba. 
According to a survey conducted in November 2001 by the town’s Tourism 
Department, 56 percent of all tourists visiting Baños were foreigners.  Among the 
44 percent of visitors who were Ecuadorians, 18 percent visited the town for 
religious reasons (Municipalidad Baños de Agua Santa – Ministerio de Turismo, 
2002).     
Directly and indirectly, tourism contributes to approximately 95 percent of 
the town’s economic base (Rios, 2002).   Local economic activities that benefit 
from tourism include transportation, lodging, food and beverage, entertainment, 
ecotourism and handicrafts. 
The economic importance of tourism was emphasized in the Municipality’s 
2002 development plan in which the industry was identified as the dominant 
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factor in the local economy.   In Baños, “all objectives, policies, strategies and 
actions of all programs; all intents, resources and actions of public and private 
agencies” (Municipalidad Baños de Agua Santa – Ministerio de Turismo, 2002 2; 
researcher’s translation) were based on the economic importance of tourism.  
During research visits in 2000, 2001 and 2002, the extent to which Baños 
was geared to tourists was obvious.  The streets in the center of town were lined 
with stores and restaurants catering to tourists. There were numerous photo 
supply stores, internet cafés and bars.  Travel/tour operators advertised outdoor 
activities including kayaking, horseback riding, mountain climbing and 
sightseeing.  Street vendors catered principally to the many local visitors who 
flocked to town on special holidays.  Much of the informal commerce was 
concentrated in an area to the east of downtown, and on the streets in the vicinity 
of the basilica (Illustration 11). 
Illustration 11.  Street in front of Basilica 
 
 
Lane, 2002 
 
Baños appeared to have regained much of its pre-
evacuation tourist activity by March 2002.  
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The economic reliance of many of the inhabitants of Baños on tourism can 
be surmised from the fact that entire families were engaged in the tourist trade.  
For example, a husband might operate a taxi while the wife managed a food or 
trinket booth on the street (Illustration 12).  After school, even the children 
sometimes contributed their labor to the family effort by helping to prepare food 
for the following day’s sales or by working on handicrafts. 
Illustration 12.  Street vendor in Baños 
 Lane, 2002
 
The livelihoods of some families were 
entirely dependent on tourism. 
 
The small mom-and-pop operations were not the only ones where most 
family members depended on the tourist trade for family income.  A similar 
dependence was noted among more prosperous segments of the population, 
such as hotel/motel owners.  Some motel owners were also tour operators, and 
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owned restaurants and other related businesses.  No data were available on 
exactly how concentrated ownership of major tourist businesses was but it is 
likely that it was highly concentrated. 
In addition to tourism locally and in the immediate environs, ecotourism to 
the Oriente was becoming increasingly important economically.  Baños had 
something of an advantage because of its location on a road through one of the 
few passes over the Andes. 
The Tourist Cadastre 
Until tourism was decentralized early in 2001, the national Ministry of 
Tourism, operating through the Provincial Ministries, was responsible for 
maintaining a “Quality Control Cadastre” of establishments catering to tourists. 
The cadastre was the basis for regulation and taxation of registered 
establishments by the central government.  In an effort to estimate what the 
economic effects of the evacuation and eruptive activity of Mount Tungurahua 
had been on the tourist industry in Baños, this cadastre was reviewed for 
available years (Table 3). 
The cadastre data show that although Baños was under an official 
evacuation order for ten months (October 1999 through the end of August 2000), 
there were more tourist establishments in 2001 than there had been in 1998.  
Additionally, between 1997 and May 2002 room offerings increased by 42 
percent (from 923 to 1311) and beds by 57 percent (from 1808 to 2818) 
(Figure 3). 
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Table 3.  Tourist establishments in Baños (1997-2002) 
 
Type of 
establishment 
1997 a 1998 a 1999 b 2000 c 2001 d 2002e 2002f 
Hotels 3 3 - - 5 4 7 
Hostels 6 6 - - 17 17 45 
Residential 
Hostels 
28 29 - - 29 30 24 
Accommodations - - - -   2 
Pensions 17 18 - - 22 22 2 
Refuges - - - - 1 1  
Cabanas 1 1 - -    
Hostelries 1 2 - - 3 3 4 
Restaurants 36 40 - - 46 45 110 
Pizzerias - - - -   9 
Cafeterias 9 8 - - 9 9 23 
Soda fountains - 1 - -  3 6 
Bars 4 4 - - 6 6 9 
Discothèques 4 5 - -  8 8 
Travel agencies 16 18 - - 28 28 37 
 
Notes: 
 
(a) Data provided by the national Ministry of Tourism in Quito. 
(b) No data for 1999 available from the local, provincial or national agencies 
responsible for record-keeping. 
(c) No data for 2000 available from any agency possibly due to the fact that 
companies listed on the cadastre were exempted from taxation by special 
ministerial decree. 
(d) Data provided by the provincial Ministry of Tourism in Ambato. 
(e) Data provided by the Municipality of Baños Tourism Department in May 2002. 
(f) Data accessed on the Municipality of Baños public website in August 2002; 
may reflect establishments that were not registered with the Ministry of Tourism 
when this entity was responsible for the cadastre, or some other cause. 
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Figure 3.  Growth in accommodations 
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                                         Source: Baños tourist cadastres 1997-2002. 
 
The Municipal Tourism Department estimated that occupancy rates in 
2002 were approximately 40 percent.  This was considered an average 
occupancy rate for Baños (Rios, 2002). 
Room rates were very inexpensive for visitors with hard currency.  
Because of the opportunities for outdoor activities, Baños attracted many 
backpackers, mountain climbers and similar active sports enthusiasts.   Modest 
but clean rooms were available in 2002 at daily rates as low as US$4.00.  A 
comfortable private room, within a few blocks of the main tourist area, could be 
had for US$6.00 or US$7.00.  A private room in a more upscale hostal, or in one 
of the larger hotels in town, might go for US$12.00 to US$20.00 – expensive by 
Ecuadorian standards.  At the high-end, the single-occupancy rate on a well-
appointed room at a resort hotel was $56.00 in 2002.  This was well beyond what 
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most visitors were able to or wanted to spend.  The more upscale hotels 
appeared be having the most difficulty in recovering financially.  No data were 
available from owners or managers of these establishments but personal 
observations in 2002 suggested that this was the case.  Also no data were 
available to compare the rate structure pre-evacuation with that in effect in 2002.  
Such comparisons might be difficult to make because of currency fluctuations 
and inflation, but are essential for any detailed assessment of the economic 
repercussions of the evacuation and eruptions on the hotel/motel industry in 
Baños. 
Meal prices were similarly attractive, but not noticeably more so than in 
comparable restaurants in Ambato, Riobamba or Quito.   A light lunch in Baños, 
with a non-alcoholic beverage might cost in the neighborhood of $2.00 to $3.00.  
A dinner entrée, accompanied by a glass of wine, could run from about $7.00 up.   
    The Baños Tourism Department was new, established in May 2001. 
Under the national government’s modernization program, tourism was one of the 
first activities to be decentralized, and Baños was one of the first municipalities to 
assume responsibility for this activity (Municipalidad Baños de Agua Santa – 
Ministerio de Turismo, 2002).  Decentralization was the reason cadastres for the 
various years could only be obtained from three separate entities: the 
Municipality of Baños, the Provincial Ministry of Tourism for Tungurahua, and the 
Ministry of Tourism in Quito. 
 
 
 83 
Continuing Investment in Tourism     
In 2002, the Baños Municipality planned to invest $150,000 in 
infrastructure enhancements of tourist facilities and services (Rios, 2002).  
Improvements to basic public services for the community-at-large, such as the 
provision of safe drinking water, appropriate management of solid waste disposal 
and sewage treatment – which was non-existent at the time since all effluents 
were dumped directly into the Pastaza River – were listed in the Municipality’s 
planning document with references to the benefits such improvements would 
have on the growth of tourism (Asociación de Municipalidades del Ecuador – 
Municipio Baños de Agua Santa, 1996). 
The Municipality of Baños had a direct financial interest in the tourist 
industry, receiving revenues from the operation of several thermal baths.  The 
municipality planned to expand its revenues from the thermal baths by branching 
out into specialty spas and increasing “health tourism” (Municipalidad Baños de 
Agua Santa – Ministerio de Turismo, 2002). 
 
Origins of Tourism to Baños 
Religious Tourism 
In 1553, Dominican missionaries established a small shrine in honor of the 
Virgin Mary near one of the thermal springs emanating near the base of Mount 
Tungurahua.  Word of the miracles performed by the Virgin of Baños de Agua 
Santa (Our Lady of the Holy Water Baths) and of the healing powers of her 
thermal waters quickly spread throughout Ecuador (Reyes, 2001).  Ever since, 
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Baños has been a site for religious pilgrimages and there is a body of myths 
about the Virgin that many people still believe and which appeared to have had 
some influence on response to the hazard and the evacuation (See Appendix III 
for highlights of four of the myths). 
The Dominican order was still prominent in Baños and played an 
important role during the evacuation of the town and the return of its people in 
2000.  In Baños the month of October is dedicated to celebrations honoring the 
Virgen del Rosario de Agua Santa (Reyes, 2001) and since the evacuation 
thousands of people have participated in religious processions (Illustration 13). 
Illustration 13. Religious procession commemorating evacuation 
 
 
                                                                  © Diario La Hora, Ambato  
                                        Reproduced with permission 
 
Thousands of people participated in a religious 
procession in October 2001, commemorating the 
second anniversary of the evacuation of Baños. 
 
Many devotees were from communities in the rural areas around Baños.   
Since the evacuation of the town in October 1999 and its reoccupation starting in 
January 2000, the number of pilgrims making the trip to the basilica in the center 
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of town increased tremendously (Guevara, 2002).  The church was said by some 
to be “the big winner” as a result of the evacuation.  While the evacuation order 
was in effect and prior to the mass movement to return in January 2000, the 
resident Dominican priests were urging people to come to Baños for Sunday 
mass in the Basilica (Mothes, 2000).  On the first anniversary of the evacuation, 
in October 2000, 15,000 people participated in a 5-hour procession from Los 
Pájaros to the main sports stadium in downtown Baños to attend an open-air 
mass (La Hora, October 22, 2000).  Members of the clergy claimed that the 
Virgin protected Baños from the volcano and from corrupt politicians (La Hora, 
October 22, 2000). 
In 2001, when local leaders successfully lobbied the central government 
for the emission of a new set of postage stamps for the purpose of promoting 
tourism to Baños, two of the five commemoratives were religious in nature, one 
honoring the Virgen del Rosario de Agua Santa, described in the article as the 
“eternal guardian of the town and its inhabitants,” the other depicting the basilica 
in which the statue of the Virgin is housed.  Tungurahua volcano and two local 
waterfalls were depicted on the other three stamps. The newspaper report 
described the volcano as “currently erupting and providing tourists with a unique 
opportunity to admire this spectacle of nature, filled with magic and color” (La 
Hora, July 26, 2001). 
Secular Tourism 
Organized secular tourism dated at least from the early part of the 20th 
century.   In the late 1920s, not too many years after Mount Tungurahua 
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concluded its 1916-18 cycle of eruptions, the central government provided for the 
construction of thermal baths, a road capable of carrying vehicular traffic, and 
several reinforced concrete bridges.  The improvement in access and facilities 
must have had the desired effect of increasing the influx of tourists because by 
1937 Baños had an electric power plant (Reyes, 2001) which was likely a luxury 
for rural Ecuador at the time.  By the 1950s, the population of the canton had 
grown to 9,921 (CEPEIGE, 1997) and the town of Baños itself had about 3,000 
inhabitants.  Even in those days, the town’s population increased two- or 
threefold on holidays (Reyes, 2001). 
 
Tourism and Disaster Management 
In a 2002 planning document, the Municipality of Baños recognized that 
the attitude of the residents of Baños was to minimize risk: “There is no culture of 
disaster management, and the local population, upon returning from the 
evacuation, has minimized the problem.  The slogan of Baneños is that ‘nothing 
is happening’ and therefore few protective measures are taken” (Municipalidad 
de Baños de Agua Santa – Ministerio de Turismo, 2002 10).  The municipality’s 
plan proposed, among several initiatives, that construction in high risk areas be 
prohibited and called upon religious and educational leaders to support 
emergency preparedness training. 
During research visits to Baños in June 2000, January 2001, and March 
and May 2002, it seemed there was no concerted, proactive effort to ensure that 
hazard information was readily available to tourists.  Instructions on what to do in 
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the event of a major eruption were not prominently displayed.   Only a few 
establishments had posted the evacuation plan developed by Civil Defense.  In 
March 2002, a small sign posted in one of the main squares was smashed and 
the wording unreadable, and appeared to have been that way for some time.  
The sign was still broken in May 2002.  Signs in other parts of town were also 
defaced (Illustration 14).  The bus terminal was not checked for hazard notices 
on the first research trip, but on the three subsequent visits, no hazard notices or 
evacuation plans were posted.  The terminal is probably one of the most 
important locations to alert and educate less affluent visitors to Baños.  Broad 
yellow stripes, painted on the surface of certain streets, which were designed to 
direct inhabitants to less hazardous areas, mainly at the base of the Runtún 
outcropping, were confusing to an outsider unfamiliar with any evacuation 
procedures.  At first inspection the stripes simply appeared to be directional 
traffic signs (Illustration 15).  Fortunately, this situation may have changed 
because in a 2002 document, the Municipality itself recognized that the lack of 
differentiation between regular traffic signs and evacuation signage was a 
serious problem (Municipio de Baños de Agua Santa – Ministerio de Turismo, 
2002).   The same document expressed the intention of authorities to improve 
emergency preparedness, including providing tourists with adequate evacuation 
information.  
An evacuation exercise in August 2002 was an indication that emergency 
preparedness was on the municipality’s agenda.  Based on subsequent press 
reports it appeared that other risk-reduction activities were underway.  In the 
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case of the August 2002 exercise, however, apparently only about 30 percent of 
the population participated.  Municipal facilities, including the thermal baths, were 
closed but most private businesses stayed open after the warning sirens were 
activated.  One official estimated that it took people far too long to reach 
designated shelter areas.  Had the emergency been real, many might have 
perished (La Hora, August 3, 2002). 
Illustration 14.  Hazard sign in Baños 
 
Lane, 2002 
In March 2002, this sign indicating an area for 
temporary shelter had been defaced, as were 
several other emergency signs in town. 
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Illustration 15.  Evacuation route marking 
 
 
Lane, 2002 
 
The yellow arrow indicates an evacuation route.  In some places these 
arrows are easily confused with traffic signs.  The building in the 
background is one of the many smaller residential hotels or pensions in 
Baños.   Note the mural of Tungurahua Volcano on one wall. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
The development of Baños has been associated historically with tourism: 
first religious and later secular.   During the past several decades, as agricultural 
activity became less significant and rural areas lost population to the cities, 
Baños came to depend more on tourism, to the degree that when Tungurahua 
became active in 1999, this activity accounted for 95 percent of the town’s 
economy. 
Reliance on a single economic activity left local authorities and business 
owners with no practical, short-term solution for recovery, other than an 
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aggressive campaign to get tourists back to the town.  Considering the economic 
crisis in Ecuador, it may have been fortunate that the economy of Baños 
depended on tourism rather than some other activity, because of the high 
percentage of foreign tourists from hard-currency countries. 
By mid-2002, it appeared that town leaders had accomplished their goal of 
getting tourists back.  Measuring the degree to which this had been achieved is 
difficult.  The accuracy of the data from the Ministry of Tourism (2002), which 
estimates 140,000 foreign visitors to Baños during 2000, is questionable.  From 
personal observation, there were very few foreign tourists in Baños in June of 
2000 and it is highly unlikely that there were any great numbers prior to that since 
this would correspond to the first months following the “retaking” of the town.   
The data in the Municipality of Baños’ tourism cadastre show a dramatic increase 
in the number of business in several categories of tourist establishment.  The 
increase requires further investigation and explanation.  Although several 
explanations suggest themselves, no verifiable explanation of the growth was 
available for this research. 
The best evidence of the success of the effort to bring tourists back to the 
town comes from comparing conditions during the research visits in June 2000 
and May 2002.  On the first visit the streets downtown were almost empty; many 
restaurants were open but few patrons were in evidence.  In May 2002, the 
streets were filled with moving, ebullient crowds, and at some restaurants all 
tables were filled at the height of the lunch or dinner hour. 
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The dark side of the economic recovery of Baños was that Mount 
Tungurahua continued to present a significant threat to residents and visitors.   
For local inhabitants, risk denial may have made living in a hazardous 
environment possible but it may also have compromised their ability to respond 
effectively to an eventual, explosive eruption.   For out-of-town visitors, so long 
as Tungurahua is a probable risk, lack of access to information about how to 
respond in the event of an emergency could have catastrophic consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
  
RETURN AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Volcanic eruptions are difficult for scientists to forecast with certainty and 
therefore organizations responsible for public safety are presented with special 
challenges when timing evacuations.  In the case of volcanoes with a history of 
explosive eruptions, given the characteristics of a particular location, or the 
degree to which the community has anticipated an event and prepared for it, 
sheltering-in-place may not be a viable option.  On the other hand, if people are 
forced to leave their homes, there must be some way of providing them with 
adequate food and shelter.  If the high level of risk persists, then the people who 
have been displaced need assistance with training and jobs. 
In the case of Tungurahua Volcano, thousands of people were displaced 
from at-risk communities for weeks and in some cases for months.  Most people 
stayed nearby, in the provincial capitals of Ambato or Riobamba.  Others traveled 
to distant cities, like Guayaquil or even Quito.  For many reasons, government 
programs were unable to care for all of the people who needed assistance, and 
because the country’s economy was in a shambles, it was very difficult for 
evacuees to find jobs or reestablish their businesses.  Owners of motels, 
restaurants and similar businesses that were virtually tied to a particular location 
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could not easily or quickly reestablish themselves somewhere else unless they 
had the financial resources to do so.  The mandatory evacuation implied that an 
eruption was imminent, something that would happen within days.  When it did 
not, many people returned to Baños and other hazardous areas where they 
believed, rightly or wrongly, that they had a better chance of economic survival 
than if they continued to live as exiles. 
 
Exodus: The Evacuation 
When activity at Tungurahua increased rapidly in late 1999, authorities 
started planning for a possible emergency.  In the town of Baños preparedness 
activities started in late August.  On September 8, the day the volcano was 
placed on alert by scientists, Civil Defense authorities started a public awareness 
campaign, which included showing a video of the effects of volcanic eruptions.  A 
week later, when the alert level was raised to yellow, official emergency 
management response was activated.  On September 28, an evacuation 
exercise was held in Baños.  On October 5, Mount Tungurahua erupted. 
Although the October 5 event was a small one, authorities were faced with 
the possibility that, similar to prior historical events, a sudden and unpredictable 
major eruption might follow.  Given the virtual impossibility of getting people in 
Baños to safety in time if such an event were to occur, authorities raised the alert 
level to orange, triggering a mandatory evacuation of the town and neighboring 
communities in the hazardous zones.  Residents had approximately 48 hours in 
which to prepare and leave their homes by the deadline of 6:00 pm on October 
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16.  The vast majority of people needed transportation to leave the area and this 
was provided principally by local bus companies and military trucks.  There were 
no arrangements for the evacuation of farm or domestic animals and many 
farmers either abandoned their animals or sold them to speculators at cut-rate 
prices.    
Some wealthier residents of Baños, and others with moveable assets or a 
place to go, had already started leaving the town well in advance of the 
mandatory evacuation.  Residents in some of the rural communities located 
higher up the flanks of the volcano had also started to evacuate voluntarily.  The 
vast majority, however, did not leave until required to do so.  During the final 
hours before the deadline, this reluctance was probably not helped by the refusal 
of three Dominican priests to leave Baños.  The priests claimed that according to 
their calculations it was impossible for the volcano to damage the town and they 
demanded that the authorities provide a notary to make a complete inventory of 
the contents of the basilica’s museum (interview with Father Julio Estileno 
broadcast on Chile TV, 1999). 
Data from a study by Tobin and Whiteford (2001) supported the idea that it 
took a mandatory evacuation order for most people to leave.   Among former 
Baños residents living in a shelter in Ambato, 57.6 percent listed the evacuation 
order as the reason for deciding to leave their hometown, compared with only 
30.0 percent who listed fear of the volcano as their reason.   The mandated 
departure was also the primary reason listed by 81.8 percent of residents who 
had returned to Baños while the evacuation order was still in effect (Table 4). 
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Table 4.  Reasons for leaving Baños 
 
Reason for 
leaving Baños 
Colégio Bolivar 
shelter (n=33) 
Returned Baños 
residents (n=11) 
Fear of volcano hazard  30.0% 18.2% 
Saw volcano erupting 3.1% - 
Safety of children 3.1% - 
Government/military 
intervention – Warning 
57.6% 81.8% 
For a better life 3.1% - 
Everyone else leaving 3.1% - 
     Total: 100.0% 100.0 
                               Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics. 
 
The same study suggested that the evacuation order provided the impetus 
that people needed to make them leave (Table 5).   Approximately 60 percent of 
respondents in both groups said they had left voluntarily but for at least half of 
the respondents, “voluntary” meant in response to the military intervention. 
Table 5. Did you leave voluntarily? 
Did you leave voluntarily? 
Interview 
area Yes 
Yes –
evacuation 
order 
No – 
evacuation 
order 
No 
Total 
Living in 
shelter in 
Ambato 
(n=36) 
30.6 % 30.6% 36.0% 2.8% 100% 
Returned to 
live in Baños 
(n=30) 
23.3% 40.0% 23.3% 13.4% 100% 
                                  Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics. 
 
 
 
Diaspora: Destinations of Evacuees 
 
Approximately 17,000 people were evacuated from Baños and its 
peripheral communities; another 2,000 left the communities of Pillate, San Juan, 
Mucubi and Cusúa in neighboring Pelileo Canton, also in Tungurahua Province.  
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An additional 4,000 people were evacuated from communities on the western 
flanks of the volcano, in Chimborazo Province (Ecuadorian Red Cross, 1999).  It  
was impossible to determine exactly where most people went, but Red Cross, 
Civil Defense, and other officials estimated that the principal destinations for the 
approximately 23,000 evacuees were Ambato, the provincial capital of 
Tungurahua; Riobamba, the capital of Chimborazo Province; and Puyo, in 
Pastaza Province in the Amazon region (Map 9).  It is known that approximately 
4,000 people sought asylum in the shelters set up in these three towns (Aráuz, 
2000). Of the 19,000 people displaced from Tungurahua Province fewer than 
2,000 proceeded to the numerous temporary shelters set up by the authorities, 
considerably less than the 5,000 anticipated in the province’s emergency plan 
(Herdoiza, 2000). 
The temporary shelters were scattered throughout the cantons of Pelileo, 
Patate and Ambato, in communities near the volcano but beyond the high risk 
zone.  Local school buildings were used for this purpose so classes at these 
establishments had to be suspended.  More than two weeks into the emergency, 
on November 1, 1999, the national government authorized the establishment of 
several resettlement centers, called Centros de Reactivación Poblacional 
(CEREPS).  Four of these were set up in Tungurahua Province: two in Ambato 
and one each in the cantonal capitals of Patate and Pelileo.  Religious 
organizations also provided shelter at various locations for some of the 
evacuees. 
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Map 9.  Principal urban destinations of 1999 evacuees 
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One of the larger resettlement centers in Ambato was at Colégio Bolivar, 
which housed people mainly from the poorer suburbs and peripheral 
communities of Baños: La Ciénega, San Vicente, Ulba, Santa Ana, Lligua, Juive 
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Chico and La Matriz (Herdoiza, 2000).  Data on the number of residents housed 
here initially were not available but in June 2000, when residents were 
interviewed for the Tobin and Whiteford (2001) study, there were 208 people in 
residence.   In mid-September 2000, when all resettlement centers were officially 
closed, there were still 180 evacuees living at Colégio Bolivar, about 86 percent 
of the June 2000 shelter population. 
Although the shelter population originated mostly from the poorer suburbs, 
many of the people displaced from the town of Baños and its environs were 
relatively prosperous small business people.  Twenty-nine percent of the people 
from Baños were middle-class small business owners, another 29 percent were 
owners of tourist businesses (Figure 4). The socio-economic composition of 
evacuees from the town of Baños was different from that of other displaced 
groups.  The 4,000 people displaced from Chimborazo Province and the 2,000 
who left the rural communities in Tungurahua Province west of Baños were all 
poor agriculturalists (Ecuadorian Red Cross, 1999). 
Figure 4.  Occupation of Baños evacuees 
Occupation  of Baños evacuees
Middle class: 
under-
employed
18%
Middle class: 
small 
business 
owners
29%
Tourist 
business 
owners
29%
Urban poor
24%
 
                                  Data obtained from Ecuadorian Red Cross, 1999. 
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Conditions for Evacuees 
 
The long-term shelters (resettlement centers) set up in Ambato in 
Tungurahua Province housed mostly evacuees from Baños.  The shelters were 
crowded and people had little privacy.  One building used as a shelter had a 
leaky roof.  However, for some residents the biggest problem may have been 
that these places just were not home and, furthermore, there were few economic 
opportunities available to them in the communities to which they had evacuated.  
Eventually, government and NGO assistance to the shelters stopped. 
Less is known about conditions for the thousands of displaced people who 
flooded into Ambato and other communities without going to shelters.   Based on 
data obtained in formal and informal interviews, while some people went to live 
with relatives or friends, these arrangements often did not last very long; some 
people rented a room or a small house for as long as their savings held out; 
some became impoverished.  Newspaper reports dating from late 1999 and early 
2000 indicate that conditions for these people were extremely difficult.  Ambato 
did not have the resources to accommodate such a large influx of displaced 
people.  The strain on public utilities, including water and trash collection, was 
too much for the city to manage. Initially, individual residents and private 
companies helped the evacuees but, as time went by, this assistance diminished 
too.  Neither the city, nor the province, nor the central government, had the 
money to care for a protracted length of time for so many people. 
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Return 
Several weeks went by after the evacuation and the anticipated violent 
eruption still did not happen. Anger and resentment at the authorities for their 
unwillingness or inability to deal effectively with the evacuee problem became 
organized around a movement to return to Baños.  In the print media, the return 
movement highlighted especially the plight of evacuees in shelters and the 
hardships experienced by farmers in the vicinity of Baños. Both groups 
represented a very small percentage of the displaced population.  The largest 
group affected economically were people engaged in tourist and related 
industries which accounted for 95 percent of the town’s economic base. 
The return movement was led principally by an organization called 
Hermandad Baneña, composed of elements from the tourist industry, including 
hotel owners/operators, tour guides, artisans’ associations and transportation 
unions. Additional pressure on the authorities to allow the return of evacuees 
came from the Province of Pastaza, immediately to the east of Baños Canton.   
Closing the Ambato-Baños-Puyo road cut the economic lifeline to the southern 
part of the province.   The road was the principal means of accessing or leaving 
the area.  Further support for the movement almost certainly came from some of 
the Dominican fathers who had stayed in Baños and who, by early November, 
while the evacuation order was still in effect, were calling on their parishioners to 
attend Sunday masses in the basilica (Mothes, 2000). 
The mayor who held office when Baños was evacuated maintained that 
townspeople should not return until the alert level was downgraded, but by the 
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end of December, Hermandad Baneña had become sufficiently well-organized 
politically to be able to mobilize a return.  This they announced on January 4 in a 
televised meeting with the Governor of Tungurahua Province.  In the meeting 
Hermandad Baneña demanded: (1) the reopening of the road leading to Pastaza 
Province; (2) demilitarization of the hazard zone; and (3) a return of the displaced 
population to Baños.  The Governor was opposed to allowing people back on the 
grounds that anyone who returned to the town would be in serious danger.  The 
following day, Baños evacuees marching from Ambato were joined by groups 
from the town of Puyo in Pastaza Province, including members of the 
Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP).  Between 2,000 and 
3,000 people advanced on the military posts set up to prevent access to Baños 
and the neighboring hazard zone.  There was a brief confrontation between the 
military and the crowed.  One civilian was killed and several military personnel 
were taken hostage by the crowd. 
The same day, January 5, 2000, in the town of Pelileo, located between 
Baños and Ambato, the Hermandad Baneña and leaders from Pastaza Province 
signed an agreement with the Governor of Tungurahua Province that provided, 
among other points, for the immediate withdrawal of military forces from the 
Ambato-Baños-Puyo road, the resumption of traffic on the road and unimpeded 
reentry to Baños and neighboring communities for anyone who wished to return.  
The agreement acknowledged that anyone who did return would do so at his or 
her own risk, and responsibility for citizen safety was assumed by those who had 
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organized the return.  The agreement was endorsed by the Archdiocese of 
Ambato. 
The plight of evacuees from Baños and the hardships being experienced 
in some of the communities in Pastaza Province were legitimate causes around 
which to organize a return movement.  The tourist industry also may have been 
pushing for a return when it did rather than wait any longer because of the start 
of the high tourist season in June/July.   A member of the tourist industry, in 
video footage filmed during the January 5 march, argued for reoccupation of the 
town with the Colonel in charge of the military contingent on site because 
“…we’re the ones who are in contact with the international tour operators and we 
know that if Baños is not reactivated within at the latest… by the end of January 
that Baños will disappear from the world tourist scene….” (“…nosotros que 
tenemos contacto con las operadoras internacionales, si Baños no se reactiva 
como máximo como… hasta el mes de enero, Baños sale del contexto turístico 
mundial.”) (transcribed from footage in untitled, undated video by PATV 
Producciones; researcher’s translation).  With mayoral elections scheduled for 
March, it was also an opportune time for possible candidates to ameliorate 
conditions for evacuees.  The leader of the return movement did run for mayor.  
His candidacy was backed by Hermandad Baneña, Ojos del Volcán (a group 
affiliated with the tourist industry) and some of the rural communities around 
Baños.  He did not win the election (La Hora, March 14, 2000). 
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Economic Recovery 
 
For the return movement to be successful, people had to be convinced 
that the volcano was not a significant danger.   Leaders of the movement, taped 
during the return march, repeatedly emphasized that Baños was not at risk 
because it was protected by the Runtún outcropping (“…tenemos la protección 
natural del Runtún”); that the hazard was not affecting the town ( “…y en Baños 
no pasa nada”); and that no one had died as a result of the volcano ( “…la 
naturaleza no nos ha destruido todavía”) (transcribed from footage in untitled, 
undated video by PATV Producciones; researcher’s translation).  These beliefs 
were still being expressed by some political leaders two years after the event.  
On the second anniversary of the return and reoccupation of the town, a member 
of the city council announced that the inhabitants of Baños decided to return 
because they had come to the realization that nothing was happening in their 
town, that the volcano was not a danger, nor had it been a danger to them 
throughout history (“…al darse cuenta que en su pueblo no pasa nada, que el 
volcán no les hace daño, ni les ha hecho a través de la historia…deciden 
volver…” (La Hora, January 5, 2002; researcher’s translation)).  
Although two thousand or more people participated in the return march, 
only a few hundred people actually resettled in town in the weeks following.  In 
addition to the volcano hazard itself, several other reasons may have contributed 
to this reluctance, including the fact that there were no basic services and that 
the provincial authorities refused to allow schools to reopen in Baños because of 
the degree of risk. Even more of a deterrent, the evacuation had effectively kept 
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all but the most intrepid tourists away so initially there was little demand for 
services and therefore few jobs.  There is some evidence that suggests that most 
people who returned early were business owners and the elderly, and that many 
young families with children stayed away.  A former resident of Baños 
interviewed in Riobamba on television explained her position this way: “I’m not 
going to return.  We have children, and we cannot put their lives at risk” 
(interview on undated Chile TV news segment; researcher’s translation). 
Getting tourists and residents back to town had to become the top priority 
for community leaders.  The tourist industry mounted an effective campaign 
designed, in the words of one resident, “to convince the rest of the country and 
the rest of the world that Baños has been reborn.”    A tourist pamphlet circulating 
within weeks of the return read: “Tungurahua Volcano is currently active and 
offers tourists a unique opportunity to admire, from the very streets of the town, a 
magical and colorful spectacle, one of nature’s displays that can be experienced 
only once in a lifetime.” (“El Volcán Tungurahua se encuentra actualmente 
activo, ofreciendo a los turistas la oportunidad única de admirar a un espectáculo 
lleno de mágia y color desde las mismas calles de la ciudad, uno de los 
espectáculos naturales que se vive una sola vez en la vida”)(transcript of 
broadcast on Chile TV; researcher’s translation). The volcano then, which had 
been the source of the town’s woes, was to become its economic salvation. 
In March 2000, a group of journalists was invited by the Municipality to 
come to Baños so they could verify – and report on – the town’s successful 
recovery.  The municipal authorities, some of whom were owners of tourist 
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businesses, had accused the press of irresponsible reporting of the hazard and 
of having been partly to blame for the economic damage inflicted on the entire 
canton.  According to one council member, it was therefore the duty of the press 
to help the town and its people recover economically (La Hora, March 11, 
2000a).   
Attempts to show the world that Baños was operating normally were not 
restricted to the activities of the Chamber of Tourism.  A representative of a local 
union claimed in a press interview in March 2000 that about 90 percent of the 
economy of Baños had recovered and that “as of this moment about 10,000 
Baneños are living in town” (La Hora, March 11, 2000b).  The 10,000 number 
was picked up and repeated by another national newspaper (El Universo, April 
25 and 29, 2000). 
In truth, the town was far from “reactivated”  and in March there were 
probably fewer than 4,000 people in town (Mothes, 2000), some of whom were 
not actually living there but were commuting to work in Baños from temporary 
living quarters in Ambato and other nearby communities.  While no reliable 
official numbers were available it was obvious even three months later, during a 
research visit to Baños in June 2000, that the town was suffering economically, 
with many businesses still closed. 
At the time, the town was still under orange alert and the ability to provide 
for sheltering-in-place (as an alternative to or in combination with partial 
evacuation) was minimal.   Apart from the main highway, which almost certainly 
would be destroyed by a major eruption, the only other way to exit the downtown 
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area in 2000 was via an old suspension bridge over the Pastaza.  A new bridge 
(estimated to cost US$ 460,000) that would enable faster egress from the 
downtown area was only contracted for in the fall of 2001, so it had yet to be 
built.  Even by July 2002, excavation and construction of a foundation for the 
bridge had only been completed on one side of the river (La Hora, July 1, 2002), 
and the connecting road, leading away from the area, still was not complete in 
January 2003 (La Hora, January 17, 2003).  How effective the new bridge might 
prove in the event of a sudden, violent eruption is questionable, since even 
though it is at street level it would be difficult for many people to reach it and 
cross it in less than the estimated seven minutes available.  
The data suggest that among people who returned to Baños while the 
evacuation order was still in effect some did so in the expectation of improving 
their economic situation.  The Tobin and Whiteford (2001) study shows that 
among a group of people who returned early, 77.7 percent did so because of a 
combination of lack of employment and economic hardship experienced in the 
place they had evacuated to, and 22.2 percent returned because of employment 
or business opportunities available in Baños (Table 6). 
The authorities were being petitioned by groups in Baños to downgrade 
the alert level, but the governor of Tungurahua Province refused.  However, in 
March 2000 he did authorize the reopening of the town’s hospital, resumption of 
some public works activities relating to bridge and road maintenance, resumption 
of telephone and police service, opening of the property registry and of the 
courts. 
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Table 6: Reasons for returning to Baños – June 2000 
 
Push factors 
for return  Pull factors for return 
 
 N (%)  N (%) 
Suffered in shelters 2 (11.1) Military had left 3 (16.7) 
Lack of employment 8 (44.4) Home and 
possessions 
4 (22.2) 
Economic hardship 6 (33.3) Return to own land 1 (5.6) 
Uncomfortable 
situations 
1 (5.6) Rebuild community 1 (5.6) 
Volcano not a threat 1 (5.6) Belong in Baños 2 (11.1) 
  Others had returned 3 (16.7) 
  Employment 
(business, farm, etc.) 
4 (22.2) 
                                 Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics. 
 
The Governor’s action was taken with the proviso that the town authorities 
agree to allow Civil Defense to train the community in emergency response and 
preparedness activities (La Hora, March 2, 2000) rather than letting the local 
groups continue to do so as had been agreed to by the government under the 
January “peace agreement” with Hermandad Baneña.  The Governor’s action 
was taken apparently in conjunction with lobbying of the national government in 
Quito by groups in Baños (La Hora, March 6, 2000). The opening of the various 
offices and agencies required, of course, that employees return to Baños.  
Informal interviews in June 2000 with workers at the town’s hospital suggest that 
some of them believed they could have lost their job had they not returned to 
staff the unit.  For these individuals, fear of the economic consequences of 
becoming unemployed seemed to outweigh fear of the hazard. 
Scientists at the Geophysics Institute, responsible for monitoring the 
volcano, continued to recommend that the alert level not be downgraded from 
orange (El Universo, April 25, 2000). 
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In addition to the lack of work in Baños, another factor that may have 
contributed to keeping people away from the hazard zone initially was that the 
provincial government would not authorize a general reopening of the schools in 
Baños while the town was on orange alert status.  The Provincial Ministry of 
Education for Tungurahua Province did, however, allow a limited number of 
classes to be held so that students from poor families working in Baños and who 
had no means of getting their children to school outside of the hazard area could 
be accommodated.  By early March 2000, there were an estimated 337 children 
in school in Baños, 300 of them with the authorization of the ministry (La Hora, 
March 11, 2000b).  Toward the end of April, the administrator of a school in 
Baños opened his facility for classes in an effort to get more people to return, a 
move that met with open criticism from the governor of the province.  A number 
of parents also objected, and they petitioned the Education Ministry to allow their 
children to complete the school year, which runs through August, in Ambato, 
regardless of whether or not schools were open in Baños (La Hora, April 25, 
2000). 
The difficulties encountered in getting the town back on its feet did not 
deter local leaders, and the campaign to get tourists and residents back 
continued.  At his inauguration in August 2000, a new mayor, elected earlier in 
the year, called for all of the residents who had evacuated the canton to return.   
According to a press report, the mayor also announced that the town’s tourism 
campaign would be a means of “getting the truth out about Baños and its 
[natural] beauty” (La Hora, August 11, 2000).  The pertinent paragraph reads:  
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[The Mayor] said that he would make a coordinated 
effort so that all residents would come back to their 
birthplace.  ‘The recovery of tourism, with publicity 
campaigns carried in the various media, will make the 
truth about Baños and its beauty known…. In Baños, 
everything is peaceful because the volcano, with all 
its power, has made a new source of revenue 
available to all families from Baños, he said.’ (Dijo que 
a través de un trabajo coordinado tratará que todos 
los pobladores vuelvan a su tierra natal.  ‘La 
reactivación del turismo con campañas en los 
diferentes medios de comunicación permitirá conocer 
la verdad y la belleza de Baños. ….. En Baños todo 
se encuentra en tranquilidad, pues el volcán con todo 
su poder ha abierto otra fuente de ingresos para 
todas las familias baneñas, afirmó.’) (researcher’s 
translation). 
 
New infrastructure would be built and existing facilities improved to 
encourage more tourists (La Hora, August 10, 2000).  The announcement was 
part of a lobbying effort that succeeded in getting the authorities to step down the 
alert level.   Faced perhaps with a fait accompli, on September 5, 2000, the 
National Civil Defense authority finally lowered the alert level to yellow, but for 
Baños only. All other hazardous areas around the volcano remained on orange 
alert.  This was still the status in December 2002. 
The step-down in alert status for Baños came just two weeks before Holy 
Friday and tourists flocked to the town (El Comercio, September 24, 2000). 
Former evacuees were interviewed in January 2001 for the Tobin and 
Whiteford study.  Asked why they had returned to Baños, 12.5 percent said it 
was because of the availability of work; another 25.0 percent returned because of 
adverse economic conditions in the communities they were living in; 7.5 percent 
listed the opening of the schools in Baños and only 2.5 percent said it was 
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because the alert level had been lowered and/or Baños was no longer at risk 
(Table 7).  
Table 7.  Reasons for returning to Baños – January 2001 
(first reason cited by respondents) 
 
Push factors for 
return 
 Pull factors for return  
 N (%)  N (%) 
Economic reasons 20 (25.0) Community and 
property 
25 (31.3) 
Uncomfortable 
situations 
10 (12.5) Work availability 10 (12.5) 
Forced to return 2 (2.5) Others had returned 5 (6.2) 
  School availability 6 (7.5) 
  Alert level 
lowered/Baños no 
longer dangerous 
2 (2.5) 
                                 Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics. 
 
Efforts by town leaders to get their community reactivated brought them 
into conflict with the scientists responsible for monitoring the volcano and 
providing risk assessments, and with the Civil Defense authorities responsible for 
emergency management.  Scientists at the Geophysics Institute were accused of 
exaggerating the degree of risk posed by the volcano to Baños. Individuals 
connected with the tourist industry threatened to bring suit against the Institute’s 
director (La Hora, July 8, 2001).  In August 2001, when ash fall from Tungurahua 
was intense and was causing serious problems for people and agriculture in 
neighboring cantons, authorities in Baños, fearful that tourists would be scared 
away, demanded that information about the volcano be released only through the 
Province’s Emergency Operations Committee (El Universo, August 27 and 28, 
2001).  The August 9, 2001 editions of several newspapers show a very different 
emphasis in coverage of the event.  The national editions of El Comercio and El 
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Universo focus on the damaging effects of the ash fall.  The national daily, La 
Hora, with a local edition in Tungurahua Province, emphasized that the erupting 
volcano was a tourist attraction (El Comercio, El Universo and La Hora, August 
9, 2001).  
Efforts to minimize the degree of risk to the community may also be 
reflected in a lack of enthusiasm to pursue the necessary public awareness 
campaigns and preparedness programs. The leaders who organized the return to 
Baños had committed that returned residents and tourists would be provided with 
full information and training as to what to do in the event of a major emergency.  
This commitment was not a top priority for community leaders because Civil 
Defense personnel were not welcome in Baños for several months following the 
return, and groups within the community insisted that they were capable of 
handling any emergency that might develop (La Hora, September 18, 2000; El 
Comercio, September 24, 2000).  However, after the intense activity and ash 
emissions in August 2001, the municipality did announce that its Emergency 
Operations Committee would be strengthened (La Hora, September 1, 2001; El 
Comercio, September 1, 2001).  Peripheral flank communities may have 
received less attention.  For example there was no road suitable for promptly 
evacuating the 150 inhabitants of the village of Pondoa (Map 2, page 36), on the 
flanks of the volcano, above Baños (La Hora, November 10, 2001).  
During research visits in June 2000, January 2001, March 2002 and May 
2002, personal observations seemed to confirm that the potential hazard posed 
by Mount Tungurahua was being downplayed by local businesses and 
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authorities.  As detailed in Chapter 6, hazard signage and directions were not 
prominently displayed in the areas most frequented by tourists, including the bus 
terminal, hotels/motels and restaurants.  
   
Ongoing Eruptions 
 
After authorities downgraded the alert level for Baños to yellow more 
residents did return and the influx of tourists gradually improved.  In March 2002, 
there were approximately 10,000 people living in Baños, about 70 percent of the 
original population (INEC, 2001).  The intervening months had seen major 
impacts of Tungurahua’s eruptions in other parts of the province and in the 
adjoining province of Chimborazo, but Baños remained relatively untouched.  
Whenever volcanic activity increased significantly, town leaders appear to have 
gone on a publicity offensive to make it clear that the hazard was not affecting 
Baños and that the eruptions provided tourists with a great opportunity to see an 
active volcano. 
 
Perceptions of the Volcano Hazard 
In June 2000, former residents of Baños living in a shelter in Ambato were 
interviewed for the Tobin and Whiteford (2001) study about their perceptions of 
the degree of risk posed by the volcano hazard.  Fifty percent of those 
interviewed said they were very worried about the volcano.  Early returnees to 
Baños were also interviewed, but among this group, fewer than 6 percent said 
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they were very worried, and 50 percent said they were not at all worried about 
the volcano (Table 8). 
Table 8.  Degree of worry about volcano – June 2000 
Are you worried about the volcano? Interview 
area No A little Somewhat Very Extremely Total 
Living in 
shelter in 
Ambato 
(n=36) 
- 22.2% 16.7% 50.0% 11.1% 100.0% 
Returned 
to live in 
Baños 
(n=34) 
50.0% 20.6% 14.7% 5.9% 8.8% 100.0% 
                                   Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics. 
 
The same study found that among evacuees from Baños living in shelters 
in June 2000, many people were still “very to extremely” worried about the 
volcano and believed it represented a “high to very high” degree of personal risk.  
The same group of evacuees, but not necessarily the same individuals in the 
group, was interviewed again in January 2001, approximately four months after 
the shelter they had been living in was closed and one year after the town of 
Baños had been reoccupied.   Many of them were still very worried about the 
volcano (40.8 percent) and 45.8 percent believed it presented a high degree of 
personal risk (Tables 9 and 10).  At the time of the January 2001 interviews some 
of these people were living in Baños but working in Ambato and vice-versa. 
Table 9. Worry about volcano among shelter residents 
 
 June 2000 (n=42) January 2001(n=27) 
Little or no worry 21.4% 48.1% 
Somewhat worried 14.3% 11.1% 
Very to extremely worried 64.3% 40.8% 
                               Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics. 
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Table 10. Perceptions of risk among shelter residents 
 
 June 2000 
(n=42) 
January 2001 
(n=24) 
Little or no risk 16.7% 41.7% 
Moderate risk 16.7% 12.5% 
High to very high risk 66.6% 45.8% 
                      Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics. 
 
Perceptions of risk among people who were actually living in Baños in 
June 2000, January 2001 and May 2002 were strikingly dissimilar.  
Approximately 60 percent or more in each of the interviews were not worried 
about the volcano and believed it presented little or no personal risk (Tables 11 
and 12).  Since these were people who were living in Baños, their responses are 
not surprising, as it would seem logical that they would not have returned had 
they believed the volcano presented a significant threat.  It is, however, 
interesting to note that by May of 2002, the percentage of people in Baños who 
indicated they were “somewhat worried” about the volcano had increased to 32.1 
percent, versus 14.7 percent in June 2000 and 7.1 percent in January 2001 
(Table 11), possibly reflecting, among other hypotheses, the inclusion of people 
in the sample who had been forced to return because the shelters were closed, 
or a growing realization among residents that the volcano was indeed a risk.  
Unfortunately it was not possible to verify either of these hypotheses. 
Table 11. Worry about volcano among Baños returnees 
 
 June 2000 
(n=34) 
January 2001 
(n=82) 
May 2002 
(n=106) 
Little or no worry 70.6% 79.8% 59.4% 
Somewhat worried 14.7% 7.1% 32.1% 
Very to extremely worried 14.7% 13.1% 8.5% 
    Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
                                   Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics. 
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Table 12.  Perceptions of risk among Baños returnees 
 
 January 2001 
(n=80) 
May 2002 
(n=105) 
Little or no risk 62.4% 64.8% 
Moderate risk 18.8% 25.7% 
High risk 18.8% 9.5% 
     Total 100.0% 100.0% 
                             Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The economic recovery of Baños required a conscious effort on the part of 
community leaders to change perceptions of risk among tourists and evacuated 
residents.  The initial eruptions and the evacuation stemmed the flow of visitors 
to Baños.  Without tourists there could be no economic recovery for the 
community.   Community leaders realized this and started an aggressive 
campaign to get positive views of the situation in Baños out in the marketplace.  
Even after the reoccupation of the town some evacuees, however, believed the 
volcano did indeed present a high degree of risk.  It is not possible to determine 
how widespread this belief was because so few evacuees went to shelters and 
there are no data on risk perception among the non-sheltered population.   
Although newspaper articles cannot be taken as completely factual reports of 
statements by leaders in Baños, the reporting throughout 2000 is consistent, and 
suggests that residents, like tourists, had to be convinced that the volcano was 
not an imminent threat. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF THE HAZARD 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When high-risk areas around Tungurahua Volcano were evacuated in 
1999, Ecuador was in the midst of a severe economic crisis that was causing 
tremendous social and political turmoil.  The ongoing eruptions of a volcano in a 
relatively unpopulated part of the country appear on the national scene as an 
event of minor significance.  One way in which to understand the vulnerability of 
the people exposed to the hazard is to view their response to the evacuation and 
their attempts to reestablish the economic viability of their community in terms of 
the major socio-economic developments occurring at the time.  These events 
may have affected individual or community perceptions of the importance of the 
volcanic hazard when compared with the socio-economic turmoil that had 
engulfed all of Ecuador, may have decreased the range of recovery options 
available to evacuees, and certainly inhibited the state’s ability to manage the 
crisis adequately. 
Macro-economic conditions in Ecuador correlated closely with local 
conditions because of the country’s relatively small size and because historically 
Ecuador has been governed on a centrist model.  Until recently, practically all 
decision-making was done by government agencies in the capital. 
 117 
The relationship between events at the national and local levels was 
drawn from an analysis of data excerpted from research conducted by Tobin and 
Whiteford (2001) in which evacuees ranked the various crises or problems they 
were experiencing.  Except among a group of rural people, who had abandoned 
their lands because of the direct impact of the hazard, more people perceived the 
economic situation and the evacuation itself as greater crises in their lives than 
the potential danger from the volcano.  The data from the Tobin and Whiteford 
(2001) study are presented in the first section of the chapter and are followed by 
research on each of the major socio-economic events that respondents had 
ranked as crises in their lives. 
 
Crises Experienced by Evacuees 
Questionnaire surveys for the Tobin and Whiteford (2001) study that were 
administered in June 2000 and January 2001 to evacuees showed that economic 
problems almost always outranked other crises, including the volcano hazard.  
The exceptions were: (1) economic problems were ranked equally with the 
evacuation as the worst crisis by people who had returned to live in Baños in 
early 2000 before the evacuation order was lifted; and (2) agricultural problems 
slightly outranked economic problems in 2000 among rural peoples who were 
living in a resettlement center.  Among people affected by the volcano, more 
respondents ranked economic problems as the worst crisis in 2001 than did in 
2000.  In a control community, that had experienced neither the evacuation nor 
the volcanic hazard, the percentage decreased significantly (Table 13). 
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Table 13. Ranking of crises 
 
 
Returned to 
Baños  
City shelter 
residents 
(current)(former) 
Rural 
Resettlement 
Center 
Rural 
Control 
Community 
(not 
evacuated) 
2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 Worst 
Crisis N=33 N=77 N=40 N=24 N=22 N=25 N=27 N=22 
 % % % % % % % % 
Agricultural 
problems 6.1 9.1 12.5 4.2 31.8 8.0 - 18.2 
Economic 
problems 33.3 40.3 32.5 33.3 22.7 40.0 51.9 40.9 
Political 
turmoil 6.1 - - - - - 11.1 - 
Volcano/ 
floods 12.1 7.8 10.0 4.2 4.5 12.0 7.4 9.2 
Family 
illness/death 6.1 10.4 20.0 8.3 9.1 4.0 29.6 4.5 
Evacuation 33.3 14.2 12.5 12.5 22.7 12.0 - - 
Other family 
issues 3.0 9.1 5.0 12.5 - 4.0 - 4.5 
Loss of 
home - 1.3 5.0 - 4.5 8.0 - - 
Everything - 1.3 2.5 12.5 - - - 4.5 
Other crises - 6.5 - 12.5 - 12.0 - 18.2 
                                      Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics. 
 
For statistical reasons, the economic problems identified as crises in 2000 
were aggregated.  They included the devaluation of the currency, loss of bank 
funds and lack of money.  In 2001, dollarization of the economy was added to the 
2000 list.  The background of these events is reviewed in the following sections. 
 
Overview of Socio-economic Developments in Ecuador 
The Ecuadorian economy is highly dependent on revenue from petroleum 
exports which, in 2001, represented approximately 45 percent of all exports (US 
Energy Information Administration, 2002).  As a result of this dependence, even 
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small changes in world prices can have big impacts on government revenues.   
In the early 1990s, Ecuador had benefited from high oil prices but within a few 
years the price for Ecuadorian crude began falling, resulting in inflation and fiscal 
deficits.  By 1998, Ecuador was spending more on imports than it was receiving 
in export revenues.   The combination of economic factors and an unstable 
political situation resulted in less domestic and foreign investment.  In 1998 the 
world price for petroleum dropped dramatically (Figure 5).  The change between 
1997 and 1999, when the per barrel price reached a low of $8.50, represented a 
drop of 62.8 percent.  Ecuador could not compensate for the decrease in 
revenues by increasing production (FAO, 2001). 
Figure 5.  Ecuador crude petroleum prices: 1997-2001 
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                                       Data obtained from: U.S. Energy Information 
                                                            Administration (2002) statistics. 
                         Note: Prices are those in effect at the start of the year. 
 
The Ecuadorian economy was also negatively impacted in 1997-1998 by 
the effects of a natural hazard.  An El Niño episode caused extensive flooding 
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and destruction of infrastructure and housing in coastal areas.  The total cost of 
the damage was estimated at US$2,869 million (World Bank, 2001), or 
approximately 14.5 percent of 1998 gross domestic product.  For comparison 
purposes, Hurricane Opal in 1995 in the United States resulted in similar 
damages: $3,000 million (1995 dollars) (Jarrell et al., 2001).  Opal was the fifth 
most costly hurricane in U.S. history, but the $3,000 million figure represented a 
mere 0.04 percent of 1995 GDP (GDP data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
2002).  In addition to the widespread infrastructure damage and loss of housing, 
the 1997-1998 El Niño event caused food production to fall because of extensive 
damage to crops especially (Figure 6).  
Figure 6.  Growth in food production: 1995-2000 
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                                                     Data obtained from ECLAC (2001) statistics. 
 
As the economy worsened, a number of banks failed, due in part to the 
economic crisis but also because of shaky loans and, in some cases, outright 
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theft and corruption.  In March 1999, in order to stop a run on the banks, the 
government declared a bank holiday and froze demand and savings deposits for 
a six-month period and time deposits for one year at all banking institutions 
(ECLAC, 2000).  The move affected all social classes but especially the middle 
class.   The freezing of bank accounts was one of the problems identified by 
many evacuees as a crisis that had affected them more than the volcano and the 
evacuation.    
Cutting government expenditures and efforts to increase revenues were 
not enough to stave off the crisis.  In September 1999 Ecuador announced it 
could not make interest payments on part of its international debt (Janes, 2000; 
Bronstein, 1999). 
For several years foreign debt had been taking up about 41 percent of 
government expenditures, leaving little to spend on education, healthcare or 
other vital social programs.  For example, in 2000 foreign debt service amounted 
to 33.4 percent of GDP, approximately US$2,124.3 million (Bureau of Economic 
and Business Affairs, 2001).  This was considerably more than government 
expenditures on social programs that year.  Public spending on health, for 
instance, decreased from 1.8 percent of GDP in 1995 to 0.9 percent in 1998 and 
while the percentage remained the same in 1999 and 2000, GDP decreased 
significantly those years resulting in smaller budgets for health expenditures 
(ECLAC, 2001) (Figures 7 and 8). 
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Figure 7.  Public expenditures on health: 1995-2000 
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                                                     Data obtained from ECLAC (2001) statistics. 
 
Figure 8.  Gross domestic product: 1995-2000 
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                                       Data obtained from ECLAC (2001) statistics. 
 
A new president, elected in mid-1998, attempted to turn the economy 
around by further cutting government budgets, by increasing tax revenues and by 
implementing structural adjustment policies recommended by international 
lenders, but the economy continued to deteriorate.  By October 1999, when the 
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town of Baños and other communities were evacuated, the inflation rate was 
43.1 percent; by yearend it reached 60.7 percent (Figure 9).  Real wages 
declined by 67.8 basis points, from 108.70 in January 1999 to 40.90 in December 
(Figure 10), a decrease of 62.4 percent.  
Figure 9.  Inflation: 1999 
Inflation: 1999
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Ja
n
Fe
b
M
ar
A
pr
M
ay Ju
n
Ju
l
A
ug
S
ep
t
O
ct
N
ov
D
ec
%
 
              Data obtained from Banco Central del Ecuador (1999) statistics. 
 
Figure 10. Real wages: 1999 
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Data obtained from Banco Central del Ecuador (1999) statistics. 
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Life had become economically impossible for most of the population.  This 
was especially so for evacuees, who were separated from their livelihoods and 
homes at the worst possible time, just as inflation, which had already been eating 
away at earnings and purchasing power, was rising even more steeply.  These 
conditions undoubtedly aggravated what was already an extremely difficult 
situation for evacuees and many who might otherwise have been able to cope at 
some level with the disaster became unable to do so. 
Among the population at large, with inflation out of control and the lack of 
funding of many social programs including pensions, healthcare, food programs 
and education, social unrest mounted.  The announcement on January 9, 1999, 
that the government intended to convert to the U.S. dollar was widely viewed as 
a move that would create additional economic hardship, especially for the poor, 
who constituted the vast majority of the population.  Opposition to the 
government culminated in a coup d’état on January 21, 2000, a little more than 
two weeks after residents forced the military to relinquish Baños.  The national 
coup was achieved in part by a massive popular uprising backed by a few 
military officers.  The leaders of the coup, however, relinquished power within 
hours to a constitutional successor government headed by the vice president, 
Gustavo Noboa (Hoy Digital, January 22, 2000). 
The Noboa government continued the previous president’s attempts to 
effect reforms, including the elimination of subsidies on essential items such as 
cooking gas, electricity and fuel.  A two-billion dollar loan package was 
negotiated with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Andean 
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Development Corporation (IMF, 2000).  Ecuador’s international debt with other 
lenders was rescheduled. 
Part of the price for the assistance was the requirement that Ecuador 
continue structural adjustment programs, including increased participation by the 
private sector, including international companies, in important segments of the 
economy. The loan also called for the elimination of subsidies on essential 
services, the imposition of higher taxes and further curtailment of government 
spending programs. The Noboa government proceeded with the implementation 
of dollarization.  In March 2000, the Ecuadorian Congress passed a law making 
the dollar the official currency.  September 2000 the former national currency, the 
sucre, was retired (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 2002). 
For many evacuees, the conversion to a dollar standard was another in 
the series of economic blows they had sustained since the evacuation in October 
1999.  Besides having to spend money on items they might otherwise not have 
had to, such as rent, inflation had also been eating away at any savings and 
then, dollarization resulted in further price hikes on essential items, particularly 
food, because of lack of familiarity with the currency and rounding-up to a dollar 
equivalent of the old sucre – a situation that was taken full advantage of by many 
unscrupulous merchants. 
 
Some Social Costs of Ecuador’s Economic Crisis 
  
Throughout 2000, economic conditions for Ecuadorians continued to be 
extremely difficult.  The dramatic increase in the number of Ecuadorians 
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emigrating provides one measure of how desperate many people had become.  
By one estimate, between January and March 2000 more than 57,000 
Ecuadorians emigrated (Unda, 2001).  The exodus was a continuation of a 
pattern that had started some years earlier and which intensified.   Most migrants 
were middle-class and a high percentage of them were female (Jokisch and 
Pribilsky, 2002).  The money sent home to Ecuador by these expatriates became 
an important source of financial assistance for family and friends (Table 14). 
Table 14.  Remittances from expatriates: 1999-2001 
 
Year Amount 
(in billions of US$) 
1999 1.084 
2000 1.317 
2001 1.415 
                                         Source: El Comercio, 2003 (January, n.d.) 
Because of the economic polarity of Ecuadorian society, average national 
figures fail to convey the full impact of the economic crisis.  Even so, GDP per 
capita figures do provide an insight into conditions.  From a high of US$1,665 in 
1997, GDP per capita decreased to US$1,079 in 2000 (Figure 11), a drop of 34.8 
percent (ECLAC, 2001).  A per capita GDP of US$1,079 equates to just $2.96 
per day as a national average.     
At yearend 1999, the official urban unemployment rate was 14.4 percent 
of the economically active population (the average for 1999 was 15.1 percent).  
Private consumption had decreased by 14.8 percent compared to 1998 (Banco 
Central del Ecuador, 2002; ECLAC, 2001). 
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Figure 11.  Gross domestic product per capita: 1995-2001 
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                                                  Data obtained from ECLAC (2001) statistics. 
 
 
In January 2000 inflation surged.  The rate for December was 8.5 percent.  
In January it jumped to 14.3 percent.  In February 2000, when the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Censos released the January figures, its data showed 
that the price of the basic family food basket was $178.75, while typical income 
for a family of 5 was $74.94, a deficit of 55.8 percent between income and the 
cost of food (INEC, 2000).  But more was still ahead: the increase in February 
was 11.5 percent; in March 9.5 percent; in April 13.8 percent.  It was May before 
inflation started to abate, but the cumulative rate for the year was 90.6 percent. 
It would be near the end of 2000 before the economy started to show 
some improvement, approximately around the same time that the shelters for 
evacuees were closed.  In 2000, gross domestic product grew by 2.8 percent 
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compared to 1999, which had seen a decline of 9.5 percent.  Real gross national 
disposable income also increased in 2000, by 5.0 percent, compared with a 
decline of 6.8 percent in 1999 (ECLAC, 2001).  But the unemployment rate 
remained high and underemployment continued to rise. By November 2000 
underemployment affected 60.5 percent of the labor force (Figure 12).   
Figure 12. Unemployment and underemployment 
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                 Data obtained from Banco Central del Ecuador (1999, 2002). 
 
 
The evacuation of Baños occurred during a critical period in the economy 
of Ecuador.  Evacuees, like the rest of the population, had seen their real income 
decreasing rapidly throughout 1999 as unemployment and underemployment 
rose.   Government revenues had been contracting, as shown by the decrease in 
the GDP and other indicators, with resulting cuts in the funding of government 
programs, such as health, that are important components of recovery from 
disaster.  The country’s economic condition had destroyed the ability of both the 
individual and the state to respond adequately to the emergency. 
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Local Economic Context 
 
Many of the people who were displaced from Baños and surrounding 
communities moved to Ambato.  Ambato has a population of 154,369 and is the 
ninth most populous city in Ecuador (INEC, 2001).  It is a bustling commercial 
and industrial town, quite different from Baños with its focus on tourism.  Ambato 
might have offered new economic opportunities for many of the people who 
sought refuge there, but because the national economy was in disarray, 
conditions were difficult even for the town’s established residents. It was 
impossible for the city to provide for such a large number of people seeking 
refuge and employment.  Informal conversations with several residents of Baños 
indicated that many people did find jobs in Ambato, although some believed that 
the wages they were being paid were less than locals would have been paid for 
the same work.  The same sources indicated that other people, possibly only a 
relative few, found better-paying jobs in Ambato than they had held in Baños. 
About 2,000 people were housed in shelters in Ambato.  An unknown 
number, but most likely several thousand people, rented living quarters or stayed 
with family or friends. 
According to the consumer price index (CPI) reports issued monthly by the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC), the increase in the average 
CPI in Ambato between October 1999, when Baños was evacuated, and the end 
of December 1999, when the return movement crystallized,  was almost 27 
percentage points.  For the year, the average increase in the CPI was 69.25 
percent, higher than the national average of 60.71 percent.  Figure 13 shows the 
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average increase in the CPI and increases in selected individual components of 
the index during 1999. 
Figure 13.  Changes in the CPI - Ambato 1999 
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                                                          Data obtained from INEC (1999) statistics. 
 
The period mid-October to end-December then was one of high inflation, 
at exactly the time that people were first evacuated from Baños and other 
communities, and when it was realized that the eruption was not a given and that 
evacuation could be for a prolonged period of time. 
The economic situation deteriorated further in 2000.  The average 
increase in the CPI for the year was 90.84 percent, and increases in the food 
component of the CPI, which consists of foods, non-alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco products, increased by 107.65 percent, while health costs increased by 
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102.76 percent (Figure 14).  For people who remained evacuated, the general 
prices increases and the increases in the price of foods particularly, must have 
accentuated the crisis. 
Figure 14.  Changes in the CPI – Ambato, 2000 
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                                                          Data obtained from INEC (2000) statistics. 
 
By the end of 2001, about 70 percent of the people from Baños and 
surrounding communities had returned home.  For that year, the average 
increase in the CPI for Ambato was 20.24 percent.   Food prices also leveled off 
somewhat in 2001, increasing by a relatively moderate 12.7 percent.  The 
leveling off in food costs, however, was partially offset by a 53.0 percent increase 
in the cost of rent, water, electricity and cooking gas; health costs increased by 
34.9 percent (Figure 15).   These data suggest that, in addition to the very 
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effective efforts of the tourist industry in Baños, the recovery of the town was at 
least partly due to the general improvement in the overall economy of Ecuador. 
Figure 15.  Changes in the CPI – Ambato, 2001 
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                                                          Data obtained from INEC (2001) statistics. 
 
Table 15 shows the breakdown in the increases in the prices of water, 
electricity, and cooking gas in Ambato between 2000 and 2001. 
Table 15.  Price increases in basic services in Ambato 
(2000 to 2001) 
 
Service Unit of measure 
Percent increase 
2000-2001 
Water 30 m3 148.80% 
Electricity 180 Kw 57.40% 
Cooking gas 15 Kg 56.90% 
                                            Source: SICA/MAG, 2002. 
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In summary, between October 1999 when Baños was evacuated, and 
September 2000, when the shelter in Ambato was closed and most people 
returned to start the new school year in Baños, the consumer price index rose 
from 394.12 basis points to 807.37 points, an increase of slightly more than 100 
percent (Figure 16), and higher than the national inflation rate of 90.6 percent. 
Figure 16. Consumer price index Ambato 
(October 1999 – September 2000) 
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                                                Base year: Sept 94-Aug 95 = 100 points. 
                                    Data obtained from INEC (1999-2000) statistics. 
 
Most people were away from their homes in Baños from October 1999 
through September 2000.  It was during this period that the cost of living was 
increasing at a faster pace than either before the evacuation or after the shelters 
were closed (Figure 17) so evacuees were adrift from their normal support 
systems during the worst of the inflationary period. 
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Figure 17.  Consumer price index Ambato: 1999-2001 
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                                                               Base year: Sept 94-Aug 95 = 100 points. 
                                                    Data obtained from INEC (1999-2001) statistics. 
 
 
 
Social Conflicts 
 
The period from 1998 through mid-2000 was a tumultuous one on the 
social front.  Government cost-cutting/cost-containment programs generated 
numerous strikes and street protests.  The difficult times continued throughout 
most of 2001.  The following information was compiled from numerous sources, 
including the daily editions from December 1999 through December 2001 of the 
national newspapers El Comercio, La Hora and El Universo; the magazine 
Ecuador Debate (1999-2002), and a review by Unda (2001). 
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In November and December 1999, while Baños was completely 
evacuated, there was a growing movement that called for the resignation of 
President Jamil Mahuad.  On January 7, just two days after the “peace 
agreement” was signed between the leaders of the movement to return to Baños, 
the Province of Pastaza and the Governor of Tungurahua Province, CONAIE, the 
politically powerful Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador 
(National Federation of Indigenous Peoples of Ecuador), called for a nationwide 
strike and demonstration for January 15.  The same day this was announced 
(January 7) some labor unions took to the streets.  Two days later, President 
Mahuad announced that he would proceed with plans to make the U.S. dollar the 
national currency (“dollarization”), and would proceed with partial privatization of 
essential services such as the petroleum industry and the telephone companies 
as well as partial privatization of the social security system. 
In the ensuing days, other social and political organizations, including 
factions within the Roman Catholic Church, started organizing, protesting and 
blockading the main roads.  On January 18, thousands of indigenous people 
moved into the capital during the night.  Two days of massive protests and the 
union of some military leaders with the indigenous groups culminated in the 
deposition of Mahuad. 
Although the coup brought some political stability, the economic issues 
were still unresolved.  Throughout the year the country would be disrupted by 
periodic strikes and demonstrations.  Social protest centered mostly on wage 
demands, privatization, dollarization and opposition to scheduled or announced 
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price increases on essential items such as bus fares, electricity and cooking gas. 
These were not the only topics however.  There were also street demonstrations 
for the release of the civilian and military participants in the January 21 coup, 
who had been imprisoned, and against the construction of a new oil pipeline.   
There were also peaceful protests demanding the “unfreezing” of bank deposits.  
Some demonstrations drew thousands and involved the entire country; others 
marshaled a few hundred protesters in one restricted location.  All were 
disruptive though, particularly the actions by public sector workers – although the 
latter are barred under Ecuadorian law from participating in strikes or work 
stoppages (Article 3, paragraph 10 of the Constitution of Ecuador). 
The sectors most affected appear to have been health care, education 
and the social security service.  One of the longest strikes was by employees at 
the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguro Social (IESS) (the Social Security agency) 
opposing partial privatization of the social security system.  In addition to 
opposing privatization, public sector workers, including health workers and 
teachers, engaged in strikes, demonstrations and work stoppages to seek higher 
wages and/or back pay owed by the government.  In April 2000, 40,000 public 
employees from various agencies went out for several weeks demanding a base 
monthly wage of $200.  The teachers were on strike periodically throughout the 
year, asking for wage hikes and for back pay owed to them by a government 
slow in paying wages.  One generalized teacher strike lasted from mid-April 
through mid-May 2000. 
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The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), along with the Ministries of Social 
Welfare, Environment and Public Works, was affected by a work stoppage.  The 
MoA were responsible for managing the resettlement centers for rural peoples, 
located mainly in Chimborazo Province.  They were on strike for three weeks in 
April.  
The protests against price hikes focused on an agreement signed on April 
19 after protracted negotiations between the government and the International 
Monetary Fund.  In order to meet the terms of the agreement, among other items 
the government was committed to raising the price of fuel, cooking gas and 
electric energy, speeding-up the privatization process, and implementing various 
changes to the tax laws, including establishing a tax on domestic services (i.e. on 
household workers/domestic servants), and increasing the value-added tax 
(VAT) from 12 to 14 percent.  
One of the most grievous issues was the conversion from the national 
currency, the sucre, to the U.S. dollar.  This was one of the crises identified by 
evacuees in the Tobin and Whiteford (2001) study.   As the September deadline 
approached for general adoption of the U.S. dollar, many economic and social 
groups throughout Ecuador protested.  It appeared at one point that there might 
be massive demonstrations but the government intervened quickly and 
decisively, threatening to impose martial law.   A general strike called by CONAIE 
did not materialize.  On September 9, with relatively little manifest protest, the 
U.S. dollar became legal tender throughout Ecuador (El Comercio, September 9, 
2000). 
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One of the problems with dollarization was that, in spite of an educational 
program that the government started in April to acquaint people with the 
currency, most of the population literally did not understand the value of a dollar.  
They also were not familiar with the coins that represent fractions of a dollar.   
People used to dealing in thousands of sucres for the purchase of a small 
quantity of a staple, such as potatoes for example, had difficulty adjusting to the 
fact that the many thousands of sucres converted to less than a unit of one.  
Also, initially, there were not enough coins in circulation and unscrupulous 
merchants would not give change or would give the wrong change.  Further, 
because of the limited convertibility (100 cents = 25,000 sucres) the price of 
many items jumped dramatically, as merchants “rounded up” from the old price in 
sucres to the new dollar amount (La Hora, September 9 and 23, 2000). 
The political events of 2000 had a significant effect on the evacuees from 
Baños.  The change in head of state at the beginning of the year had a ripple 
effect because it resulted in a series of new government appointments, including 
several to key posts responsible for managing the crisis, such as the Governor of 
Tungurahua Province and the Minister of Housing and Urban Development.  The 
numerous strikes by public employees, particularly those in the ministries of 
health, education and agriculture, created an unstable administrative 
environment and must have adversely affected the ability of these ministries to 
render assistance.  Given the circumstances, then, it is not surprising that rather 
than wait for the national bureaucracy to manage the situation, political and labor 
leaders in Baños took matters into their own hands.   In the Tobin and Whiteford 
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(2001) study, among early returnees to Baños, surveyed in June 2000, 88.2 
percent said that the government had done “little or nothing” to help people 
affected by the volcano.  A survey for the same study, conducted in January 
2001, showed that the percentage of people who believed the government had 
done nothing increased to 94.0 percent (Tobin and Whiteford, 2001). 
Toward the end of 2000, the government implemented some of the price 
hikes announced earlier in the year.  On December 27, bus fares increased by 
up to 75 percent on some routes and the price of premium gasoline increased by 
20 percent.  The following day, some of the subsidies were removed from the 
price of cooking gas and early in the new year an increase in the value-added tax 
went into effect.  As a result, the year 2001 started with mass demonstrations 
against the price increases (BBC News, 2001).  In a process similar to that of the 
year before, which had resulted in a coup, major roads were blocked and 
thousands of people marched on Quito.  According to media reports, 6,000 
indigenous peoples occupied the Salesian University in Quito.  They camped 
there for several days. Eventually conflicts developed between the police/security 
forces and demonstrators in Quito and in other parts of Ecuador.  On February 2, 
the president declared a nationwide state-of-emergency (La Hora, February 3, 
2001).  Although the protesters’ demands were not entirely met, the government 
did eventually agree to roll-back the regressive VAT from 14 to 12 percent.  The 
roll-back went into effect in September 2001. 
After such an inauspicious start to the year, social unrest diminished 
gradually throughout the balance of 2001.  Figure 18 shows the steep rise in 
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social and political conflict from October 1999 through the end of January 2000.  
The period immediately following the coup was calm but unrest gradually 
increased until the end of May/early June when wage demands by public workers 
and others reached a peak.  The peak around August/September coincides with 
protests against the introduction of the dollar as the national currency.  Protests 
against price increases are reflected in the unprecedented January peak. 
When only public sector conflicts are analyzed the trend is somewhat 
different.  The January 2001 peak is missing.  Since the January 2001 protests 
were not successful, the data suggest that the public sector played a significant 
role in events during the period analyzed (Figure 19). 
Figure 18.  Social and political conflict: 1999-2001 
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          Data obtained from statistics in Ecuador Debate Vols. 46-55 (1999-2002). 
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Figure 19.  Public sector conflicts: 1999-2002 
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       Data obtained from statistics in Ecuador Debate Vols. 46-55 (1999-2002). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Mount Tungurahua could not have become active at a worse time.   
Evacuees from the volcano were divorced from their livelihoods and cast out 
from their homes at a time when the economic and political structures of the 
nation were disintegrating.   The volcanic hazard occurred when inflation – 
already high – was skyrocketing.  People who might have been able to grow part 
of the family food supply at home, in a kitchen garden for instance, had to buy 
basic foods at market prices that made many items unattainable.  Trying to find 
work in a new environment, when the unemployment rate was high and 
underemployment pervasive would have been extremely difficult even for those 
with the right skills.  Moving to a large city, like Ambato, where getting around 
might require taking a bus, could be a problem.  A small town like Baños can be 
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walked without difficulty from one end to the other, but not a city the size of 
Ambato.  Looking for work might require spending money on transportation – and 
bus fares were rising rapidly, as were the prices of other essentials that 
evacuees had to pay for, such as rent and utilities.    
The economic hardships were aggravated by the political turmoil and the 
constant strikes and protests.  Essential public services such as health care, 
schools and transportation were frequently shut down, or their regular functioning 
was impaired.  Agencies that should have been deeply involved in the recovery 
process were paralyzed.  The evacuees from Mount Tungurahua were not at the 
center of public attention.  This was directed away, toward events that were 
shaping the national political scene. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The case of Baños illustrates the relevance of the socio-economic context 
when considering vulnerability to disasters.  Issues of class and State that 
Cannon (1994 23) identifies in his model (Figure 1, page 21), including income 
distribution, assets, livelihood opportunities and institutional support, all affected 
the response of the evacuees to the risk posed by Mount Tungurahua.   The 
residents of Baños were confronted with a natural hazard that scientists 
estimated presented a high degree of risk to the community, although the 
impacts of the ongoing eruptions were hardly experienced in the town of Baños 
itself.   Many of the less affluent evacuees had limited opportunities to earn a 
living in the communities they evacuated to because of the economic crisis; the 
owners of tourist-reliant businesses could not move their assets out of Baños; the 
economic crisis and associated political turmoil diminished the capacity of the 
State to respond to the disaster.  Therefore, many evacuees chose to return to 
their homes, prepared to risk their lives by living at the base of a continuously 
erupting volcano rather than live as refugees, in exile, in extremely adverse 
economic conditions, with no expectation that the State would be able to 
adequately assist them. 
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Evacuees who returned to the hazard zone increased their exposure to 
the potential effects of a sudden-impact, violent eruption of Mount Tungurahua.  
On the surface, such a decision seems irrational, but people who returned were 
following reasoning that made sense to them.   The research suggests that their 
decision-making was constrained by a series of factors, mainly economic, which 
increased livelihood vulnerability.   An already disastrous situation – an entire 
community evacuated for an indeterminate length of time – was exacerbated 
because there was no “safe” place for most evacuees to go to, safe in the sense 
of a space where there were sufficient economic opportunities for them to rebuild 
their lives.   Had Ambato and other destination locations been able to provide 
better economic opportunities for evacuees than was possible under the 
conditions that prevailed in Ecuador at the time, fewer people might have 
returned to the hazard zone. 
A hostile national economic environment and the expectation of 
opportunities in Baños were the principal motivators for many of the people who 
returned, but other factors, specific to the locality, as suggested by Maskrey 
(1994), also intervened.  The absolute dependence of the local economy on 
tourism made the large-scale relocation of businesses and their associated jobs 
virtually impossible.  For most of these businesses, Baños was the only place 
where economic recovery could be achieved.  Further, the closing of the road 
running through Baños had serious economic repercussions on communities, 
transportation services and other businesses in the Oriente, so the spatial 
dimensions of the disaster extended well beyond the actual hazard zone and the 
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urban confines of Baños.  Additionally, many people held deep-rooted beliefs that 
helped to shape perceptions of the relative hazardousness of their community.  
These beliefs appeared to be rooted mainly in the spatial characteristics of the 
location and in the history of the town, but may also have been influenced by 
past hazard experience and by the efforts of the business community to secure 
the return of tourists to the area.  Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the 
volcano hazard barely affected Baños.  As the weeks following the evacuation 
turned into months, the ongoing eruptions caused no physical destruction in the 
town.  The people in Baños had no direct, intense experience with the hazard. 
The preceding observations are reviewed in greater detail below.  The 
chapter concludes with a timeline that shows concurrent major events that 
occurred between September 1999, when Tungurahua’s eruptive activity first 
became a serious concern, and December 2001.  The latter date brings the 
record up to two complete years of the reoccupation of Baños.  The scale of 
analysis is local and national.  Events noted include economic, social and 
political happenings, and a listing of significant natural hazards, including the 
progression of the volcano hazard.  
 
Discussion 
 
Endemic joblessness, low wages, rapidly escalating prices, and political 
uncertainty already had a firm grip on Ecuador well before Baños was evacuated.  
However, during the weeks and months following the exodus, the adverse 
economic and political conditions intensified.  Apart from the exceedingly 
wealthy, every socio-economic group in society was suffering the effects of the 
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economic crisis.  In the case of evacuees from Baños, the economic crisis was 
compounded by the abandonment of established livelihoods and the crisis in the 
government. 
Baños had been a space of economic well-being, with a large middle-
class and a high percentage of well-educated people.  The hard work of its 
inhabitants, combined with its propitious location and the many foreign travelers, 
domestic tourists and religious pilgrims who visited there had made Baños a 
small but prosperous oasis in the otherwise harsh physical environment of the 
eastern Sierra.  Baños also benefited economically from activities at the Agoyán 
Hydroelectric Plant located just to the east of town.  The main road running 
through Baños connected the Amazon region, with its growing potential for 
ecotourism and its important oil fields, with the towns of the high inter-Andean 
valley, even with the country’s principal commercial city, Guayaquil, on the 
Pacific Coast. 
Throughout its history, Baños had used its physical location to advantage.  
Mount Tungurahua threatened to make this location untenable.  Business owners 
had to abandon operations that generally take years to bring to profitable levels, 
leaving their employees out of work.   Further, where could the town’s many self-
employed artisans, taxi-cab owner/operators, tradesmen, street vendors, or tour 
guides, whose economic success was due to the status of Baños as a tourist 
Mecca, find a comparable location to reestablish themselves?  Tourist locations 
take years to develop and require increasingly sophisticated marketing. 
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At the national level, the political scene was changing rapidly.  As 
Baneños were being forced out of their homes, indigenous, labor and other 
groups were massing in opposition to the existing political regime.  Within two 
months of the evacuation, one president was deposed and a new one installed.   
The social and political disruption prior to the coup implied that the economic 
survival of the vast majority of evacuees from Mount Tungurahua depended not 
on government intervention or other outside assistance but on the initiative, 
inventiveness and tenacity of the evacuees themselves. 
It is not surprising therefore, that leaders within the displaced community 
were able to mobilize people to return to Baños in spite of the risk of an eruption.  
Because Baños depended on a single industry – tourism – it followed almost as a 
corollary that groups within the tourist industry would be instrumental in the 
return.  Many had fixed assets, impossible to relocate.  In addition to the 
economic distress of the tourist industry, closure of the road to the Oriente 
through Baños had economic repercussions for communities and business 
interests far away from the actual hazard zone, many of which had close ties to 
Baños.  The movement of people and goods along the Puyo-Baños-Ambato road 
had been brought to a halt when Baños was evacuated and the road closed.   
The cost and time of taking an alternate route, through Quito considerably to the 
north, for example, made products more expensive, and therefore less 
competitive.  The road could not stay closed indefinitely. 
Only a resumption of the tourist trade could help effect economic recovery.  
It is significant that according to the Municipality of Baños more than half of all 
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tourists in 2001 were foreigners (Municipalidad Baños de Agua Santa – 
Ministerio de Turismo, 2002).   Foreign tourists, traveling with hard currency, 
would be unaffected by the rampant local inflation even though they might be 
perturbed by the political instability attending the economic crisis.  If Baños was 
to recapture its share of this foreign market and also attract domestic tourists 
during the peak season, the town had to get the recovery effort underway 
quickly. The eruptions and evacuation in October 1999 had generated negative 
publicity that discouraged most tourists.  The perception that Baños was a 
dangerous place had to be overcome, particularly in the mind of the traveling 
public.  A number of factors undoubtedly contributed to make this possible. 
The characteristics of the ongoing volcanic eruptions and the spatial 
distribution of hazards were prime factors.  The violent explosive eruption did not 
occur within weeks as had been expected.  Baños was evacuated but nothing 
happened.  During the ensuing months, the town experienced virtually no direct 
effects of the hazard.  Ash fall was light and infrequent.  There were occasional 
rumblings and inconsequential tremors but no lahars advanced into town and no 
pyroclastic flows reached populated areas at the base.  The damage caused by 
hazards was elsewhere: further on down the road leading to Pelileo and Ambato; 
along the slopes of the volcano that bordered the Chambo River; in the highlands 
of Quero, Mocha and Guano. 
Even these hazards had killed nobody, but periodic floods and pervasive 
unpredictable landslides had.  In one frightening flash flood, just a few kilometers 
away, 13 people died.  In other parts of Ecuador both types of hazard claimed 
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several dozen lives.  Mount Tungurahua, sitting right at the backdoor to Baños, 
continuously threatened to do so, but took the life of no one. 
Historically, the volcano had caused serious damage and some 
inhabitants had died, but that was beyond the personal experience of virtually 
any current resident.   Devastating events, like the 1949 earthquake that 
destroyed nearby Old Pelileo, had killed thousands and had occurred within living 
memory. 
Furthermore, among those who believed in miracles, when Tungurahua 
had threatened the town in the past, the Virgin of Baños had always interceded, 
saving most of the inhabitants from instant annihilation.  The very characteristics 
of the space the town occupied, nestled at the base of the protective outcropping 
called Runtún, would save Baños and its inhabitants from destruction, according 
to local legend.  This was, supposedly, one of the reasons the Dominicans who 
founded Baños had chosen that particular site in the first place: according to their 
calculations, it was protected by Runtún from any eruption of Tungurahua.  The 
most recent eruptive cycle before the current event had been in 1916-1918.   
Baños had grown considerably since then when it was little more than a hamlet.   
Even in 1950, at the time of the first census ever in Ecuador, Baños had a mere 
3,000 people.  Thirty or more years earlier there were probably even fewer 
inhabitants but by the close of the twentieth century, the town had spread out so 
it occupied the entire width of the terrace between Runtún and the gorge of the 
Pastaza.  In addition to this expanded downtown, busy little communities had 
built up in or near the valleys of the Ulba and Vazcún Rivers, both of which have 
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served as pathways for major hazards in prior eruptions.  Would Runtún really 
still protect the entire urban area? 
Another factor in the development of local perceptions of the hazard may 
have been that the eruption column, which could frequently be seen from other 
communities, was barely visible from downtown Baños, because it was partly 
hidden by intervening mountain slopes and ever-present clouds.  
All of the preceding factors are well-established in the hazards literature 
as influencing perception: lack of recent, frequent, or intense experience with the 
hazard; lack of salience; and the power and persistence of myths and religious 
beliefs. 
Efforts to effect the economic recovery of Baños, even though it was 
located in a hazardous area, were aided by the general state of political and 
social chaos.  Although a new president had taken up the reins of power, the 
political and economic agenda did not change from that of his predecessor: 
dollarization of the economy; removal of subsidies on essentials like cooking gas 
and gasoline; announcement of new taxes and a higher level of taxation 
accompanied by more aggressive tax collecting by the authorities; privatization of 
some industries, threatening loss of public jobs; and overhaul and partial 
privatization of the Ecuadorian Social Security system.  All of these programs 
threatened to make life even more difficult for Ecuadorians than it was already 
and further increase the economic vulnerability of evacuees.  Many of the 
changes or proposed changes also threatened a system that was widely 
considered ineffective and corrupt but was also familiar and entrenched.  Faith in 
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government as an institution capable of resolving the evacuee crisis was 
undoubtedly diminished due to the instability of the political system. 
Before, during and after the evacuation many government bureaucracies 
were crippled by strikes or go-slow work stoppages.  While many dedicated 
public employees responsible for essential services, including health and 
education, continued to perform their duties, their dedication and capacity to 
respond must have been stretched to the limit.  Tens of thousands of public 
employees went unpaid for weeks at a time.  People working in agencies directly 
or indirectly responsible for providing assistance and support services were being 
squeezed in the same economic vise that the evacuees were.  
Given the socio-economic circumstances at the time, it is not surprising 
that for many evacuees the most viable solution to their problems was to return 
to Baños.  As the data suggest, some believed they would find economic 
opportunities there, similar to those they had prior to the evacuation.  Others 
returned because in Baños they would be in their own homes again, and they 
preferred this and the associated risk, to living like beggars in Ambato or 
wherever they had evacuated to.  Destitution away from Baños was perceived to 
be a more immediate and real hazard than the uncertain likelihood of a violent 
eruption. 
The case of Baños surely is not unique.  Wherever socio-economic 
conditions limit the choice of viable alternatives, people are forced to make hard 
decisions as to the type and degree of risk they believe they can best live with.  
These decisions frequently place them in harm’s way.       
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Timeline 
 
First Quarter 1999 
 January February March 
Mt. Tungurahua 
and Baños 
   
    
    
Other hazards1    
    
    
    
    
Economic Data:    
National inflation 
rate2 
3.2% 5.9% 20.2% 
CPI Ambato3 1.63% 3.66% 14.69% 
CPI Riobamba3 4.35% (0.04%) 11.04% 
CPI Quito3 3.01% 2.96% 13.26% 
Unemployment4 - - - 
Underemployment4 - - - 
    
  Political, Economic 
and Social events   
   
   
   
   
   
Bank crisis 
comes to a head; 
demand and 
savings deposits 
frozen for six 
months; time 
deposits for one 
year 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
                                            
1 Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador. 
2 The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative. 
3 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are 
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month. 
4 Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year. 
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Second Quarter 1999 
 April May June 
Mt. Tungurahua 
and Baños 
 Instability 
observed at Mt. 
Tungurahua 
 
    
    
    
    
Other hazards1    
    
    
    
    
Economic Data:    
National inflation 
rate2 
26.9% 28.0% 30.3% 
CPI Ambato3 4.90% 0.9% 3.0% 
CPI Riobamba3 6.31% 1.01% 1.79% 
CPI Quito3 5.26% 0.39% 2.87% 
Unemployment4 - - - 
Underemployment4 - - - 
    
   Political, Economic 
and Social events    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
                                            
1 Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador. 
2 The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative. 
3 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are 
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month. 
4 Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year. 
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Third Quarter 1999 
 July August September 
Mt. Tungurahua 
and Baños 
 
 
Mt. Tungurahua placed on technical alert (Sept. 8); Civil 
Defense starts public awareness programs; alert level 
raised to yellow and official response initiated (Sept. 15); 
census taken of Baños population; evacuation exercise 
Baños (Sept. 28). 
    
   
Other hazards1   
   
   
   
   
Economic Data:   
Eruptive action at 
Guagua 
Pichincha on 
outskirts of Quito; 
some villages 
evacuated; ash 
fall in capital 
National inflation 
rate2 
34.3% 35.0% 37.4% 
CPI Ambato3 4.03% 0.86% 2.96% 
CPI Riobamba3 4.3% 1.02% 2.0% 
CPI Quito3 2.65% 0.65% 2.04% 
Unemployment4 - - - 
Underemployment4 - - - 
    
 Political, Economic 
and Social events  
Ecuador defaults 
on Brady Bond 
interest payments 
   
   
 
Government 
announces fuel 
increase and new 
system of 
taxation. 
  
 Private sector strongly opposes tax reform effort 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
Transport workers and 
indigenous people 
strike; government 
announces it will hold 
prices on fuel until July 
2000 
  
  
                                           
 
 
1 Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador. 
2 The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative. 
3 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are 
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month. 
4 Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year. 
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Fourth Quarter 1999 
 October November December 
Mt. Tungurahua 
and Baños 
 
 
 
First eruption (Oct. 5); alert level raised to orange and 
evacuation of Baños and neighboring communities 
ordered (Oct. 16); first attempt to return to Baños (Nov. 
3); last permitted reentry under military escort (Nov. 6); 
2,500 people in shelters (Nov. 15).  Lahars frequent 
October/November. 
    
Other hazards1    
    
    
    
    
Economic Data:    
National inflation 
rate2 
43.1% 52.2% 60.7% 
CPI Ambato3 5.04% 6.06% 5.04% 
CPI Riobamba3 4.43% 5.48% 4.43% 
CPI Quito3 5.46% 6.3% 5.97% 
Unemployment4 - - 14.4% 
Underemployment4 - - 56.9% 
    
  Political, Economic 
and Social events   
   
   
   
   
1999 per capita 
GDP decreases 
11.2 percent 
(based on figures 
at constant 1995 
prices) 
    
    
 
 
 
Social unrest prevalent among Public Sector workers, 
particularly in health, education and petroleum, due to 
precarious salary/wage conditions. 
    
   
   
   
   
   
Remittances from 
Ecuadorians 
living abroad total 
US$1.084 billion 
in 1999. 
                                            
1 Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador. 
2 The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative. 
3 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are 
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month. 
4 Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year. 
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First Quarter 2000 
 January February March 
Mt. Tungurahua 
and Baños 
Mass return to 
Baños (Jan. 4-5) 
 First warning 
siren installed in 
Baños 
 
 
 
Loud explosions/lava founting/frequent ash columns in 
January and February; debris flows through June; overall 
mild activity, decreasing through June. Lahars common 
January-February. 
    
Other hazards1 Heavy rains 
  
  
   
   
 
                                           
Economic Data:    
National inflation 
rate2 
14.3% 25.8% 35.3% 
CPI Ambato3 15.35% 12.39% 5.39% 
CPI Riobamba3 12.89% 14.33% 7.3% 
CPI Quito3 14.97% 7.98% 6.45% 
Unemployment4 - - - 
Underemployment4 - - - 
    
Political, Economic 
and Social events 
 
US$2 billion loan 
package from 
IMF/WB/ADC; 
 
 
 
President announces 
dollarization of 
economy Jan. 9; 
deposed Jan. 21 in 
coup d’état; VP 
assumes presidency 
with backing of 
United States 
In Jan. cost 
of basic food 
basket for 
family of 4 
was $178.75. 
Typical 
income for 
family of 5 
was $74.94 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Change in government 
results in many new 
bureaucratic appointments 
including replacement of 
Governor of Tungurahua 
Province and other officials 
involved in hazard 
response   
Dollarization of 
national 
accounts; 
 
Starting mid-
March and 
continuing 
through early 
April protests and 
strikes mainly 
against food and 
fuel price 
increase 
 
1 Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador. 
2 The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative. 
3 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are 
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month. 
4 Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year. 
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Second Quarter 2000 
 April May June 
Mt. Tungurahua 
and Baños 
  
 
Ash columns; 
expulsion of large 
boulders   
 Debris flows through June; overall mild activity 
   
  
Other hazards1 
 
 
 
  
 
Heavy rains 
cause floods and 
landslides (14 
dead total); 300 
people in Quito 
evacuated where 
3 die 
Ice storms in 
Tungurahua; in 
Imbabura and 
Carchi 12 die in 
landslides; floods 
claim 34 lives 
total nationwide  
Economic Data:    
National inflation 
rate2 
49.1% 56.8% 65.1% 
CPI Ambato3 8.56% 4.03% 6.48% 
CPI Riobamba3 8.29% 6.22% 4.63% 
CPI Quito3 8.35% 4.77% 6.02% 
Unemployment4 - - - 
Underemployment4 - - - 
    
Political, Economic 
and Social events 
 
 
Nationwide 
protests against 
government 
austerity 
measures 
Public health 
workers and 
teachers on strike 
   
   
  
Strike by 41,000 
public employees 
ends  
Workers at 14 of 
Ecuador’s 18 
electric 
companies strike 
in support of 3-
month old labor 
dispute at one 
plant 
   
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
  
Government/ 
CONAIE talks re 
economic, 
social, and 
political 
programs break 
off (resume in 
September) 
Pachakutik 
Party (mainly 
composed of 
indigenous 
Indians) 
makes 
important 
gains in local 
elections      
                                            
1 Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador. 
2 The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative. 
3 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are 
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month. 
4 Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year. 
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Third Quarter 2000 
 July August September 
Mt. Tungurahua 
and Baños 
 
  
  
  
Alert level 
downgraded to 
yellow for town of 
Baños only; 
shelters close  
 
Increased 
activity; ash fall in 
Ambato, Baños, 
Cotaló, Pelileo, 
Patate, etc. 
  
Other hazards1 
 
 
Earthquakes 
Guayas Province 
and Quito 
 
 
Activity at 
Guagua 
Pichincha near 
Quito. 
 
 
 
 
Economic Data:    
National inflation 
rate2 
69.1% 71.4% 77.7% 
CPI Ambato3 3.74% 1.92% 4.14% 
CPI Riobamba3 4.12% 0.6% 4.49% 
CPI Quito3 1.79% 1.35% 4.85% 
Unemployment4 - - - 
Underemployment4 - - - 
    
Political, Economic 
and Social events   
 
54-day strike by 
14,000 health 
workers ends  
Demonstrations 
against 
dollarization  
   
   
 Election issues 
U.S. dollar 
becomes official 
currency 
   
  
Debt with Club of 
Paris restructured 
  
  
  
Talks resume 
between CONAIE 
and Government 
 
Refugees from 
Colombia moving 
into northern 
Ecuador  
   
     
     
     
     
 
  
                                           
 
 
1 Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador. 
2 The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative. 
3 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are 
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month. 
4 Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year. 
 159 
Fourth Quarter 2000 
 October November December 
Tungurahua and 
Baños 
Frequent mudflows 
Low-level activity  
Low-level activity 
   
 
but ash fall in 
Ambato for 
several days 
  
   
  
Other hazards1  
  
  
  
 
Flash flood in 
Chimborazo: 30 
dead. 
Earthquake in 
Ibarra, Imbabura 
Province 
15,000 acres of crops lost 
to drought and freezes in 
Tungurahua Province. 
 
 
Economic Data:    
National inflation 
rate2 
82.5% 86.4% 91.0% 
CPI Ambato3 2.65% 1.19% 1.55% 
CPI Riobamba3 1.39% 1.91% 2.73% 
CPI Quito3 3.33% 3.26% 1.8% 
Unemployment4 - - 9.0% 
Underemployment4 - - 65.9% 
    
  Political, Economic 
and Social events   
   
   
   
   
   
Government 
removes 
subsidies on 
cooking gas and 
other essential 
items; prices rise 
dramatically 
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Remittances from 
Ecuadorians 
living abroad total 
US$1.317 billion 
in 2000 
                                            
1 Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador. 
2 The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative. 
3 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are 
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month. 
4 Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year. 
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First Quarter 2001 
 January February March 
Mudflows Tungurahua and 
Baños 
 Mudflow Cusúa 
canyon 
   
   
   
  
Other hazards1  
  
  
  
 
 
Two die at 
Guagua 
Pichincha 
Volcano in Quito. 
 
Heavy rain/floods 
throughout 
Ecuador: 39 die 
in Sucumbíos 
and Orellana; 
landslide kills 3 in 
Alausí, 
Chimborazo; in 
Azuay 8 villages 
isolated by 
landslides. 
Economic Data:    
National inflation 
rate2 
7.0% 10.1% 12.5% 
CPI Ambato3 5.4% 1.84% 2.58% 
CPI Riobamba3 6.79% 3.43% 1.12% 
CPI Quito3 6.72% 2.03% 2.58% 
Unemployment4 - - - 
Underemployment4 - - - 
    
Political, Economic 
and Social events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Protests/mass 
demonstrations; 
major roads 
closed; 
thousands march 
on Quito; 6,000 
indigenous 
people occupy a 
university; five 
die in conflicts 
A bill to partially  
privatize the 
Social Security 
system generates 
social unrest 
March through 
June 
 
President 
declares 
nationwide state-
of-emergency on 
February 2 
 
Unions and other 
groups demand 
reversal of 
December price 
hikes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gap between 
monthly income 
and expenses for 
family of 4 is 
US$89.36 (INEC) 
 
On February 7 Government 
agrees to stabilize cooking gas 
price at $1.60 and freeze some 
fuel prices through year-end 
 
 
                                            
1 Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador. 
2 The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative. 
3 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are 
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month. 
4 Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year. 
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Second Quarter 2001 
 April May June 
Mt. Tungurahua 
and Baños 
Lahars 
  
Magmatic 
intrusion in 
dome; ash fall 
and lahars 
   
   
   
Lahars. 
Heavy rains, 
evacuation along 
Pastaza, Vazcún 
and Ulba Rivers.  
Cold (80 to 100 C). 
Other hazards1   
   
   
   
   
Landslides on 
Papallacta-Baeza 
road kill at least 
39 people 
Economic Data:    
National inflation 
rate2 
14.4% 14.6% 15.2% 
CPI Ambato3 1.45% (0.06% 1.58% 
CPI Riobamba3 0.34% (1.07%) 0.49% 
CPI Quito3 0.56% (0.13%) 1.22% 
Unemployment4 - - - 
Underemployment4 - - - 
    
   Political, Economic 
and Social events    
    
Strike by 
health care 
professionals 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Potato glut results 
in price collapse; 
farmers affected 
in Tungurahua 
and Chimborazo 
Provinces 
(increased 
harvest may have 
resulted from 
suppression of 
pests by ash fall 
from Tungurahua  
 
                                            
1 Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador. 
2 The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative. 
3 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are 
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month. 
4 Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year. 
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Third Quarter 2001 
 July August September 
Tungurahua and 
Baños 
Lahars 
  
  
  
  
Major ash emissions and 
state of emergency August 
14. Baños unharmed but 
local emergency committee 
announces it is 
strengthening emergency 
plan  
Overall 
low 
levels 
of 
activity 
in Sept. 
 
Other hazards1 
 
Drought in Sierra Drought in Sierra 
 
Landslide on 
Loja- 
Zamorra road: 2 
dead, 1 missing 
 
   
  
Record snowfall 
in northern Sierra 
leaves 200 
stranded  
Economic Data:    
National inflation 
rate2 
15.45% 15.95% 18.32% 
CPI Ambato3 (0.11%) 0.47% 2.66% 
CPI Riobamba3 1.24% 1.55% 4.55% 
CPI Quito3 0.14% 0.61% 3.38% 
Unemployment4 - - - 
Underemployment4 - - - 
    
 Political, Economic 
and Social events  
  
VAT decreased 
from 14% to 12% 
effective 
September 1 
  
Approximately 4 
million 
Ecuadorians 
emigrated since 
1990  
    
   
   
   
   
   
  
Cost of basic 
food basket is 
$292.97; average 
income for family 
of 4 is $200.76 
 
  
  
  
Increase in food costs in central 
Ecuador blamed on strike by 
banana workers and Tungurahua 
 
  
                                           
 
 
1 Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador. 
2 The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative. 
3 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are 
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month. 
4 Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year. 
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Fourth Quarter 2001 
 October November December 
Mt. Tungurahua 
and Baños 
  Lahars 
   
   
  
Pondoa residents 
petition authorities 
for evacuation 
road 
 
Other hazards1 Drought in Sierra  
  
  
  
 
Low water-level 
of Pastaza 
threatens 
Agoyan 
generating 
capacity 
August-November 
was driest period 
in the Sierra in 20 
years. Flood kills 
child in Ambato  
Economic Data:    
National inflation 
rate2 
19.71% 21.62% 22.44% 
CPI Ambato3 1.28% 1.35% 0.27% 
CPI Riobamba3 1.72% 1.56% (0.86%) 
CPI Quito3 1.88% 2.24% 1.00% 
Unemployment4 - - 10.9% 
Underemployment4 - - 57.3% 
Political, Economic 
and Social events 
   
 
Privatization of electric 
utilities postponed until 
January 2002    
    
 
New Social Security 
Law enacted    
     
 
Strike by health 
workers     
 
 
 
 
 
CONAIE, labor 
unions and other 
groups threaten 
mobilizations in 
opposition to 
privatization of 
electric utilities 
 
Price of 
Ecuadorian 
crude dips to $17 
per barrel 
 
Remittances in 
2001 from 
Ecuadorians 
abroad total 
US$1.415 billion  
Sources: Websites of El Comercio, El Universo, La Hora and Hoy Digital 
(November 1999-December 2001); INEC Statistical database; Ecuador Debate 
Vols. 46-55 (1999-2001); Unda, M. (2001); Instituto Geofísico website (February 
1999-December 2001); GVP reports (1999-2001); IFRC reports (1999-2001); 
Defensa Civil (2001).   
 
1 Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador. 
2 The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative. 
3 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are 
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month. 
4 Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Translation of Questions from 2000 Questionnaire 
 
(Questions asked of all respondents) 
 
1. Are you worried about the volcano?   F 1 = Not worried 
        F 2 = A little worried 
        F 3 = Somewhat 
        F 4 = Very worried 
        F 5 = Extremely worried 
 
2. Did you have to evacuate?    F Yes 
If not evacuated, skip to question #17   F No 
 
3. When were you evacuated? Indicate month/year. ________________ 
 
4. Did you leave voluntarily?    F Yes 
        F No 
5. Where did you go? 
(Probes: Shelter first?  Then relocated to other place?  Friends?  Family? 
 
 
6. Did anyone help you to evacuate?   F Yes 
F No 
 
7. If yes, who helped you?     F Family member 
        F Friend 
        F Govt. agency 
        F NGO 
        F Other, please specify: 
        _______________ 
        _______________ 
        _______________ 
        F No help 
 
8. Who came with you when you evacuated? 
9. Did all of your children accompany you when you evacuated? 
F Yes 
F No 
 
10. At the time, did you think it was necessary to evacuate?  
F Yes 
F No 
 
 
 xi 
Appendix I (Continued) 
 
 (Questions asked in Baños only – early returns) 
 
11. For how long were you evacuated?   F 1 = Less than a week 
        F 2 = 1 to 2 weeks 
        F 3 = 3 weeks to 1 month 
        F 4 = 1 to 3 months 
        F 5 = 3 to 6 months 
 
12. Why did you come back? 
 
 
 
********************************************************************************************
**************************************** 
QUESTIONS FOR QUIMIAG & COLEGIO BOLIVAR (NON-RETURNED 
EVACUEES) 
 
 
13. Do you want to return to your home?    F Yes F No 
  
14. Why haven’t you returned? 
 
 
************************************************************************ 
 
15. Why did you decide to evacuate? 
(Probe: Who made the decision?  Was the decision discussed within the family?) 
 
16. Now, do you think that the volcano is a risk to you and your family? 
F 1 = No risk 
        F 2 = Little risk 
        F 3 = Moderate risk 
        F 4 = High risk 
        F 5 = Very high risk 
 
QUESTIONS FOR NON-EVACUEES 
17. Do you think that the volcano is a risk to you and your family? 
F 1 = No risk 
        F 2 = Little risk 
        F 3 = Moderate risk 
        F 4 = High risk 
        F 5 = Very high risk 
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18. Do you think it (the volcano) posed a risk to those who evacuated? F Yes 
                      F No 
 
***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   *** 
INDICES OF PROBLEMS – A lot of things have been going on in Ecuador in the 
past year.  I’d like to know what kinds of things have affected you and your 
family, in particular. 
 
48) Has your family faced any crises in the last 6-8 months? F Yes 
F No 
   
49) If yes, what are they? 
(Probes: Loss of crops, loss of livestock, loss of home, loss of bank funds, 
evacuation, lack of money, devaluation, coup d’etat, volcano, flooding, family 
illness, family death, other) 
   
50) Please rank responses from worst to least bad: 
  (Probe: Which was the worst?) 
 
***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   *** 
 
52) What has the government done to help people affected by the volcano? 
 
53) What have non-governmental agencies done to help people affected by 
the volcano? 
 
54) What do you think the government should do to help people affected by 
the volcano? 
 
 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
Translation of Questions from 2001 Questionnaire 
 
(Questions asked of all respondents) 
 
1. Are you worried about the volcano?   F 1 = Not worried 
        F 2 = A little worried 
        F 3 = Somewhat 
        F 4 = Very worried 
        F 5 = Extremely worried 
 
2. Did you have to evacuate?    F Yes 
If not evacuated, skip to question #17   F No 
 
3. Where did you go: 
 
4. When did you return home?    ________________ 
 
5. Why did you return?     ________________ 
 
    (Probe: Did you return voluntarily?)   F Yes 
        F No 
 
6. Did anyone help you return?    F Yes 
        F No 
 
7. If yes, who helped you?      F 1 = Family member(s) 
        F 2 = Friend(s) 
        F 3 = Military 
        F 4 = Government agency 
        F 5 = NGO 
                  F 6 = Other 
        _________________ 
  
        F 7 = No one 
 
8. How did they help you? 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Who came with you when you returned? 
(Probe: Is anyone in your family still evacuated?) 
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10. Do you think the volcano is currently a risk to you and your family? 
F 1 = No risk 
        F 2 = Little risk 
        F 3 = Moderate risk 
        F 4 = High risk 
        F 5 = Very high risk 
(Questions for non-evacuees – Control group) 
 
11. Do you think the volcano is a risk to you and your family? 
    
 F 1 = No risk 
        F 2 = Little risk 
        F 3 = Moderate risk 
        F 4 = High risk 
        F 5 = Very high risk 
 
12. Do you think the volcano was a danger to those who evacuated? 
        F Yes 
        F No 
 
***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   *** 
 
48.  Since you returned, have you had any problems, such as 
    
 F 1 = Loss of crops 
        F 2 = Loss of cattle 
        F 3 = Loss of home 
        F 4 = Financial loss 
        F 5 = Lack of money 
F 6 = Devaluation 
        F 7 = Volcano 
        F 8 = Flooding 
        F 9 = Family illness 
        F 10 = Death in family 
F 11= Family separation 
        F 12= Violence 
        F 13 = Other 
(please identify other                             
crises) 
        ___________________ 
        ___________________ 
        ___________________ 
        ___________________ 
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49.  Please rank the three worst problems, starting with the worst: 
 
 
 
 
 
***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   *** 
 
 
67.  What has the government done to assist people affected by the volcano? 
 
 
***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   *** 
 
70.  What do you think the government should do to help people affected by the 
volcano? 
 
 
 
APPENDIX III 
 
Legends about the Virgin and Natural Hazards 
 
The settlement established by the Dominicans in 1553 experienced the 
benefits and the dangers of its location at the base of an active volcano.  Hazard 
and religion became interwoven in a number of myths and legends about the 
miraculous powers of patron saint of Baños, the Virgen del Rosario de Agua 
Santa (Our Lady of the Rosary of Holy Water).    Four are outlined here: 
The Virgin of Baños had just been taken from her shrine for a street 
procession in February 1773 when Tungurahua began to erupt.  According to a 
local report the statue raised an arm as if blessing the volcano which immediately 
ceased all activity and no-one was harmed (Martínez, 1932 in Apolo, 2000; 
Guevara, 1995).  To this day the February miracle is remembered in Baños 
during the Carnival festivities that precede Lent.  It attracts thousands of pilgrims 
from surrounding communities and from other parts of Ecuador. 
Later that same year, during an April eruption, some residents sought 
refuge in the church where the statue was housed.  The Virgin protected them 
and they were the only people saved (Martínez, 1932 in Apolo, 2000). 
The Virgin’s divine intercession also helped some townspeople survive the 
cataclysmic earthquake of 1797.  These people too escaped by taking refuge in 
the church dedicated to the Virgin (Reyes, 2000). 
In 1886, eruptions of Mount Tungurahua blocked the flow of the famous 
thermal waters.  The Virgin restored the flow when the local priest, “…as though 
inspired by the Mother of God took one of the Virgin’s hands and placed it on the  
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spot where the spring used to flow. With great joy those present saw the lost 
spring flow forth immediately” (Martínez, 1932, in Apolo, 2000 198-99; 
researcher’s translation). 
 
APPENDIX IV 
 
     Copyright Releases
 
Authorization from Diario El Universo, Ecuador, to use copyrighted 
photograph 
 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Natalia Tamayo" <ntamayo@eluniverso.com> 
To: <lane2563@bellsouth.net> 
Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 11:55 AM 
Subject: Respuesta Diario El Universo 
 
Estimada señorita, 
 
La Gerencia de Redacción de Diario El Universo autoriza la reproducción, con 
fines académicos, de la foto solicitada por usted y que fue publicada el 17 
de agosto del 2001. Favor registrar crédito de autor: Diario El Universo. 
 
Saludos cordiales 
 
Eco. Nathalia Tamayo 
Jefe de Documentación 
Diario El Universo 
Tel: 593-4-249 0000 Ext. 286 
Fax: 593-4-249 2925 
 
La noticia del día léala en www.eluniverso.com 
 
 
Translation 
 
Dear Miss [Lane], 
The Editors of Diario El Universo authorize the reproduction, for academic 
purpose, of the photo  you requested and which was published on August 17, 
2001.  Please give credit to the author: Diario El Universo. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Economist Nathalia Tamayo 
Head of Documentation 
Diario El Universo 
Tel: 593-4-249 0000 Ext. 286 
Fax: 593-4-249 2925 
 
Read the daily news at www.eluniverso.com 
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Request to Diario El Universo, Ecuador, for permission to use copyrighted 
photograph 
 
-----Mensaje original----- 
De: Lucille Lane [mailto:lane2563@bellsouth.net] 
Enviado el: Martes, 01 de Octubre de 2002 07:30 a.m. 
Para: Jefatura de Redaccion 
Asunto: Solicitud para reproducción de una foto publicada en El Universo 
 
Estimados Señores: 
 
Esta es para solicitar permiso para usar una foto que se publicó en la 
edición electrónica de su diario del 17 de agosto de 2001. 
 
Soy estudiante de geografía en la Universidad de la Florida del Sur en 
Tampa, estado de la Florida, EEUU, y estoy preparando una tesis de maestría 
que tiene a ver con las erupciones del Volcán Tungurahua.   Quisiera mostrar 
algunos de los efectos de la caída de ceniza pero durante las visitas que 
hice a la zona  el volcán no estaba emitiendo ceniza, entonces no pude tomar 
fotos adecuadas. 
 
La foto publicada el 17 de agosto del 2001 se tomó en San José de Sabañag y 
muestra a un campesino sacudiendo las ramas de un árbol que esta cubierto de 
ceniza.  Adjunto una copia del mismo sacada de la versión electrónica de ese 
diario. 
 
La finalidad del uso es puramente académico y sin fines de lucro y la foto 
se utilizaría solamente en el documento de tesis.  Si se permite ocupar esta 
foto, se haría con la siguiente anotación o cualquier anotación que ustedes 
me indiquen: "© El Universo.  Reprinted by permission."  (reproducido con el 
permiso de El Universo.) 
 
En la espera de sus noticias me despido, cordialmente, 
 
Lucille Lane 
Correo electrónico:  lane2563@bellsouth.net 
Dirección:   31195 Park Ridge Dr., 
   Brooksville, FL 34602 
   USA 
   Tel.: (352) 540-9746 
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Translation 
 
Subject: Request to reproduce a photograph published in El Universo 
 
Gentlemen: 
 
This is to request your authorization to use a photograph that was published 
in the August 17, 2001, electronic version of your newspaper. 
 
I am a student of Geography at the University of South Florida in Tampa, 
State of Florida, USA, and I am preparing a master's thesis that has to do 
with the eruptions of Tungurahua Volcano.  I would like to show some of the 
effects of the ash fall however, during the visits I have made to the 
affected zone, the volcano was not emitting ash, and therefore I was unable 
to take appropriate photographs. 
 
The photo taken on August 17, 2001, was taken in San José de Sabañag and it 
shows a farm worker shaking the limbs of a tree that is covered in ash. 
Attached is a copy of same taken from the electronic version of your 
newspaper. 
 
The use is strictly for academic purposes and not for profit, and the 
photograph would be used only in the thesis document.  If you authorize the 
use of this photograph, it would be done with the following notation or any 
notation that you might request:  "© El Universo.  Reprinted by permission." 
 
Awaiting your advice, I am, Sincerely, 
 
Lucille Lane 
email:  lane2563@bellsouth.net 
Address:   31195 Park Ridge Dr., 
                Brooksville, FL 34602 
               USA 
                Tel.: (352) 540-9746 
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Authorization from Dario La Hora - Ambato, Ecuador, to use copyrighted 
photograph 
 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "La Hora ambato" <lahora@andinanet.net> 
To: "Lucille Lane" <lane2563@bellsouth.net> 
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2002 1:36 PM 
Subject: permiso aprobado 
 
 
Querida Lucille 
Nuestra redacción y en particular el editor de Diario La Hora Ambato, le dan 
el permiso para que usted ocupe esa foto con la inclusión del texto que 
sugiere: Diario LA HORA reproducido con autorización. 
Además agradecemos que nos siga en la transmisión de las noticias de nuestra 
ciudad. Suerte en la elaboración de su tesis. 
 
Atentamente 
Diario La Hora 
 
 
  
 
Translation 
 
Dear Lucille 
 
The editorial department, and in particular, the editor of Diario La Hora 
Ambato, authorize you to use that photo, with the inclusion of the text you 
propose, i.e. Diario La Hora Reproduced with permission. 
Additionally, we thank you for following the news in our city.  Best wishes 
in the preparation of your thesis. 
 
Sincerely, 
Newspaper La Hora 
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Request to Diario La Hora – Ambato, Ecuador, to use copyrighted 
photograph 
 
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Lucille Lane" <lane2563@bellsouth.net> 
To: <ambato@lahora.com.ec> 
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2002 9:52 AM 
Subject: Solicitud para ocupar foto publicada en La Hora (Ambato) 
 
 
> A la Gerencia de Redacción del Diario La Hora 
> 
> Estimados Señores 
> 
> Esta comunicación es para obtener su permiso para usar una foto que se 
> publicó en el Diario La Hora (Ambato) el dia 18 de octubre de 2001.  Se 
> adjunta una copia electrónica de la foto que lleva el título "Baños 
> Multitudinaria manifestación de fé y gratitude" y que tiene que ver con la 
> conmemoración del segundo aniversario de la evacuación Baños. 
> 
> Soy estudiante de geografía en la Universidad de la Florida del Sur en 
> Tampa, estado de la Florida, EEUU, y estoy preparando una tesis de 
maestría 
> que tiene a ver con las erupciones del volcán Tungurahua.  Una parte de la 
> tesis relata, de forma resumida y solo para información, la evacuación de 
> Baños y el retorno de los habitantes a su ciudad. 
> 
> La finalidad de uso, entonces, es puramente académico y sin fines de lucro 
y 
> la foto se utilizaría solamente en el documento de tesis.  Si se permite 
> ocuparla se lo haria con alguna anotación que Uds. indiquen, como por 
> ejemplo: © Diario La Hora - reproducido con permiso (en ingles: © Diario 
La 
> Hora.  Reproduced by permission) 
> 
> En la espera de sus noticias me despido, cordialmente, 
> 
> Lucille Lane 
> Correo electrónico: lane2563@bellsouth.net 
> Dirección: 31195 Park Ridge Dr. 
>                   Brooksville, FL 34602 
> Tel.: (USA) 352-540-9746 
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Translation 
 
To the Editorial Department Diario La Hora 
Sirs: 
This communication is to request your authorization to use a photo that was 
published in the Diario La Hora (Ambato) on October 18, 2001.  A digital 
copy of the photo is attached.  The photo is titled "Baños thousands in 
manifestation of faith and thanks" and it relates to the second anniversary 
of the evacuation of Baños. 
 
I am a student of Geography at the University of South Florida in Tampa, 
State of Florida, USA, and I am preparing a master's thesis that has to do 
with the eruptions of Tungurahua Volcano.  Part of the thesis relates, in a 
summary manner, and for background information, the evacuation of Baños and 
the return of the inhabitants to their town. 
 
The purpose of use, therefore, is strictly academic, and not for profit, and 
the photograph would be used only in the thesis.  If you consent to its use 
for this purpose, it would be done with any notation that you suggest, for 
example:  © Diario La Hora.  Reproduced by permission. 
 
Awaiting your advice, I am, sincerely, 
Lucille Lane 
email: lane2563@bellsouth.net 
Address: 31195 Park Ridge Dr. 
              Brooksville, FL 34602 
Tel.: USA (352-540-9746 
 
 
 
